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ABSTRACT 
One of the primary images for ecclesiology is Paul’s “body of Christ” metaphor. 
The contemporary church, as the body of Christ, sometimes struggles with its sense of 
identity and mission as well as with its relationship with other social bodies in the world. 
This study examines the intersection of ecclesiology, disability, embodiment, and liturgy 
and offers possibilities for developing a general ecclesiology of disability that is 
grounded in human embodiment and embodied practices. The interconnections between 
disability theory and theology are explored, followed by an examination of the “body of 
Christ” metaphor, starting with Paul’s context and continuing with an analysis of how the 
metaphor functions linguistically. A review of how body theology developed and 
functioned in church history is presented, and then consideration is given to how the 
work of theologians such as Louis-Marie Chauvet and Edward Schillebeeckx is grounded 
in a theology of the body. A brief history of ecclesiology is followed by an assessment of 
the embodied ecclesiology of Chauvet, Schillebeeckx, John Howard Yoder, and Stanley 
Hauerwas. The relationship among embodiment, liturgy, and Christian formation is 
probed using the work of Don Saliers, Gordon Lathrop, and James K. A. Smith. Finally, 
x 
principles are proposed that answer the question, “What would it mean for the church to 
be a disabled body?” The intention of these principles is to help churches dis-able those 
beliefs and practices that keep them from being the message of the kingdom of God and 
from embodying the new social reality of the gospel that challenges the values of other 
social bodies in the world.  
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM WITH THE BODY OF CHRIST 
 
The question for me is how does the description of “the body of Christ” help 
Christians better understand what we must be in order to face the challenges of 
being Church. 
—Stanley Hauerwas1 
 
Statement and Significance of the Problem 
On Monday, March 12, 1990, more than 1,000 disability rights activists and 
people with disabilities gathered in front of the U.S. Capitol Building to demand the 
passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which would give equal rights to 
people with disabilities. The ADA had been passed by the Senate a year earlier, but was 
stalled in the House of Representatives. After a series of speeches, some 60 people cast 
aside their wheelchairs, crutches, and other assistive mobility devices and began crawling 
up the stone steps leading to the Capitol while chanting “ADA Now!” Other activists 
remained at the bottom of the stairs holding signs and giving encouragement to these 
“Capitol Crawlers.” As one crawler inched her way to the top, she said, “I want my civil 
rights. I want to be treated like a human being.”2 Four months later, the ADA was signed 
into law, marking a successful culmination to many years’ worth of activism that 
                                                 
1
 Stanley Hauerwas, In Good Company: the Church as Polis (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1995), 22. 
2
 “‘Capitol Crawl”–Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.” History by Zim, accessed February 
20, 2015, http://www.historybyzim.com/2013/09/capitol-crawl-americans-with-disabilities-act-of-1990/. 
2 
addressed the gaps in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which did not recognize the rights of 
or offer protections for people with disabilities.  
Since the 1990s, people with disabilities are more visible, more active, and more 
integrated into American society than ever before. But while much has been done to 
improve accessibility in public spaces—such as providing curb cuts, ramps, Braille signs, 
assistive listening systems, etc.—people with disabilities are still oppressed and 
ostracized. Disability carries a stigma and people with disabilities are often not 
considered legitimate or useful in a society that values able-bodiedness, independence, 
and productivity. This is true even in the church, where the contribution of people with 
disabilities is often limited to helping the church become more aware of its need to be 
physically accessible.
3
 But the concept of disability has much more to offer the church 
than supporting the decision to add a ramp or accessible bathroom; it can also help 
expand the church’s self-understanding of its identity, nature, and mission. 
One of the most fundamental and familiar images of ecclesiology is the body of 
Christ.
4
 According to this image of the church, which is prominent in the letters of the 
apostle Paul, individual members are bound together in love and mutual care, and every 
member is considered indispensable to the body as a whole. It is in and through this body 
that the church fulfills its call to ministry, mission, and witness. The church is, in a very 
                                                 
3
 Throughout this project, I use “church” to denote church in both its general and localized forms. 
I will use “Church” only when it is part of the name of a particular church community or denomination. 
And in order to emphasize the ecumenical aspects of this work, I will use “eucharist” except when it is 
capitalized in a direct quote.  
4
 See Romans 12:4-8 and 1 Corinthians 12:13-27. All scripture citations are from the New Revised 
Standard Version (NRSV) unless otherwise noted. 
3 
tangible sense, embodied: it is a social body that consists of individual human bodies. 
People experience God not only as individuals through their human bodies, but also (and 
perhaps more importantly) as a communal body that is the body of Christ.  
But what does it mean for the church to be the body of Christ? What was Paul’s 
intention when he used that phrase in his epistles to different early church communities? 
What kind of “body” is the church called to become and proclaim as part of its mission? 
According to Paul Minear, the answer to these questions is neither readily apparent nor 
without controversy. Not only is Paul’s usage of the phrase “extremely flexible and 
elastic,” but the tensions and disagreements within the worldwide church make any 
attempt to find “ecumenical consensus” difficult, at best.5 
Forty years ago, Jürgen Moltmann noted that behind “the struggle for a credible 
church and a more human society” and “the political and social crisis of the church in 
modern society,” there stands an “identity-crisis of Christianity.”6 This identity crisis is 
evident in the disunity of the church. Contrary to Paul’s vision, the body of Christ that is 
the church is anything but united in its doctrine, theology, structure, or understanding of 
its mission. In addition, there are varieties of interpretations of the nature and purpose of 
the church as it is constituted as the body of Christ. Some local congregations view their 
particular manifestation of the body as an insular community that stands against the wider 
culture and that is charged with helping people save their souls or get to heaven. Other 
congregations understand that their identity as the body of Christ means continuing the 
                                                 
5
 Paul Minear, Images of the Church in the New Testament (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1960), 173. 
6
 Jürgen Moltmann, “Crucified God,” Theology Today 31, no. 1 (April 1, 1974): 6. 
4 
physical ministry of Christ, akin to Teresa of Avila’s assertion that “Christ has no body 
now on earth but yours.” The state of disunity in the modern church, which is evident in 
the wide variety of doctrines, liturgical practices, and concepts of purpose and mission 
across the Christian spectrum, is the result of diverse histories and contexts, but it is also 
a problem of theology, ecclesiology, and even liturgy.  
That the church is in crisis is evident in both its internal struggles and its 
sometimes antagonistic, sometimes mutually reciprocal relationship with the larger 
society, especially in the United States, where this project will focus. In addition to the 
problems of defining itself according to the body of Christ image, the church struggles 
with how it should relate to other social bodies. The major mainline Protestant 
denominations and the Roman Catholic Church continue to wrestle not only with internal 
issues of doctrine and praxis, but also with questions about their ministry, mission and 
identity in relation to the wider society. As noted above, some churches adopt a mentality 
of self-sufficiency in which the church members are expected to isolate themselves as 
much as possible from the surrounding society (and its inherent evils). Other churches 
assume an autocratic position of self-proclaimed privilege and power in relation to 
society and attempt to use that power to influence the policies, practices, and beliefs of 
the society at large (as can be seen in the annual “war on Christmas,” in which certain 
Christians try to force the United States as a whole to celebrate a religious rather than a 
secular version of Christmas).  
5 
Does the church exist primarily for the benefit of its members, or does it exist for 
the sake of the world? Which “model” of church-world relations is the right one?7 The 
New Testament does not offer one clear vision of how the church should be structured or 
how it should function. In fact, Paul Minear identifies some 96 images of the church 
found in scripture, including the people of God, the flock of God, the vine, the bride of 
Christ, and the body of Christ.
8
 Although not all of these images can operate as 
representations of the church, there is still enough variety in the New Testament to cause 
confusion. And yet, these biblical images play a significant role in ecclesiology because, 
as Avery Dulles notes, they have a tendency to become “self-fulfilling: they make the 
church become what they suggest the church is.”9 Because of the nature and focus of this 
project, the body of Christ model is the most appropriate model to consider because it 
lends itself to the discussion of embodiment and disability in a way that the other models 
cannot. 
Paul Minear reminds us that the scriptural images of the church “did not grow out 
of a basically sociological, psychological, or moral comparison-and-contrast between the 
church and its surrounding societies.”10 Rather, the images evolved from the movement 
that started with Jesus’ proclamation of the coming kingdom of God. In other words, 
                                                 
7
 Avery Dulles, Models of the Church (New York: Doubleday, 1987), identifies six models: 
church as institution, community (body of Christ), sacrament, herald, servant, and school of discipleship. 
Although Dulles does not offer these specifically as models for the church-world relationship, each model 
carries with it inherent suppositions and possibilities about that relationship. 
8
 Minear, Images of the Church. 
9
 Dulles, Models of the Church, 13. 
10
 Minear, Images of the Church, 265-66. 
6 
Christology and eschatology led to ecclesiology. Because the church is founded on Jesus’ 
proclamation of the kingdom, it is itself a “polis,” as Stanley Hauerwas notes, but 
unfortunately, “the church is constantly tempted to imitate the false politics of the world 
for its own life.”11 
All of this leads back to one of the primary questions for this study: what does the 
image of the body of Christ mean for the church and what does it mean for the 
relationship between the church and the world? Although scholars disagree whether 
Paul’s language should be taken literally (“the church is the glorified body of Christ”) or 
metaphorically (“the church is a body of Christ”),12 the body motif invites (or, one could 
say demands) comparison with embodied human experience—the vehicle through which 
the church is constituted. But this leads to the question of whose experience? Whose 
bodies are definitive for drawing out the connections between the church and 
embodiment, and the church and the world? The church has traditionally relied on 
normative images of embodiment that result in theological projects that do not always 
include the embodied experience of those on the margins of society. Feminist theologians 
such as Sallie McFague point out the “androcentric, hierarchical character” of 
Christianity that situates male, strong, wealthy, powerful, and healthy bodies as the norm 
                                                 
11
 Hauerwas, In Good Company, 8. 
12
 See Andrew Perriman, “‘His body, which is the church . . .’: Coming to Terms with Metaphor,” 
Evangelical Quarterly 62, no. 2 (1990): 123-42. 
7 
for creation and for the church.
13
 Rebecca S. Chopp decries “the image of the ‘perfect’ 
body that forms our distorted beliefs and practices.”14 
According to the standards of our society, which are fueled by the popular media 
and advertising industry, a body is good and acceptable if it meets certain norms of 
height, weight, appearance, and ability. Although very few bodies meet all these criteria, 
some bodies fall so far short of the cultural vision of perfection that their embodied 
experiences are considered insignificant. For instance, the bodies of women, of people 
who exist in poverty, and of persons with physical or mental deficiencies are often 
relegated to the margins of society. Their experiences of embodiment are often 
considered less important than the experiences of people who have power or status, such 
as those who are male, wealthy, or able-bodied.  
These concepts of bodily acceptability and importance have had detrimental 
effects on the church’s sense of its identity and mission. But the most harmful of these 
are not going unchallenged. Feminist theologians are critiquing the structure of 
patriarchy, liberation theologians are arguing for God’s preferential option for the poor, 
and disability theologians are pressing for the dismantling of interpretations of scripture 
that privilege able-bodied biases. All of these efforts recognize that the experience of 
marginal embodiment that diverges from societal “norms” can be beneficial to the 
church’s identity and its own ecclesiological experience of embodiment. These 
                                                 
13
 Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1987), 6. 
14
 Rebecca Chopp, foreword to The Disabled God, by Nancy Eiesland (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 
1994), 12. 
8 
contextual theologians are acknowledging how theology and ecclesiology must include 
the experiences of all bodies, not just those at a central place of power or status. 
In particular, physical disability, which has a profound impact on the experience 
of embodiment, has much to offer the discussion of ecclesiology and the church’s self-
image as the body of Christ. By considering itself through the lens of disability, the 
church can explore its relationship both to God and to other social bodies not from a 
place of power, but from a place of greater self-awareness of the significance of its own 
embodiedness. 
Most studies that relate ecclesiology to disability focus on the topic of 
inclusiveness and accessibility of the church’s buildings, ministries, and liturgy. There 
are many fine examples of theological arguments for liberating the church from physical 
structures, theological concepts, and embodied practices that exclude or oppress people 
with disabilities.
15
 However, I am not aware of any projects that employ disability as an 
integral part of an ecclesiological model rather than a tangential issue that has bearing 
only on the church’s level of accessibility and hospitality. In this project, I hope to use the 
concept and experience of disability as the basis for developing an ecclesiology that I can 
offer to the church as a new way of understanding its embodiment, its identity, and its 
relationship to the world. The main questions I hope to answer include: What would it 
                                                 
15
 These works include Eiesland, The Disabled God; Nancy L. Eiesland and Don E. Saliers, eds., 
Human Disability and the Service of God (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1998); Kathy Black, A Healing 
Homiletic: Preaching and Disability (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996); Jennie Weiss Block, Copious 
Hosting (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2002); Jennie Weiss Block and 
Thomas Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion: A Theology of Disability and Hospitality (Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: Brazos Press, 2008); and Brett Webb-Mitchell, Dancing With Disabilities: Opening the Church to 
All God’s Children (Cleveland: United Church Press, 1996). 
9 
mean for the church, as a social body and as the body of Christ, to be a dis-abled body? 
In what ways is the church already constituted as a disabled body? In what ways should 
the church understand itself as a disabled body? How might that affect the way the 
church interacts with the world? 
 People with disabilities experience the world in particular and unique ways, which 
are often influenced by the ways they are perceived by the world (through 
misunderstanding, fear, and able-bodied privilege). Marginalization, impairment of 
physical ability, the need for interdependence, and being judged according to the world’s 
norms are common experiences to most people with disabilities, and these experiences 
affect their relationships with other people (and sometimes, with God). By affirming and 
identifying with these experiences, the church can find new, creative, and faithful ways to 
function in society as what French Roman Catholic theologian Louis-Marie Chauvet (b. 
1942) describes as the church’s very essence, which is the sacramental mediation of Jesus 
Christ.
16
 
According to theologians such as Chauvet and Belgian Roman Catholic 
theologian Edward Schillebeeckx (1914-2009), embodiment is the means through which 
we receive revelation of God’s truth, and through which we are formed into the ecclesial 
                                                 
16
 Louis-Marie Chauvet, The Sacraments:The Word of God at the Mercy of the Body (Collegeville, 
Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 2001), 34.  
10 
body of Christ.
17
 The body mediates truth—of God and of the world—to the self because 
it is the locus of the sensory experiences that are necessary for any knowledge of God and 
the world.
18
 If that body is defined by the norms of society, which may not represent that 
individual’s experience of embodiment, then the individual’s conception of himself or 
herself, and of reality and truth, may well be distorted. 
This is no less true for the church as the body of Christ. Chauvet’s book The 
Sacraments is subtitled The Word of God at the Mercy of the Body. In this play on words, 
Chauvet observes that the manner in which any mediated experience of God is perceived 
by an individual is at the mercy of both that individual’s human body and the body of 
Christ that is the church. That is, the ways that a person understands his or her body, 
combined with the ways the church understands itself as a body, can have a profound 
effect on the message that is mediated to that person through both bodies. In addition, if 
God and the world are mediated to the church as a whole through a model of embodiment 
that is based on the world’s definition of what constitutes an acceptable body, the truth of 
God and the church’s understanding of its nature and mission may be distorted as well. 
One central question for this project is, “how might the concept of disability and the 
bodily experiences of people with disabilities be correctives to that distortion?” 
                                                 
17
 Louis-Marie Chauvet, The Sacraments and Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental 
Reinterpretation of Christian Existence (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1995); Edward 
Schillebeeckx, Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord, trans. John Bowden (New York: Crossroad 
Publishing, 1989) and Christ: The Sacrament of the Encounter with God, trans. John Bowden (New York: 
Sheed and Ward, 1963). Although they are both Roman Catholic theologians, their theology of 
embodiment is not specific to Roman Catholic doctrine or practice. Rather, their works address the more 
ecumenical needs of the church and its relation to embodiment, and are thus appropriate for this project. 
18
 Chauvet is not making a case for a separation of “body” and “self.” Rather, he argues that the 
body is the necessary channel of communication between the world and the individual; the body is “the 
primordial place of every symbolic joining of the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’” (Symbol and Sacrament, 147). 
11 
No discussion of ecclesiology and embodiment can be complete without also 
addressing sacramental theology. The church is constituted as a body primarily through 
the gift of grace found in the eucharist: “where the Eucharist is, there is the church with 
everything that makes it the body of Christ in [a] specific place.”19 In order to understand 
itself as the body of Christ, the church must look at the role the eucharist plays in the 
relationship between ecclesiology and embodiment, and in the relationship between 
becoming the body of Christ in the eucharist (“becoming what it receives”) and its 
mission to be the mediation of God’s presence in the world. 20  
By re-evaluating the ways in which the church is constituted as a body and by 
exploring the physical, political, and theological aspects of disability, the church can 
develop an ecclesiology of disability: a self-understanding that the church is both formed 
as a disabled body and also called to reveal itself to the world in and through this disabled 
body. That is, the church incorporates and embraces aspects of the experience of 
disability both in its nature as a social body and in its relationship with other social 
bodies. In this, the church will be challenged to recognize a new model for wholeness 
that includes the concept and experience of disability and that can prepare the church to 
proclaim better the gospel of the Christ to whose body it bears witness.  
 
                                                 
19
 J.-M.-R. Tillard, Flesh of the Church, Flesh of Christ (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 
2001), 81. This is a common understanding among many Eastern and Western Christian traditions and 
denominations. See, for instance, the statement from the World Council of Churches: “It is in the Eucharist 
that the community of God’s people is fully manifested” in Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry (Geneva: 
World Council of Churches, 1982), 14. 
20
 J.-M.-R. Tillard, Church of Churches: the Ecclesiology of Communion (Collegeville, Minn.: 
The Liturgical Press, 1992), 223. 
12 
Method of Investigation and Overview of the Project 
This is constructive, interdisciplinary project that includes several components, 
including metaphorical language, ecclesiology, theology, and liturgy, which will be 
brought into conversation in the context of disability. It will be necessary to examine 
each component and to clarify the ways in which each will be used for this project in 
order to understand how the interaction between them can inform and challenge our 
perception of the nature of the church.  
The first challenge is to define disability for the purpose of this study. Because the 
experience of disability varies widely between individuals, because it cannot be reduced 
to one simple definition, and because disability scholars differ in their interpretations of 
disability, a basic examination of disability is crucial in order to discover those 
definitions that will be relevant to this project, and that will help bring disability studies 
into conversation with other topics of study. In chapter 2, I first look at the different 
sociological, medical, and political models of disability and their significance for people 
with disabilities. Then I turn to the interplay between theology and disability. By 
employing some biblical exegesis, I investigate how scripture approaches the topic of 
disability, and then I examine how the church has interpreted particular passages of 
scripture. Finally, I turn to disability theology, a fairly new field of study that is grounded 
in the work of liberation theology. While liberation theology is a good starting point for 
disability theology, there are also limits in this relationship because liberation theology as 
a whole focuses on those who are poor and on dismantling systems that keep people 
living in poverty. But the experience of disability is highly variable and transcends any 
13 
one category of social-economic status (even though many people with physical 
disabilities live in poverty).
21
 The marginalization experienced by people with disabilities 
is not only economic; it is also a result of social systems that do not accommodate the 
needs and concerns of people with disabilities—situations that may be overlooked by a 
liberation theology lens. 
The next area to explore is ecclesiology, focusing on Paul’s use of the phrase the 
body of Christ, with an emphasis on trying to discover Paul’s intention in choosing that 
image to describe the church. I will consider both the significance of “the body” in the 
Stoicism of Paul’s cultural background and also the cultures of the Roman and Corinthian 
churches to which he was writing.
22
 This will be followed by a brief survey of how the 
“body of Christ” has been understood at different points in church history. Then I will 
look at how metaphorical language operates in general and how the “body of Christ” in 
particular functions both linguistically and metaphorically in its ecclesiological setting, 
including what it both reveals and conceals as a metaphor. 
In order to understand the significance of embodiment for the church, I explore 
body theology in Chapter 4, first by tracing the evolution of ideas about the human body, 
and especially the relationship between the body and the soul, through the trajectory of 
ancient Judaism, early Christianity (including the influence of Platonic philosophy), the 
                                                 
21
 According to the 2010 U.S. Census, approximately 46.5 percent of people aged 15 to 64 with 
disabilities lived in poverty while 14.3 percent of people with no disability lived in poverty. Among those 
aged 65 and older, 18.4 percent of those with disabilities lived in poverty compared with 5.0 percent for 
those with no disability. See Matthew W. Brault, Americans with Disabilities: 2010, Household Economic 
Status (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2012), 12, available online at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p70-131.pdf. 
22
 1 Corinthians 12:12-27. 
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later church, and the contemporary church. Then I turn to the works of Chauvet and 
Schillebeeckx, whose projects involve a holistic view of the body and its relationship to 
the church. 
In Chapter 5, I take up ecclesiology and consider the relationship between the 
church and bodies. Because one of the primary scriptural images of the church is the 
embodiment of the risen Christ in this world, I will focus on how the church is an 
anamnetic, embodied performance of Christ’s life and ministry.23 That is, how the 
church’s outward and visible nature is defined by praxis that is empowered by the Holy 
Spirit and informed by the scriptural witness to Christ’s own embodied practices. After 
examining briefly the development of the relationship between the church and human 
embodiment from the early church period through the Second Vatican Council in 1962-
65, I explore the development of a specifically and self-consciously embodied 
ecclesiology through the works of Chauvet; Schillebeeckx; John Howard Yoder (1927-
1997), an American Mennonite who wrote from an Anabaptist perspective; and Stanley 
Hauerwas (b. 1940), an American United Methodist theologian. 
In chapter 6, I look at liturgy and sacramental theology, and specifically to the 
pedagogical function of liturgy (and the sacraments) as ritual enactments of the scriptural 
narrative that is the basis for the church’s identity. The works of Catherine Bell and 
Richard D. McCall inform discussion of liturgy as ritual performance. In particular, 
McCall’s ideas that liturgy, as seen through the lens of performance theory, denotes a 
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“model for approaching all . . . reality which can only be . . . enacted” will be a starting 
point to discuss how liturgy is formational.
24
 The function of the liturgy on bodies will be 
explored through the works of E. Byron Anderson, an American United Methodist 
liturgical scholar who argues that liturgy is primarily catechetical; Don Saliers (b. 1937), 
an American United Methodist scholar who understands Christian worship as the 
ongoing prayer and worship of Jesus as enacted through his body—the Church—for the 
sake of and on behalf of the whole world; Gordon Lathrop, an American Lutheran 
professor of liturgy who perceives the potential for Christian liturgy to orient worshipers 
in the world; and James K. A. Smith (b. 1970), a Canadian-American philosopher of the 
Reformed tradition who builds on McCall’s ideas by interpreting Christian worship as an 
embodied act that trains our bodies to perform in the course of our daily lives the very 
practices we enact in the liturgy. The significance of sacramental theology and 
embodiment will invite Chauvet into the discussion because he describes liturgical 
practices, and especially the sacraments, as those embodied acts that form us into the 
“symbolic order” of the church, of which the body is the necessary mediation of God’s 
truth and presence for humans.  
In chapter 7, I bring disability studies and theology, body theology, ecclesiology, 
and liturgical theology into conversation to begin constructing a general ecclesiology 
from the perspectives of disability and embodiment that will address the sociological and 
identity problems of the modern institutional church. That is, in response to the question, 
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“What would it mean for the church, as the body of Christ, to be a disabled body?” I 
formulate an ecclesiology of disability that can help the church understand itself as a 
communal body that is called, by its nature as the body of Christ, to mediate itself and 
God to the world through the experience of disability. Finally, I explore the significance 
and possible consequences of this model of ecclesiological embodiment for the church 
and its relationship to society, its identity, and its mission. 
 
Sources and Limitations 
The limitations of this project include the limitations that are inherent in the 
different fields that will be covered. The area of disability studies presents limits not only 
because there are many different definitions and kinds of disability, but by the fact that 
the experience of disability is subjective and varies from person to person. Because the 
experience of physical disability in general differs greatly from that of mental or 
developmental disabilities, this dissertation will focus primarily on the former. Although 
the experience of mental or developmental disabilities could contribute to a fuller 
understanding of the body of Christ, this study would be too broad if it were to include 
both physical and mental disability. Mental or developmental disability is primarily a 
matter of dysfunction of the mind or cognitive processes and of the relationship between 
cognitive ability and embodiment, issues that are beyond the scope of this project. 
Because the primary focus is embodiment, physical disability is a good starting point and 
an appropriate lens through which to construct an introductory ecclesiology of disability. 
However, the inclusion of mental and developmental disabilities in future work on this 
17 
topic would be beneficial because the embodied aspects of developmental and mental 
disabilities could be explored as well as how the experiences of those types of disability 
mediate the reality and presence of God. 
Likewise, the areas of ecclesiology and sacramental theology are so broad that I 
will need to limit my exploration of these areas to those works that deal with the main 
assumptions I make about these topics, which include the significance of embodiment 
and of defining the church as a set of embodied practices, rather than as an institution that 
imparts the truth of the Christian faith through its doctrine and liturgy. That is, I will need 
to narrow my focus on ecclesiology and on the nature of the sacraments to those aspects 
that highlight the significance of the human body in faith formation and the experience of 
the gathered community. In doing so, I will be focusing on the “outward and visible sign” 
aspect of the sacraments, perhaps at the expense of the correlating concept of the “inward 
and spiritual grace” of God’s presence that is mediated to individuals through the 
sacraments in the church.
25
 My purpose is not to offer a theology of the sacraments per se 
or a doctrinal ecclesiology. Although the sacramental theology in which I ground this 
project may be incompatible with that of some traditions, my intent is to emphasize an 
embodied theological approach to ecclesiology that can transcend some of the differences 
in theological and doctrinal principles among various church traditions. 
In addition, I will need to focus mainly on the church’s sacramental practice of 
the eucharist because while baptism is a one-time entrance into the body of Christ, the 
                                                 
25
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eucharist is the ongoing embodied action that re-members the body and, therefore, has 
the most power to shape both human bodies and the ecclesial body. The idea that the 
church is constituted as the body of Christ through liturgy and the eucharist poses a 
challenge because most Protestants and some Roman Catholics do not have a sacramental 
understanding of the church. Thus, I will need to interpret the sacramental ecclesiology of 
some of my sources (particularly Chauvet, Schillebeeckx, and Orthodox priest and 
scholar Alexander Schmemann) in a way that can provide a more universal and 
accessible understanding of the nature of the church. 
Similarly, I engage the relationships between the church and world without fully 
developing the global complexities that are shaped by culture and tradition. These 
variations are important, but this work is concerned with a more generalized picture of 
the church-world relationship, even while being self-consciously focused on the North 
American context and, even more particularly, on a United States Protestant location. 
As a life-long United Methodist, I am limited somewhat by my own experience of 
church and its liturgical and sacramental practices. However, I took several courses 
during my graduate studies at Boston College with Jesuit professors who helped me 
realize that there is more in common between my tradition and Roman Catholicism than I 
had previously believed. In particular, the problems of ecclesiology rise above any 
particular theologies. I learned that “their” problems (of debates about theology or 
doctrine, or of the behavior of priests, for example), are also “my” problems because 
what affects one part of the body of Christ affects all in some way. 
19 
This project includes the works of Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox 
authors who were chosen not for their specific denominational theology or ecclesiology, 
but for their emphasis on embodiment and on the integral relationship between human 
bodies and the church as the body of Christ. Therefore, my conclusions will be offered 
not as a universal ecclesiological standard, but as a general ecclesiological reflection—a 
tool by which individual congregations or church traditions can examine their own sense 
of what it means to be the body of Christ. I hope that churches will take what is offered 
here and apply it more specifically to their own tradition, theology, and practices. 
Finally, I am limited by my own experience with disability, and my own 
interpretations of how my disability (hearing loss) affects my relationship with God, with 
others, and with the church. I am aware that it is difficult, if not impossible, for someone 
who does not experience disability to speak knowledgeably about disability. But neither 
is it easier (or prudent) for one individual with a disability to speak on behalf of another 
person with either a similar or different kind of disability. Even within the narrower 
confines of one disability, such as hearing loss, there is a wide variety of experience. I am 
mindful, therefore, of Susan Wendell’s caveat about “the necessity of recognizing that the 
claim to speak for oneself does not relieve one of the responsibility not to overgeneralize 
on the basis of one’s experience and not to construe issues narrowly in the interest of 
promoting one’s own viewpoint.”26 I also humbly acknowledge the accommodations and 
support I have received throughout my life—and particularly during my education—that 
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 Susan Wendell, The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability (New 
York: Routledge, 1996), 5. The idea is Wendell’s, but the quote is from Mairian Corker, “Sensing 
Disability,” Hypatia 16, no. 4, Feminism and Disability, Part 1 (Fall, 2001): 38. 
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have enabled me to work, to study, and to function adequately in the hearing world. Even 
as a person with a disability, I still exist in a place of privilege that leads to biases of 
which I may not be aware. In the course of writing this dissertation, some of those biases 
have been uncovered, but I am sure others remain. 
 
21 
CHAPTER 2 
DISABILITY THEORIES AND THEOLOGY 
 
Historically, rather than naming ourselves, the disabled have been named by 
medical and scientific professionals or by people who denied our full personhood. 
So naming the experience of disability is no mere exercise in semantics or a 
matter of personal preference, it is part of the political work of empowerment. 
—Nancy Eiesland1 
 
In his exploration of the relationship between human embodiment and human 
comprehension of the world, James K. A. Smith describes the necessity of a subconscious 
relationship with one’s body: “the successful functioning of our bodies requires that our 
bodily organs and operations recede and even hide in our acts of experiencing things in 
the world.”2 Mark Johnson notes that “we don’t have to work to ignore the working of 
our bodies. On the contrary, our bodies hide themselves from us in their very acts of 
making meaning and experience possible.”3 If correctly or normatively perceiving the 
world around us depends on this “hiddenness” of our bodies from conscious thought, then 
the experience of physical disability—in which the body and its impairment are often 
painfully and ubiquitously obvious—raises serious questions and concerns for society 
and for the church about the nature and significance of disability. 
                                                 
1
 Nancy Eiesland, The Disabled God: Toward a Liberatory Theology of Disability (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1994), 25-26. 
2
 James K. A. Smith, Imagining the Kingdom: How Worship Works (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker 
Academic, 2013), 49. 
3
 Mark Johnson. The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007), 4. 
22 
According to the World Health Survey, about 785 million, or 15.6 percent, of 
persons around the world over the age of 15 live with a disability.
4
 In America, almost 
one in five people, or twenty percent, have a disability.
5
 Of these 56.7 million people, 
approximately one-third have a physical disability that limits mobility, and another one-
fifth have a sensory disability affecting sight or hearing.
6
 Until the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) was passed in 1990, people with disabilities were a mostly 
invisible segment of the population. Lack of accessibility prevented many of them from 
venturing outside their homes to work, shop, or simply enjoy life. Now, with ubiquitous 
curb cuts, Braille signs, assistive listening systems, and other accessibility aids in public 
spaces, people with disabilities are more visible and more involved in public life than 
ever before. However, in spite of being more conspicuous, people with disabilities still 
face ongoing exclusion and discrimination in many areas of their lives, particularly 
because of stereotypes, societal attitudes, and misunderstanding about their needs. 
It seems that “disability” would be easy to define, or at least easy to recognize. 
For instance, the presence of a wheelchair or hearing aid or white cane or seeing-eye-dog 
seems clearly to announce the disabled condition of an individual. But disability defies 
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23 
simple definition or identification. For instance, it cannot be identified solely by visible 
accommodations such as wheelchairs or canes. A disability such as deafness or mobility 
challenges caused by a chronic health issue is invisible—that is, until some sort of social 
interaction reveals its presence. In addition, disability is not restricted to any particular 
social group but transcends barriers of class, socio-economic status, race, gender, and 
age. Although people from every socio-economic class can experience disability, the vast 
majority of people with disabilities live in poverty because of an inability to work or to 
find work that can accommodate their needs. 
Finally, the level of disability can vary widely, even among people who have the 
same kind of bodily impairment. For instance, blindness is not defined simply by a 
complete loss of vision; a person with visual acuity of less than 20/200 in the better eye 
with the best possible correction is considered legally blind. Hearing loss ranges from a 
mild loss to complete loss of hearing function, and people can be considered deaf if they 
cannot understand spoken language even though they may have enough residual hearing 
to distinguish environmental noises.  
Because of the variety of impairments and individual experiences, disability 
cannot be defined merely according to an individual’s physiology. Rather, to define and 
24 
understand disability properly, we must consider the entire embodied experience, 
including the social, psychological, and physical experience of a person with a disability.
7
 
 
Disability Theories 
Disability, especially physical disability, has been historically viewed as an 
abnormality and a freakish aberration of the human body. People with disabilities have 
been displayed as “monsters” by medieval kings and as “curiosities” by sideshow and 
circus exploiters such as P. T. Barnum. Serious study of disability has its roots in the 
medical field. From the earliest days of medicine, disabled bodies were prominent 
specimens in clinical settings as doctors and students tried to understand the nature of 
disability in terms of an impairment to a part of the body. 
As Deborah Creamer notes, scholars often draw a distinction between having an 
impairment and being disabled.
8
 An impairment is damage or abnormality to a physical 
form or function, such as sight, hearing, or mobility, which may be congenital or may be 
the result of an accident or illness. Disability is a consequence of the impairment, and is 
the difficulty encountered by the lack of the physical function. But an impairment does 
not necessarily denote a disability For instance, people who are culturally Deaf and rely 
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on sign language consider themselves to be members of a linguistic minority, a language-
based culture of deafness in which the impairment is not seen as a disabling condition.
9
 
Of course, when people who are culturally Deaf interact with people who are hearing, the 
“disability,” as defined by hearing people, becomes obvious. 
Starting in the 1940s, disability became the focus of much research in the fields of 
philosophy, biology, anthropology, linguistic studies, and sociology, to name a few, and 
several major theories of disability have been advanced. Many of these theories are “top-
down” systems of representation in which disability is defined from the perspective of 
intellectual privilege: 
The most authoritative representations of disabled persons arise from medical 
and/or therapeutic disciplines, and the social sciences. Anyone who is to be 
regarded as “in the know” about disability must show that they know that it is a 
problem and the more details they possess of the problem, the better. This is the 
“official textbook” of disability represented in our culture.10 
Disability is often represented as a “problem,” but scholars, disability activists and people 
with disabilities have not always agreed on where to locate the source of that problem. 
Those with the resources, power, and support have been the ones who offer definitions to 
which society pays heed, whereas those with perhaps the most important information to 
offer—that of the embodied experience of disability—have not had a voice in the 
conversation until recently. 
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The earliest theories focused on biology, locating the problem of disability in the 
deviant body of the individual with a disability. This model, called the medical or 
functional-limitation model, assumes that disability is defined by a body that does not 
work properly, and, therefore, attention is focused on what a person with a disability 
cannot do.
11
 Thus, disability is primarily seen as a medical or biological condition. 
Because the disabling condition is located in an individual body, disability is defined as a 
problem of impairment—of individual bodies that do not conform to normal expectations 
of human ability. Disability, then, is reduced to the capabilities of the individual body and 
to a comparison with objective norms that are identified by the medical community and 
society in general. 
Because the definition for disability in this model is focused on the individual 
body of another person, that definition becomes objective. That is, if a person displays 
certain physical conditions, he or she is automatically considered “disabled.” Under this 
model, anyone who cannot see or hear, for instance, is disabled, regardless of her or his 
ability to function in society. In addition, this definition of disability is something that is 
imposed on people with disabilities from the medical field, and does not take into account 
the perspectives of those whose experiences are being defined. 
According to this model, disability is a defect in normal functioning, and the 
medical and psychological response is to focus on the physical functioning of the 
individual body: to “fix,” “correct,” or “cure” what can be remedied through surgery, 
drugs, or rehabilitation. The focus is always on what is “broken,” or on that which is 
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undesirable and detrimental to an individual’s bodily health, as it is defined by normative 
standards of bodily function. While for some people the loss of physical function can be 
restored through medical intervention, for others only partial restoration is possible, and 
for still others no medical technology exists as of yet to restore any kind of significant 
function. The goal of the medical model is to restore enough function through medical 
intervention or the use of assistive devices so an individual can participate in society. 
However, because some people with disabilities cannot regain or overcome the loss of a 
certain bodily function, they are considered beyond help, and are sometimes 
institutionalized or relegated to the margins of society. When a disabling condition 
cannot be fixed in some way through medical intervention, then the focus often turns to 
the individual’s psychological process of adjustment.12 Disability is thus reduced to a 
pathology—a problem that resides either in individual bodies that do not fit an objective 
set of “norms” for physical functioning or in individual psyches that cannot adapt to the 
experience of disability. 
Because the medical model draws attention to bodily function that is abnormal or 
undesirable, it adds to the experience of stigmatization for people with disabilities. The 
ways in which the model draws clear lines between what is normal or acceptable and 
what is not, and the ways in which it locates the problem in the individual with a 
disability, leads to labeling and disenfranchisement. As Deborah Creamer notes, “it is 
only a short step from saying that ‘you have a problem’ to believe that ‘you are a 
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problem.’”13 This creates a vicious cycle: because stigma is caused by the “social 
disruption” or threat to the values of society (in this case, the value of a well-functioning 
body that participates in and contributes to the well-being of society), stigmatization 
leads to awkward and strained social interactions with society, which then leads to an 
even greater experience of stigmatization for people with disabilities.
14
 It was common in 
previous generations to isolate or “hide” people with disabilities because of the level of 
discomfort they caused for able-bodied people, thus imbuing disability with not only a 
sense of stigma but of disgust. Stigmatization renders a person “not quite human,” which 
has resulted in people in the medical field advocating for gene therapy as a form of 
eugenics to remove disability.
15
 But stigmatization is a social construct that occurs when 
“normal” people interact with those who do not fit a certain set of norms. Thus, the 
“problem” of disability extends beyond dysfunctional bodies.16 
Disability advocates, including people with disabilities, reacted against the 
medical model of disability with the critique that the model focuses exclusively on the 
physiology of disability while ignoring the sociological aspects of an individual’s 
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experience with disability. These advocates raised questions about whether the source of 
disability is located in the bodily impairment or in something outside the body, such as 
the way society is constructed and functions: Is disability “fundamentally a personal 
tragedy” or is it “a form of social oppression”?17 Is disability something that is inherent 
and inevitable for a person with an impaired body, or is it something imposed from 
outside the body?  
In the mid 1970s, when the voices of people with disabilities were finally being 
heard and valued and the disability rights movement began, the social or minority group 
theory of disability was proposed, which emphasizes “shared experiences of 
discrimination and oppression.”18 In this model, disability is defined not by abnormality 
in bodily function, but in the oppression, discrimination, and exclusion that people with 
disabilities face. It is not lack of ability or bodily function that disables a person; rather, it 
is the inability or unwillingness of society to accommodate, accept, and acknowledge the 
worth and potential contributions of that person. For example, a person who uses a 
wheelchair because of an impairment in bodily function only becomes disabled when he 
or she confronts a building entrance that is accessible solely by a set of stairs. As Thomas 
Reynolds notes, “as a loss of bodily function, impairment is socially transformed into a 
disability, a restriction of activity that excludes social participation.”19 
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This model locates the problem of disability not in the condition of being 
physically impaired or disabled, but in the “systems of social relations and institutions”—
inter-personal relationships, communities, schools, community organizations, churches—
that work to marginalize and discriminate against people with disabilities.
20
 The problem 
of disability is still considered a problem of embodiment, but it becomes a problem of 
social and political bodies rather than a problem of individual bodies. The emphasis 
shifts from individual body parts that do not function properly to the macro-body of 
society that does not function to allow for full participation by all people. 
However, the physical construction of society is not the only problem. According 
to some disability scholars, the most daunting problem that people with disabilities face is 
neither the loss of function from a physical impairment nor physical barriers. Rather, the 
biggest problem is the attitudes and values of society. Nancy Eiesland cites two of the 
most harmful attitudes: (1) paternalism, which stems from the stereotype that people with 
disabilities are weak and helpless, and results in things being done for or to people with 
disabilities, rather than with them; and (2) social aversion, which derives from fear or 
disgust and results in isolation, exclusion, and discrimination.
21
 These attitudes arise, in 
part, because people with disabilities are an offence to our cultural ideals, which define 
the body by expectations of beauty and perfection, by normative social interaction, and 
by sociocultural and economic productivity and usefulness.
22
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As Creamer notes, this makes disability more than simply “a functional or 
theoretical concern—it becomes an issue of justice as well.”23 The social construct of 
disability creates the unjust system of ableism which, like all “isms,” generates 
stereotypes that prevent people with disabilities from even having an opportunity to 
participate in society as capable, contributing citizens. According to this model, the 
solution to the problem of disability lies not in “fixing” the individual, but in addressing 
unjust social systems, working for systemic changes in societies, and advocating for 
equal opportunities for people with disabilities.
24
 In contrast to the medical model, which 
identifies disability as a personal tragedy, the social group model defines disability as a 
communal tragedy. 
While this social group model is an improvement over the medical model, it does 
not go far enough to define disability as both a matter of individual bodies and social 
bodies. Some bodily impairments cause difficulty to the individual in their private daily 
lives outside the realm of public, social interaction. To claim that the main problem of 
disability lies in the way society is structured is to locate the problems people with 
disabilities face outside their bodies. But this minimizes the fact that some people have 
body parts that simply do not work the way they are designed to work and that present 
challenges in accomplishing even simple everyday tasks. As John Harris observes, one of 
the troubling claims of some scholars who support the social model of disability is that 
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“once the social dimensions of disability have been resolved no seriously ‘disabling’ 
features remain.”25 
There is a fine balance between recognizing the limitations set up by society and 
recognizing the limitations caused by physical impairment and disability. For instance, 
even if some of the social barriers were broken down, and accessibility to places of 
employment were a given for people with disabilities, physical impairment could still 
cause problems. As Nancy Mairs notes, “Getting a job is one thing; getting to it is 
another. Not everyone can run out the door, a coat in one hand and a piece of toast in the 
other, jump onto a bicycle or into a car, and join the morning rush to the office.”26 Carol 
Thomas argues that if we simply equate the problem of disability with the restrictions 
imposed by social barriers, it becomes easy to claim that “impairment does not cause 
restrictions of activity because . . . all restrictions of activity are caused by social 
barriers.”27 
When the daily lived experience with impaired bodily function is devalued, “there 
is little room for people with disabilities to have a negative or even ambivalent 
relationship to their impairment.”28 When society is the cause of the problem, then people 
with disabilities are encouraged to minimize the problems within their own bodies. This 
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can lead people to deny that their bodies do not function well, which then leads to severe 
psychological problems. In speaking about my own experience with hearing loss and 
denial, I wrote: 
I think denial is part and parcel of any experience with disability, but in the case 
of hearing loss, it is easier to pretend that you don’t have a disability. Hearing loss 
is an invisible disability; there’s no wheelchair or cane or limp to give you away. 
In fact, if you are skilled enough in pretending, you can coast right along, fooling 
people into believing that you don’t have a disability at all. But pretending and 
living in denial only get you so far and can cause a lot of grief along the way.
29
 
Some scholars are working on the social group model of disability in order to 
discover the proper balance between the ontology of the individual body and the 
epistemology of social constructs: “Disability . . . is an emergent property, located, 
temporally speaking, in terms of the interplay between the biological reality of 
physiological impairment, structural conditioning, and socio-cultural interaction.”30 
Edwards and Imrie note that in the field of disability studies, “an understanding of the 
interrelationships between disabled people’s bodily function, and broader socio-cultural 
values and practices, is underdeveloped.”31 R. B. Jones, a pediatrician who worked 
extensively with children with disabilities, draws a comparison between “disability” and 
the now-disparaged term “handicapped.” He also makes a critical distinction between the 
two that highlights both the connection and the distinction between the medical and the 
social models of disability: 
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Most of my patients did have physical impairments, which although rarely 
curable, did usually need treatment. These physical impairments often prevented 
them from carrying out actions, walking for example, with which their 
unimpaired peers had no problems. They were disabled. For many, society’s 
response to their impairment and disability, inadequate education, rejection by 
their family or community for example, caused further problems; they were 
handicapped.
32
 
Thus, the theoretical conversation is being propelled in a direction that looks at disability 
holistically, taking into account bodily impairment, psychological adjustment, self-image, 
interpersonal relationships, and the relationship between people with disabilities and the 
larger society.  
While the social group model has gained greater acceptance than the medical 
model, some scholars feel that neither is adequate to explain the experience of being a 
person with a disability: “Both the medical model and social model seek to explain 
disability universally, and end up creating totalizing, meta-historical narratives that 
exclude important dimensions of disabled people’s lives and of their knowledge.”33 
One inadequacy of both models is they construct disability as an absolute category 
defined as part of various binary systems: disabled/non-disabled, functional/non-
functional, normal/abnormal.
34
 Persons are either disabled or not, their bodies are either 
functional or not, or normal or not. Postmodern theorists such as Jacques Derrida, Michel 
Foucault, and Emmanuel Levinas claim that binary logic such as this keeps people in 
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subjugation and oppression. Luce Irigaray claims that the less significant term (in this 
case, “disabled” or “abnormal”) has value only insofar as it is the negation of the 
dominant term (“able-bodied” or “normal”).35 The lesser term, then, has little intrinsic 
value; it serves only as a sign of what is not good or desired. In addition, the medical and 
social models both emphasize difference: the medical body highlights the difference 
within a dysfunctional body as compared to “normal bodies” while the social model 
highlights the difference of people with disabilities as they are members of a minority 
group who face stigmatism and oppression.  
Deborah Creamer suggests that while neither of these models is adequate, we 
cannot reject them, but must further expand the conversation in such a way that honors 
and includes the lived experiences of people with disabilities. She speaks of the “fluidity” 
of disability and notes that, from the experience of an individual, the self-conception of 
his or her “disability” may change from day to day.36 For instance, some days my hearing 
loss makes me feel disabled, especially when I miss important parts of conversations or 
misunderstand something over the telephone. There are other days when the 
accommodations I use, including a cochlear implant, a hearing aid, special phones, 
neckloops, and assistive listening systems, allow me to participate more fully in my daily 
activities and ministry. Thus, any objective and absolute definition of disability will not 
reflect my lived experience. While other people with disabilities may not be able to 
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experience the same level of participation, there are times when they feel “more or less 
disabled than in other situations.”37 
Creamer proposes a third model to supplement the insights gained by the medical 
and social models, which she calls the limits model. She describes this as a deconstruction 
of the idea of “normal” embodiment and physical functioning and a recognition that 
“limits” are a “common [and normal] aspect of being human,” and by extension, of being 
embodied.
38
 The starting point for this model of theoretical reflection is the idea that 
limitation is a natural and common part of being human. The “problems” arise when we 
value some limits and devalue others, or when we make accommodations for some but 
not for others. In addition, this model surpasses the binary construct of disability and 
attends to “the fluidity of human embodiment.”39  
This is not to say that we should accept all limits as normal. Nor is it to say that 
we should not continue to fight limits that are artificially or unjustly imposed, such as 
exclusion from a community because a body does not function as it might. Rather, the 
limits model demonstrates that the proper starting point for an anthropological 
examination of disability is not the idea of normality as it is defined in relation with the 
binary terms “able-bodied” and “disabled.” Instead, theoretical (and theological) 
reflection on the problem of disability must begin by rejecting this binary logic and the 
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concept that there is some ideal “norm” of embodied experience.40 As Jennie Weiss 
Block notes, even our understanding of what is normal is itself limited.
41
 
Although he is addressing health and sickness rather than disability per se, Jürgen 
Moltmann’s words support the idea of finding a holistic interpretation of disability: 
We cannot measure “health” merely against the system of values of the particular 
society in question. We also have to note the agreement and the contradictions 
between the bodily Gestalt of human beings and their social environment. 
“Health” must be defined in several dimensions if the concept of health is to be 
conducive to the life of human beings. It must find its definition in the flux of the 
history between the person and society, society and nature, past and present, 
immanence and transcendence.
42
 
In other words, disability cannot be defined solely by any one model unless that model 
includes both the objective and the subjective.  
Thomas Reynolds offers what he calls a “more holistic definition of disability” 
that rests in the intersection between “involuntary bodily impairment, social role 
expectations, and external physical [and] social obstructions that come together in a way 
that preempts an intended participation in communal life.”43 In this definition, both forms 
of embodiment—individual and social—are held together in identifying the problem of 
disability. In addition, Reynolds critiques not only the social definition of what is normal 
regarding physical embodiment, but what is normal in terms of social participation. He 
argues that the relationship between physical and social embodiment is a circular logic in 
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which a “society’s conception of normalcy informs and governs exchanges between 
persons, producing a system of conventions resistant to or incapable of accommodating 
the non-normal.”44 
The experience of disability expands the definition of normal embodiment, not 
only because of the socially-constructed view of what is “normal,” but also because 
people with disabilities often use devices that compensate for the loss of biological 
function of certain body parts. Many people with disabilities consider devices such as 
wheelchairs, hearing aids, and white canes as an extension of their bodies.
45
 Nancy 
Eiesland describes the experience of a woman who was born without lower extremities 
and uses an electric wheelchair: “[She] subverts the notion that she has a ‘natural’ body 
and other ‘unnatural’ accoutrements. Her body doesn’t stop with the bones and flesh. She 
incorporates devices that promote her self-definition as a healthy, mobile, and intact 
woman.”46 Nancy Mairs, who has multiple sclerosis and uses a wheelchair, writes 
poignantly about her experience of “incorporating artificial body parts that compose her 
‘bones and braces body’”: “I don’t think about my brace any more than I think about my 
cane. I’ve incorporated them, I suppose: made them, in their necessity, insensate but 
fundamental parts of my body.”47 This lived experience of embodiment that includes both 
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biological and artificial parts complicates any attempt objectively to define the embodied 
experience of disability. Perhaps, then, the proper starting point for a holistic definition of 
disability is neither a dysfunctional physical body nor a dysfunctional social body, but the 
lived experience of persons with disability. 
This turn to the subjective and focus on the personal experience of disability is 
evident in the work of Stanley Hauerwas, one of the first scholars to advocate for people 
with mental disabilities through academic research and study:  
People who really care about the mentally handicapped never run out of things to 
say, since they do not write “about” the mentally handicapped precisely because 
they do not view the mentally handicapped as just another “subject.” They write 
for and, in some sense, with the mentally handicapped. To be able to write for and 
with the mentally handicapped requires that you know people who are mentally 
handicapped. By “know” I mean you must be with the handicapped in a way they 
may be able to claim you as a friend.
48
 
In his work with people with developmental and intellectual disabilities, Hauerwas 
examines the ways that disability affects our understanding of what it means to be 
human, to live as humans in the coming reign of God, and faithfully to embody and live 
out Christian ethics. He challenges the notion in “liberal society” that people with 
disabilities are “poor” and “weak” and in need of charity. He also debunks the idea that 
authentic and “normal” personhood requires independence, rationality, and the ability to 
“develop a purposeful life-course without any necessary reference to others.”49 Thus, 
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Hauerwas’ work was among the first to take disability studies into the realm of 
theological studies, a topic to which I now turn.
50
 
 
Disability in the Scriptures 
The historic witness of Christianity regarding a variety of human conditions and 
experiences has been both contradictory and oppressive. For instance, the Hebrew 
Scriptures consider fertility as a sign of God’s favor; infertility, at best, is a temporary 
situation that can be “corrected” by the eventual blessing of having children.51 Regarding 
the scriptural witness and disability, Nancy Eiesland writes,  
The primary problem for the church is not how to “accommodate” disabled 
persons. The problem is a disabling theology that functionally denies inclusion 
and justice for many of God’s children. Much of church theology and practice—
including the Bible itself—has often been dangerous for persons with 
disabilities.
52
 
Eiesland points out one such disabling theological concept: “The persistent thread within 
the Christian tradition has been that disability denotes an unusual relationship with God 
and that the person with disabilities is either divinely blessed or damned: the defiled 
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evildoer or the spiritual superhero.”53 Deborah Creamer is even more critical of the 
Christian tradition regarding disability: 
It is important to note that religion, particularly Christianity, has frequently been 
cited as a source of destructive stereotypes about people with disabilities. 
Traditional understandings of God validate detrimental explanations for and 
analyses of disability. Models of omnipotence support images of dis-ability, and 
models that fail to challenge such assumptions implicitly perpetuate them.
54
 
Because Christian tradition has its roots in scripture, the proper starting point for 
our consideration of disability theology is the Bible. According to Julia Watts Belser, the 
Hebrew scriptures provide a “strong ethical foundation for affirming the humanity and 
dignity of people with disabilities.”55 The ancient Israelites were commanded to “not 
revile the deaf or put a stumbling block before the blind” (Lev. 19:14), which reveals an 
obligation to treat people with disabilities with justice and decency. In his examination of 
disability and Jewish Law, Tzvi Marx observes that compassion toward people with 
disabilities is at the heart of the Jewish tradition. This was a marked contrast to the later 
Greek (as formulated by Plato and Aristotle) and Roman (as stated in the legal document 
the Twelve Tables) practice of infanticide as a response to children born with disabilities. 
However, Marx also notes that the Jewish tradition is not consistent, and the “instances of 
apparent indifference, even callousness” toward people with disabilities are found side-
by-side with passages that call for their just and humane treatment.
56
 Even these latter 
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passages, which speak of a concern for people with disabilities, are laden with 
paternalism and pity. Rebecca Raphael observes that in laws designed to protect them, 
people with disabilities have no voice, and are treated as passive recipients of other 
people’s charity. In other words, the power belonged solely to the able-bodied, while 
people with disabilities had little or no agency in their interactions with society.
57
 
Several scholars have pointed out how certain interpretations of scripture have 
promoted what Amos Yong calls an “ableist worldview that continues to stigmatize, 
marginalize, and exclude people with disabilities.”58 Furthermore, Yong bemoans the 
“flat representations of disability that have been lifted from the biblical test by 
generations of ableist interpreters.”59 He begins his study of the Bible and disability with 
statements found in the Holiness Code in the book of Leviticus. The “idealized” vision of 
priestly bodies raises particular concerns for the issue of disability. In one passage (Lev. 
21:17-23), priests with any number of physical impairments, including blindness, 
lameness, having one limb too long, a broken foot or hand, eye blemishes, or a crushed 
testicle, are prohibited from entering the presence of God in the Holy of Holies. Although 
these priests were permitted to perform other priestly duties outside that most holy place, 
the code asserts that these blemishes would profane the sanctuaries of God (Lev. 21:23). 
Thus, holiness—the call which God gives to the people of Israel—seems incompatible 
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with physical impairment and disability, which somehow distorts and desecrates the 
divine image and the sacredness of the sanctuary.
60
 
There are several references in Deuteronomy chapter 28 that link physical 
impairment with curses for disobedience, such as this passage: “The Lord will afflict you 
with the boils of Egypt, with ulcers, scurvy, and itch, of which you cannot be healed. The 
Lord will afflict you with madness, blindness, and confusion of mind” (vss. 27-28). This 
and other passages from this section of the covenantal blessings/curses seem to link 
disease or disability with “purposive divine action intended to deal with and respond to 
the disobedience of God’s people.”61  
In some passages in the Bible, disability is correlated with sinfulness or divine 
retribution. For instance, in the Book of Job, the title character is afflicted with a 
disabling condition. Directed by the principle of covenantal blessings and curses, Job’s 
friends repeatedly link his condition with some sin he must have committed: “As I have 
seen, those who plow iniquity and sow trouble reap the same. By the breath of God they 
perish, and by the blast of his anger they are consumed” (Job 4:8-9). By the end of the 
book, Job’s self-proclaimed innocence is finally borne out and his health is restored. But 
as Yong notes, this only further supports the idea of divine blessing for obedience and 
curses for sinfulness, since Job, being free of sin, sees his curses converted into 
blessings.
62
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There is no single, cohesive representation of disability in the New Testament. On 
the one hand, disability is sometimes equated with sinfulness. In Mark 8:17-19, Jesus 
likens the disciples’ hardened hearts to being unable to see or hear. In John 5:14, Jesus 
heals the man who lay beside the pool of Bethesda and then tells him, “See, you have 
been made well! Do not sin anymore, so that nothing worse happens to you.” In addition, 
in the story of the man born blind, the immediate reaction of Jesus’ disciples to the blind 
man is to ask, “Rabbi, who sinned, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?” (John 
9:2). These passages seem to support the common belief that people with disabilities have 
done something to deserve their condition. Finally, in the Gospel of Luke, a paralytic 
man is brought to Jesus, who says to the man, “Friend, your sins are forgiven you” (Luke 
5:20). When the religious authorities complain about Jesus’ authority to forgive sins, 
Jesus responds, “Which is easier, to say, ‘Your sins are forgiven you,’ or to say, ‘Stand 
up and walk’?” (Luke 5:23), which seems to suggest that healing and forgiveness of sins 
are the same. 
On the other hand, some New Testament passages seem to release people with 
disabilities from the responsibility for their impairments. For instance, in the story of the 
man born blind, Jesus rejects the disciples’ assumption that the blindness was a result of 
sin: “Neither this man nor his parents sinned; he was born blind so that God’s works 
might be revealed in him” (John 9:3).  
The Gospel of Luke records Jesus’ paradigmatic statement in the synagogue at 
Nazareth:  
The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to bring good news 
to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim release to the captives and recovery of 
45 
sight to the blind, to let the oppressed go free, to proclaim the year of the Lord’s 
favor (Luke 4:18-19). 
All four gospels record stories of Jesus healing people who are blind, deaf, lame, leprous, 
and “demon-possessed.”63 It seems, then, that Jesus’ healing of disabling conditions is the 
core of the Gospel.
64
 As Yong observes, “the gospel has meant relief for people with 
disabilities [and . . .] the good news refers to the healing power of God.”65 
A worldview that considers properly functioning bodies to be normal and 
acceptable interprets these healing stories as affirming that the healing of bodily 
impairment is salvific. However, Jesus was doing more than curing dysfunctional 
physical bodies. In Jesus’ day (as, to some extent, in ours), people with various 
disabilities were social outcasts, relegated not only to the margins of society, but to a 
subsistence lifestyle supported by begging for alms by the side of the road (as in the story 
of blind Bartimaeus in Mark 10). Healing for these people was not confined to the 
recovery of bodily function; healing meant re-integration into the community as a full 
participant in social and religious life. As Kathy Black notes,  
The biblical healing texts were intended to be liberating events for those whom 
Jesus healed. Though they had been excluded from the worshiping community 
and from society at large because of their disability, Jesus’ acts allowed them to 
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be full participants in their religious, secular, and domestic spheres. The healing 
was liberating because it meant incorporation back into these communities.
66
 
In modern society, which is still very much grounded in the medical model of disability, 
“healing” is so frequently connected to “curing” that the two are conflated, and this sense 
of restoration to community as healing is lost. Thus, restoration to community is seen as a 
byproduct of fixing dysfunctional physical bodies through medical and technological 
means. 
In some New Testament passages, disability is portrayed as a kind of virtuous 
suffering which one must endure in order to gain the rewards of the next life. For 
instance, Jesus’ admonition to “take up your cross” is sometimes interpreted to mean that 
people with disabilities should gratefully accept the “burden” of their disability in order 
to be faithful disciples. What follows is the idea that people with disabilities should 
passively accept their situation and silently endure the injustices committed against them 
by society. 
The Apostle Paul has sometimes been used as an example of the ideal of “virtuous 
suffering.” Yong suggests that Paul may have been the first disabled theologian.67 In his 
letter to the Galatians, Paul writes,  
You know that it was because of a physical infirmity that I first announced the 
gospel to you; though my condition put you to the test, you did not scorn or 
despise me, but welcomed me as an angel of God, as Christ Jesus. What has 
become of the goodwill you felt? For I testify that, had it been possible, you 
would have torn out your eyes and given them to me (Gal. 4:13-15).  
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In addition, Paul lifted up his “thorn in the flesh” (2 Cor. 12:7), which some biblical 
scholars believe was a disability, as a sign of divine grace: “Therefore I am content with 
weaknesses, insults, hardships, persecutions, and calamities for the sake of Christ” (2 
Cor. 12:10). Like Job’s friends, Paul suggests that physical impairment, disability, and/or 
suffering is a means of grace that is to be gratefully received and accepted in order to be a 
faithful disciple and to gain eternal rewards. 
Christianity has often regarded people with disabilities as instruments on which to 
hone its charitable skills. This view is grounded in the biblical mandate to care for the 
poor, and especially in Jesus’ words that describe the nations that care for those who are 
in need and are marginalized: “Truly I tell you, just as you did it to one of the least of 
these who are members of my family, you did it to me” (Matt. 25:40). Too often, the 
church considers people with disabilities, along with other disenfranchised people, as 
“the least of these” to whom they are to minister. Jennie Weiss Block argues that if 
people with disabilities are members of “the least of these” it is not because of their 
physical impairments and disabilities, but because of the way they are treated by 
society.
68
 Thus, the church has a long history of reducing people with disabilities to 
objects that are ministered to rather than people who are allowed to participate in the 
ministry of the congregation. This tendency to slip into the imbalance of power in 
caregiving seems to be a natural human trait that is unfortunately encouraged by the 
Christian witness. According to Yong, “most non-disabled people will easily understand 
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how to ‘lend a helping hand’ to the profoundly disabled but have little inkling of what it 
means to minister with them.”69 
The Bible also fosters the belief that people with disabilities could be cured or 
healed if only their faith were stronger. In several of the gospel healing stories, Jesus 
affirms that the faith of the individual is the channel of healing. The gospels record 
several instances when Jesus tells the one who was healed, “Your faith has made you 
well.”70  
Finally, even the eschatological hope of a redeemed and perfected world complete 
with transformed bodies encourages the church to devalue the experience of disability. 
Paul’s eschatological affirmation of “perishable bodies [that] must put on 
imperishability” (1 Cor. 15:53) implies that anything associated with perishability, 
including disease and impairment, will be eradicated in the world to come. The author of 
the Book of Revelation affirms that in the world to come, “there will be no more . . . 
mourning or crying or pain, for the old order of things has passed away” (Rev. 21:4). 
Yong argues that the apostle Paul’s “depiction of the resurrection body suggests why 
there will be no more sadness in the new earth”: these new bodies will be raised in honor 
and power because the dishonor and weakness of physical bodies—including the 
experience of disability—will be eliminated.71 Thus, says Yong, disability has “no place 
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in God’s new creation.”72 But Yong notes that “some impairments are so identity-
constitutive that their removal would involve the obliteration of the person as well.”73 So 
while the promise of transformed bodies without impairment seems hopeful, it actually 
diminishes and ignores the embodied experience of people with disabilities. 
 
Disability Theology Today 
The church’s understanding and theological interpretations of disability, which 
has been through the lens of able-bodied experience, have reinforced the marginalization 
and oppression of people with disabilities. Since the 1990s, theologians have been 
reframing disability theology in ways that honor and privilege disability. Nancy Eiesland 
was one of the pioneers in the field of disability theology. In her seminal work The 
Disabled God (1994), she constructs a “liberatory theology of disability” in which she 
calls for a reimagining of religious symbols because symbols “establish and maintain 
beliefs and values.”74 Because current religious symbols and images (such as Christ, the 
suffering servant, and the ideal of embodiment that reveals the divine image) are 
grounded in able-bodied values, Eiesland challenges the Christian community to find new 
symbols that can confront oppression and stigmatization: “Resymbolization entails the 
deconstruction of dominant symbolic meanings and a reconstitution of those symbols, 
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making them both liberatory for the marginalized group and unsettling for the dominant 
group.”75 
To Eiesland, the incarnation of Jesus addresses both issues of embodiment and 
contextual symbolism. She argues that the images of Jesus as the suffering servant or as a 
model of virtuous suffering cultivate a bias against disabled embodiment and experience. 
She offers a resymbolization of Jesus—a “contextualized Christology”—as the “disabled 
God who embodied both impaired hands and feet and pierced side, and the imago Dei.”76 
This image both demonstrates how God is present with people with disabilities and 
unmasks “the ways in which theological inquiry has frequently instituted able-bodied 
experience as the theological norm.”77 This disabled God is symbolically located not in 
the Holy of Holies where physical impairment is considered a desecration, but at the 
margins of society with people with disabilities. As Yong notes, this disabled God in the 
resurrected Jesus shatters the expectation of human perfection in the earthly body of 
Jesus in which there was no sin or blemish.
78
 This new symbol forces Christians to 
reconceive the disabled body as one in which God is present and active, and to reimagine 
traditional ideas about holiness, wholeness, and power. 
Jennie Weiss Block proposes a “theology of access” that is grounded in the social 
model of disability and that has a specific focus on the inclusion of people with 
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disabilities in the body of Christ. Her framework does not offer a theology of disability, 
per se, but rather an ecclesiology of inclusion, friendships, and interdependence. 
Likewise, Kathy Black advocates for inclusion through her “theology of 
interdependence” in which she argues for a redefining of the church’s traditional 
understanding of God’s omnipotence. Rather than being in control of everything that 
happens in our world, God is intimately interdependent with all of creation. God does not 
cause disability, but God does call us to “work interdependently with God to achieve 
well-being for ourselves and others.”79 
Deborah Creamer laments both the “invisibility” of the experience of disability 
from modern contextualized and liberatory theologies—even those that focus on the 
body—and the inadequacies of the disability theologies proposed by Eiesland, Block, and 
Black.
80
 Starting with the embodied theology of Sallie McFague and using her own limits 
model of disability, Creamer constructs a theological understanding of disability that 
“critically reflects on the full range of human experience of embodiment, including 
disability, as primary source material.”81 For Creamer, limits are unsurprising, intrinsic, 
and good (or at least not evil) aspects of being human. Instead of focusing on what we 
lack (what she calls being “limited”), this model begins with the understanding that 
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limits, or boundaries of what is possible, are a necessary and appropriate part of creation: 
all persons have limits, some of which “are viewed as more normal (I cannot fly) than 
others (I cannot run).”82 Creamer also demonstrates that the proper starting point for 
theological anthropology is not the idea of normality as it is defined in relation with the 
binary terms “able-bodied” and “disabled.” Instead, theological reflection on the problem 
of disability must begin by rejecting both this binary logic and the concept that there is 
some ideal “norm” of embodied experience.83 
Both Eiesland and Creamer offer a theological basis for reimagining the nature of 
God through the lens of disability studies and through the embodied experience of people 
with disabilities. Eiesland’s reconceptualization of the primary symbol of the church—
the risen Christ—works to shatter perceptions of normalcy and wholeness. Jesus’ 
resurrected body is neither perfect nor whole (as society would define “wholeness”), and 
it demonstrates that disability “does not contradict the human-divine integrity.”84 Thus, 
the resurrection of Christ’s body cannot be considered as a victory of “perfection” over 
“imperfection.” Rather, the resurrection is a vindication of the justice of God—a justice 
that favors those on the margins whom society would consider “imperfect.” That which 
we might call “imperfect” is gathered as is into the life of God through the resurrection of 
the embodied Christ. The signs of our earthly embodiment—our scars, diseases, and 
disabilities—are not erased in the resurrection life. Likewise, Creamer invites us to 
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imagine a God that includes limits because, as she notes, a God without limits implies 
that “the more limits we have, the less we are like God. If God is unlimited, then the less 
limited are more like God, and the more limited are less like God.”85 
Each of these reflections on disability attempt to locate disability within an 
accessible (pun intended) theological framework, but none of them are broad enough 
both to provide a strong systematic theology of disability and to include subjective and 
objective experiences of disability. Nancy Eiesland’s challenge to the church to find new 
religious symbols that respect and include disability is admirable, but her image of the 
disabled God in a sip-puff wheelchair may be, at best, irrelevant, or at worst, disturbing, 
to people with other forms of disability or no disability. On the other hand, Jennie Weiss 
Block’s “theology of access” has much to say about theological anthropology, but little to 
say about God and about how our subjective and objective experiences of disability affect 
our understanding of God. Deborah Creamer’s idea of limits as an inherent and universal 
human experience seems expansive, but her argument that “if each of us lives long 
enough, we will become disabled” both minimizes the lived experience of disability that, 
for some people, is a daily reality, and equates disability with the deterioration of the 
body as we age.
86
 While Kathy Black’s “Theology of Interdependence” does not offer a 
theological system, it does begins with the assumption that disability exists without trying 
to either universalize or particularize it. She does not try to explain why disability exists. 
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Rather, she explores how all people—with a disability or not—are to be in relationship 
with each other and with God. 
Although these theories about disability and theological reflections on disability 
are varied in their focus, in their location of source material, and in their conclusions, 
they are all grounded in the basic premise of embodiment. Some theories emphasize the 
physical body, while others highlight social bodies. The concept of the body is central to 
both the experience and study of disability and also to the church’s understanding of its 
nature, purpose, and mission. Therefore, I turn next to an examination of the body in 
ecclesiology, and particularly to the metaphorical body of Christ that is the church. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE METAPHORICAL BODY OF CHRIST 
 
For as in one body we have many members, and not all the members have the 
same function, so we, who are many, are one body in Christ, and individually we 
are members one of another. 
—Romans 12:4-5, NRSV 
 
One of the most fundamental images of ecclesiology is Paul’s description of the 
church as the body of Christ. As with any metaphor, the body of Christ lends itself to 
various interpretations and applications. Paul’s use of the metaphorical “body” could be 
interpreted as ontological reality for the church, as a functional description of the church, 
or as a portrayal of the fellowship and unity of the Christian community (koinonia). Also, 
as with any metaphor, the “body” is both like and unlike, and both reveals and conceals, 
aspects about that which it is meant to describe (the church). In order to understand the 
body of Christ metaphor for the purpose of this thesis, we must look briefly at its 
intended meaning in the writings of Paul and its function as a metaphor according to 
linguistic theory. 
 
What Did Paul Intend? 
It can be difficult to determine precisely what Paul meant when he used the phrase 
“the body of Christ.” Paul, of course, was no systematic theologian. His use of the phrase 
occurs in three different epistles sent to three different congregations in three different 
communities. Paul Minear warns us against trying to find a “single inclusive definition of 
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the image” because “the body of Christ is not a single expression with an unchanging 
meaning. Paul’s thought remains extremely flexible and elastic. In some passages the 
church is explicitly identified with Christ’s body, but in other passages this identification 
becomes very tenuous indeed.”1 With this caveat in mind, I move ahead to discover 
Paul’s motivation and intention for using the phrase the body of Christ.2 
When Paul told the church in Corinth “you are the body of Christ” (1 Cor. 12:27), 
did he mean to affirm that they were the literal body of Christ, or was he referring to the 
Corinthian church as a figurative body, a community of believers who are connected to 
Christ? The first interpretation was affirmed by Augustine and later by the Roman 
Catholic Church:  
Let us rejoice then and give thanks that we have become not only Christians, but 
Christ himself. Do you understand and grasp, brethren, God's grace toward us? 
Marvel and rejoice: we have become Christ.
3
  
According to Augustine, one of the ways Christ can be understood and named is “as the 
whole Christ in the fullness of the church, that is, as head and body, according to the 
completeness of a certain perfect humanity, the man in whom each of us are limbs.”4 
The second concept—that the church is the figurative body of Christ—is held by 
several Protestant denominations: 
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The visible church of Christ is a congregation of faithful men.
5
 
We believe the Christian Church is the community of all true believers under the 
Lordship of Christ.
6
 
Did Paul use the body of Christ image to describe the ideal relationship between 
members of the Christian community as one that functions to promote mutual support 
and interdependence, or as one that represents an ontological reality (unity)? Does the 
phrase carry an ethical component? Or, is our tendency to read Paul’s phrase as 
metaphorical anachronistic? Did Paul not mean for it to be metaphorical at all, but to be 
an actual representation of the church as the physical, earthly body of Christ with each 
member acting as a different part of that body? Scholars have offered arguments in 
support of all of these possibilities.
7
 
In order to determine Paul’s intention in using the phrase “the body of Christ,” we 
can make comparisons with other themes in his writings, examine his Christology, and 
look at his cultural milieu and the situations he was addressing in his letters to the 
churches in Rome and Corinth. While a detailed examination of all these issues is beyond 
the scope of this work, I focus briefly on the two latter issues: the cultural influences on 
Paul’s theology, and the circumstances faced by the Roman and Corinthian churches. 
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Paul was well-traveled and in his missionary journeys, he was exposed to 
different philosophical schools and various religious cults and movements. According to 
Robert J. Banks, Paul did not just experience these sometimes-competing schools of 
thought; he “adopted a deliberate policy of accommodation to them.”8 This is not to say 
that Paul shaped his emerging Christian theology to conform to these varied systems of 
belief; rather, he was “always taking such beliefs and practices into account and making 
them the starting point for his own message and behavior.”9 Thus, Paul’s theology should 
be studied in the context of the cultures in which he lived and worked. 
Paul used the phrase the “body of Christ” in his letters to churches in the cities of 
Rome and Corinth where the question of Christian identity was paramount. Paul may 
have used the body image to help these early Christians understand and establish that 
identity. Michelle Lee writes, “The early Christians constructed an alternative social 
world apart from the larger society. This social world applied not only to the physical 
structure of the Christian communities, but to the ways in which they perceived 
themselves and their relationship to the world.”10 In this sense, the newly emerging 
churches were seen as communities that stood in contrast to wider society and in which 
members would need to learn new ways of understanding themselves and their 
relationships to each other, to God, and to the society around them.  
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The Christians in Corinth and Rome were struggling to discover their new identity 
in societies that were very diverse, cosmopolitan, and polytheistic.
11
 In order to solidify 
the church as a community of faith, new distinct boundaries in behavior, loyalties, and 
relationships had to be established. Wayne Meeks observes that “Pauline Christianity, 
like other forms, required ‘conversion’ of those who entered. Conversion is a radical 
process of re-socialization. It entails strong symbolic and social boundaries separating the 
group of converts from the macrosociety.”12 In addition, through this process of re-
socialization, “the sect was intended to become virtually the primary group for its 
members, supplanting all other loyalties,” such as to the emperor, the system of 
government, and even to one’s family or friends.13 Meeks also notes that the boundaries 
for this community had to be somewhat permeable, or else the process of evangelism and 
conversion would stop.
14
 
The churches in Rome and Corinth were set among societies that were steeped in 
Roman culture, which meant religious and cultural diversity and individualism were 
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highly valued.
15
 The ideals of the nascent Christian community—monotheism, unity, and 
mutual cooperation—ran counter to these Roman values, placing Christians in danger of 
persecution or, at the very least, suspicion from the political authorities. In addition, the 
new relationships that Christians were creating among themselves meant that old 
relationships with family members and friends would change. This was another source of 
potential danger for the churches: “One of the most powerful causes for the hostility of 
the Roman literary classes toward . . . Christianity was precisely the fear that they would 
disrupt households and, consequently, undermine the social order.”16 
Boundaries became important for more than just securing an identity: “The notion 
of the boundary-protected community indicates the members’ need for protection and 
belonging.”17 Paul’s body image thus functioned to foster not only unity, but also a sense 
of safety from the world within well-defined boundaries. This safety is ensured, in part, 
by the behavior of each individual part of the body: “the body metaphor . . . can be used 
to argue for behavior which supports common advantage.”18 In the case of Corinth (and 
presumably other early Christian communities), one of the chief advantages of the body 
image is protection from a potentially hostile (and non-Christian) world. 
According to Wayne Meeks, there are five indicators of group boundaries, 
including rules and rituals of purity, membership sanctions, the development of 
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autonomous institutions, reports of specific kinds of interactions with macrosociety, and 
special language involving separation.
19
 Michelle Lee argues that Paul’s use of “body” 
language corresponds to the indicator regarding special language: “The identification of 
the community as Christ's body both identifies the group and separates it from those who 
are not part of the ‘body.’”20  
At points in his letters to the churches in Corinth and Rome, Paul seems to draw 
strong boundaries between the ideal Christian identity and the identity that the larger 
society (or “the world”) would impose on the believers. For instance, he warns the 
Roman Christians, “Do not be conformed to this world” (Romans 12:2). And to the 
Corinthian church, he writes, “Now we have received not the spirit of the world, but the 
Spirit that is from God” (1 Cor. 2:12). As Meeks observes, “In the Pauline letters, a 
variety of terms distinguish Christians categorically from everyone else. Even the most 
neutral terms used for non-Christians, hoi exo (‘the outsiders’), makes the sense of 
separation unmistakable.”21 Paul’s rhetoric seems to favor a way of being and acting for 
the Christian community that is independent of the ways of the world.
22
 For Paul, then, 
the church is (or should be) distinct and separate from the world with clear boundaries 
that govern the ways Christians relate to the world. 
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In addition, Paul is also using body imagery for the community of faith to address 
a lack of unity among the believers, especially in Corinth. In his first letter to that 
community, Paul confronts the problem head-on: 
For it has been reported to me by Chloe’s people that there are quarrels among 
you, my brothers and sisters. What I mean is that each of you says, “I belong to 
Paul,” or “I belong to Apollos,” or “I belong to Cephas,” or “I belong to Christ.” 
Has Christ been divided? (1 Cor. 1:10-13a). 
For Paul, this experience of disunity in the Corinthian church clashed with his 
understanding of a properly functioning social body, which was influenced by “the 
learned school of Stoicism, for which one pillar of thought was unity and harmony.”23 In 
his letter to the Galatians, Paul describes the egalitarianism of the social body that is the 
church, which stands in contrast to the highly stratified Greco-Roman culture: “There is 
no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male and 
female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus” (Gal. 3:28).24 
According to Banks, there was a long rhetorical tradition dating from at least the 
first century C.E. that assumed the city-state was a social body in which “strife, discord, 
or a civil disturbance [was] a disease that must be eradicated.”25 More often than not, 
philosophers and politicians believed this disease, or illness, resulted not from an external 
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agent, but from “an imbalance in the body’s internal constituents.”26 In particular, discord 
in the social body was the product of “the disruption of the natural concord of the 
different groups and classes that make up the body politic.”27 Stoic philosophers believed 
that the health of the body was threatened when the hierarchy was disrupted; that is, when 
the “upper” and “lower” classes were at conflict over social issues such as more civic 
privileges for the larger lower class.
28
 In other words, friction within the social body 
ensued when the lower classes failed to recognize and honor their proper place in the 
hierarchical system. As Banks points out, one favorite device of Stoic rhetoricians was to 
“show how the political hierarchy of the city mirrors the harmonious hierarchy of the 
cosmos [which] works well because each cosmic entity knows its place in the cosmic 
body.”29 
In spite of his egalitarian vision, Paul recognized that, like other body politics, the 
church was inherently hierarchical. Dale Martin argues that the analogy of the human 
body for a social body “usually functioned conservatively to support hierarchy and to 
argue that inequality is both necessary and salutary.”30 Even within his extended 
depiction of the church as the body of Christ, Paul notes that there is both differentiation 
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and stratification within the body, although he quickly asserts that this ordering of the 
social body is God’s doing:  
The members of the body that seem to be weaker are indispensable, and those 
members of the body that we think less honorable we clothe with greater honor, 
and our less respectable members are treated with greater respect . . . but God has 
so arranged the body, giving the greater honor to the inferior member, that there 
may be no dissension within the body (1 Cor. 12: 22-25).  
Although it is not clear what Paul means by this reference to “weaker” members, we can 
infer that, at least in this passage, the measure of respect and honor afforded to individual 
members is more a matter of roles within the body than some kind of social or economic 
status: “And God has appointed in the church first apostles, second prophets, third 
teachers; then deeds of power, then gifts of healing, forms of assistance, forms of 
leadership, various kinds of tongues” (1 Cor. 12:28). It is important to note that Paul is at 
the same time affirming a natural, God-given hierarchy while also questioning the 
assumptions of Roman-Greco culture about the hierarchy of social bodies. Here Paul 
makes it clear that any difference in status lies in the perception of the individual 
members, rather than an ontological reality: “The members of the body that seem (or are 
judged, or are supposed) to be weaker.” Thus, the “normally conceived body hierarchy is 
actually only an apparent, surface hierarchy.”31 
But Paul knows that this hierarchy, while necessary, is also dangerous for the 
body, for later in the same letter, he corrects those who claimed more importance for 
themselves than even the significance of their gifts (in this case, glossolalia) would 
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allow: “Those who speak in a tongue build up themselves, but those who prophesy build 
up the church” (1 Cor. 14:4). 
Indeed, Paul addressed several problems within the nascent Christian 
communities that were caused, in part, by the mixed social status of the people in the 
community and the failure of people of these different strata to honor their 
interdependence and to use their differentiation to promote unity, which were Stoic 
ideals.
32
 Meeks points out the conflict at Corinth over meat that was offered to idols (1 
Cor. 8-10): in this passage, the “strong” were the socially powerful who, after converting 
to Christianity, “may have had reason to accept invitations to dinner where meat would 
be served,” while the “weak” were the poor who rarely ate meat.33 For Paul, the disease 
of disunity in the body caused by friction between the classes lay squarely on the 
shoulders of those who were more wealthy because they failed to show proper respect 
and honor to those who were poor. This is most evident in his diatribe against the 
“strong” and powerful who ignored the egalitarian nature of the Lord’s Supper: “For 
when the time comes to eat, each of you goes ahead with your own supper, and one goes 
hungry and another becomes drunk. What! Do you not have homes to eat and drink in? 
Or do you show contempt for the church of God and humiliate those who have nothing?” 
(1 Cor. 11:21-22). For Paul, the well-being of the church requires recognition of and 
respect for the essential and ontological unity of the body: “For all who eat and drink 
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without discerning the body, eat and drink judgment against themselves” (1 Cor. 11:29). 
Robert Banks says that while “the body” in this passage has generally been interpreted as 
the presence of Christ’s body in the bread, it is also an appeal to the community to 
receive one another and thus affirm, in this action, the community’s solidarity.34 It was 
incumbent, then, upon the stronger or more powerful members of the church to recognize 
the non-hierarchical nature of the body of Christ so to ensure unity in Christ. 
Paul’s concern about the church’s lack of unity in the Corinthian church may also 
be grounded in his concern for protection against the threats from outside the community:  
Paul’s statements to the Corinthians to end their factionalism reveal not only a 
functional concern for the preservation of the community and the dangers that 
come from disunity. The concern for unity is built upon an ontological 
understanding that the Corinthians are a people who stand apart from the world by 
the mind of Christ.
35
 
Meeks points out that these early Christian communities held beliefs about what is “real 
and valuable,” particularly the ideas of radical monotheism and a crucified, divine 
Messiah, that were in significant ways different from the beliefs held by the surrounding 
societies.
36
 These communities existed in cosmopolitan, pagan societies, and the risk of 
synchretism was always a concern. In several of his letters, Paul tells these converts of 
the significance of their conversion to a new way of believing and living. He reminds the 
Thessalonians “how you turned to God from idols, to serve a living and true God” (1 
Thess. 1:9), and he instructs the Corinthians to recall that “even though there may be so-
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called gods in heaven or on earth—as in fact there are many gods and many lords—yet 
for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist, and 
one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist” (1 Cor. 
8:5-6). Any dissent that might arise among the members of the group over their beliefs 
and practical application of these beliefs was a threat to the unity and cohesion of the 
group. Unity would reinforce their beliefs and practices, while disunity would put their 
beliefs, practices, and, indeed, their entire religious system in jeopardy. 
The unity that was necessary between the members of the church was preceded 
only by the unity between the members and Christ.
37
 Paul reinforced this relationship 
between the believers and Christ through identification of the community with the actual 
body of Christ. Paul reminded the members of the church at Corinth that they were 
“always carrying in the body the death of Jesus, so that the life of Jesus may also be made 
visible in our bodies” (2 Cor. 4:10).  
There are two interesting points to note regarding Paul’s description of the church 
as the body of Christ. First, Paul makes a distinction between the church as Christ’s body 
(Christos sōma) and the church as a particular gathered assembly (ekklēsia). Banks 
suggests that Paul’s use of the plural form for church (ekklēsiais), for example, when he 
refers to the churches of Asia, or Macedonia or Judaea, demonstrates Paul’s conception 
of the church as a particular gathered assembly; “the idea of a unified provincial or 
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national church is as foreign to Paul’s thinking as the notion of a universal church.”38 
Thus, Paul may have used the body image as a rhetorical device to stress the unity of all 
these particular churches in Christ. 
Second, when Paul uses the body image, he speaks almost exclusively about the 
inner structure of the body, and does not describe any outward orientation or working of 
the body toward other social bodies or the surrounding society. In light of Paul’s broad 
missionary and outreach efforts, this image of an inwardly-focused body is ironic, but it 
may be another rhetorical strategy to strengthen the boundaries of the community and to 
reinforce the members’ sense of identity and unity. 
Paul also carried that image of Christ’s body into the ritual practices that served to 
strengthen the unity of the social body of the church: baptism and the Lord’s Supper. 
These bodily acts, the origins of which are attributed to the bodily actions of Jesus in his 
own baptism and his final meal with his disciples, were symbols of “enormous generative 
power” that promoted cohesiveness and highlighted the bodily nature of the 
community.
39
 
The influence of Stoicism for Paul challenges the idea that he used the phrase “the 
body of Christ” metaphorically. While modern people use the image of a body as a 
metaphor—a “social body” is an aggregate of individuals, heavenly “bodies” are planets 
and stars, etc.—ancient thinkers did not make such distinctions. Banks notes that in the 
ancient world, “the human body was not like a microcosm; it was a microcosm—a small 
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version of the universe at large.”40 And, conversely, Plato depicted the cosmos as a 
single, tangible, living thing. Thus, “body” was used to describe both the reality of any 
entity as a microcosm—a whole, living system—and the relationship between these 
bodies that created the macrocosm. For instance, the workings of the human body were 
understood as part of the working of the cosmos as a whole. 
So it is likely that Paul’s intention in using the phrase “the body of Christ” to refer 
to the church would have been more literal than metaphoric.
41
 The Stoic philosophers 
believed the universe existed as a body, but “they did not just speak of the body 
‘metaphor,’ for, with them, being a ‘body’ was a fundamental component of the nature of 
existence.”42 In addition, Stoics understood society or the state as a literal body “in which 
each member had his part to play.”43 It is plausible that the Christians in Rome and in 
Corinth, many of whom were Gentile converts, were familiar with the Stoic concept of 
the body as an ontological (and necessary) reality, and would have understood Paul to be 
using “the body of Christ” to denote a new, literal state of existence. 
Robert Jenson, a twentieth-century American Lutheran theologian, interprets 
Paul’s phrase very literally, and very functionally:  
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But what can Paul mean, speaking so of Christ’s body? The obvious first 
suggestion is that he speaks of the “body of Christ” as he speaks of “bodies” 
generally. In Paul’s language, someone’s “body” is simply the person him or 
herself insofar as this person is available to other persons and him or herself. In 
Paul’s ontology, such personal availability may or may not be constituted as the 
biological entity moderns first think of as “a body”; for Paul, a “spiritual” body, 
whatever that may be, is as much or more a body as is a biological body.
44
 
That is, the church is the body of Christ because it is only through the embodied 
experience of church members that Christ can be made present (available) to the world. 
While there are certainly ethical, pneumatological, and apocalyptic elements in 
Paul’s description of the church as the body of Christ, it seems that by stressing the 
ontological and even literal aspect of the metaphor, Paul could clearly address the urgent 
situations he encountered in Corinth and Rome. These emerging Christian communities 
needed to understand themselves as a cohesive social body with clear boundaries that 
would cultivate a sense of identity over and against a potentially antagonistic world. 
Because this project emphasizes embodiment and constructive ecclesiology, the 
use of Paul’s concept of the body of Christ must also lend itself to the idea of physical 
embodiment. Thus, for my purposes, I describe the body of Christ that is the church as a 
social body—a community—that helps to establish Christian identity by formation 
through bodily practices into ways of acting, understanding, and being that are contrary 
to the values of the surrounding society. The unity of this social body is a gift of God 
through Jesus Christ, and is something the members of the community are challenged to 
recognize, claim, and live into. Finally, the body of Christ, which is an ontological reality 
and which represents a new state of existence, has boundaries (“skin”) that are clearly 
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identifiable in order to set the community apart from the world, and yet porous enough to 
allow mutual interaction between the church and the world. 
 
“The Body of Christ” as a Metaphor 
Metaphors are always rhetorical. That is, by making comparisons between the 
topic (the subject of the metaphor, in this case, the church) and the vehicle (that to which 
the topic is compared, in this case, the body of Christ), metaphors aim to challenge the 
ways people understand or perceive a topic. A metaphor does not simply describe a 
comparison, however; it “uses similarity in order to say something about its subject.”45 
According to Sallie McFague, we employ metaphorical thinking when  
the familiar meets the unfamiliar, and in the process of trying to understand the 
unfamiliar, tries out various perspectives on it—sees it as something else—which 
it “is and is not.” We make judgments which have to undergo revision as we come 
to clearer recognition of the process by which the new, unfamiliar thing is both 
like and unlike what we already know.
46
 
Unlike a simile, which outlines an indirect correspondence of similarity between two 
seemingly unrelated topics (“the church is like the body of Christ”), a metaphor forces us 
to look for meaning beyond the words and the comparison. A simile functions more to 
define one topic in light of another by comparing similarity; a metaphor uses similarity to 
describe a topic on a deeper level. As Andrew Perriman notes, Paul is saying “neither that 
the church is identical with the body of Christ nor that the church is similar to the body of 
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Christ”; rather, he is making a statement about the church.47 The problem, as noted 
above, is that we cannot be certain what Paul meant to say about the church when he 
called it the body of Christ. While some metaphors are intentionally left “open” to 
interpretation by readers or hearers, most metaphors require the “recovery of the 
speaker’s [or author’s] intended metaphorical meaning.”48  
Behind any metaphor lies not only the speaker’s or author’s intention, but also a 
wealth of culturally-conditioned meanings, symbols, and interpretative mechanisms. 
Paul’s body metaphor is laden not only with the Stoic notion of the body, as noted above, 
but also with the Stoic understanding and use of metaphorical language. Stoic 
philosophers regularly employed allegorical methods of interpreting texts. For instance, 
Philo, a contemporary of Paul, used these methods to interpret the Hebrew scriptures.
49
 
But these philosophers would also shift freely from using literal language to using 
language that is more figurative. Philo did not disregard literal interpretations of scripture 
while using his allegorical method. For instance, in his interpretation of the creation story 
in Genesis, he both protected its historicity while expounding its allegorical meaning.
50
 
Paul himself uses a similar process in his description of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar (Gal. 
24:21-31), a story which he affirms as historical fact while using figurative language to 
                                                 
47
 Perriman, “His body which is the church,” 134-35. 
48
 Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., “When is Metaphor? The Idea of Understanding in Theories of 
Metaphor,” Poetics Today: Aspects of Metaphor Comprehension 13, no. 4 (Winter, 1992): 583. 
49
 An allegory can be described as an extended metaphor because within an allegorical story are 
individual metaphors. 
50
 “Allegorical interpretation,” Jewish Encyclopedia Online, accessed July 9, 2014, 
http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/1256-allegorical-interpretation. 
73 
interpret it. Thus, the use of both allegorical (and, by extension, metaphorical) and literal 
language was common to Paul and his contemporaries, and both were often combined as 
a rhetorical or interpretative device.  
In the modern age, the boundaries between literal and figurative language are 
more precise. We tend to draw sharp distinctions between figurative and literal language, 
tropes, and ideas. According to A. C. Bridge, contemporary Biblical scholarship assumes 
that “in the doctrine of the body of Christ, theology is faced with an ontological either-or: 
either the New Testament is speaking of a literal, material reality, or it is using mere 
metaphors.”51 Janet Soskice observes that because of the “legacy of historical criticism . . 
. and literalism, it is an accepted principle that in the twentieth century we have lost the 
living sense of the biblical metaphors which our forefathers had.”52 Thus, modern readers 
do not have the same capacity or willingness to perceive metaphorical language as did the 
people of Paul’s time. As Marcus Borg notes, prior to the modern period, the 
metaphorical meaning of the Bible mattered most to readers, who did not make the 
distinctions between literal and metaphoric as precisely as we tend to do today.
53
 In 
addition, the Enlightenment’s emphasis on science and verifiable facts, coupled with a 
“higher degree of authority [that was] attributed to the Bible,” led people to interpret 
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scripture as factually true and infallibly authoritative.
 54
 It is only within the last 150 years 
or so that an attempt has been made to “correct” this overly literal reading of scripture. 
The progressive theology movement that has developed during the last twenty years is 
devoted, in part, to the recovery of a metaphorical interpretation of the Bible.
55
 Thus, 
many modern readers may not be able or willing to understand that Paul is speaking 
metaphorically about the church because they tend to work out of that dichotomy 
regarding metaphorical or symbolic language—it is either literal or metaphorical. It can 
never be simply a statement about the nature of something, and for many years, the 
tradition of the church has leaned toward the literal interpretation.
56
  
Therefore, it is likely that the phrase “the body of Christ” no longer functions 
metaphorically for modern readers.
57
 It has become what John Witlviet calls a “frozen 
metaphor” that functions as a “conventional, fixed, idiomatic” phrase that is likely to be 
“enshrined in dictionary definitions.”58 Gail Ramshaw notes that such metaphors are 
                                                 
54
 Gregory C. Jenks, “Taking the Bible Seriously but not Literally,” Progressive Christianity.org, 
December 4, 2011, accessed July 8, 2014, http://progressivechristianity.org/resources/taking-the-bible-
seriously-but-not-literally/. 
55
 Scholars who advocate for a metaphorical method of reading the Bible include Marcus Borg,   
N. T. Wright, John Dominic Crossan, Matthew Fox, and Barbara Brown Taylor. 
56
 Some scholars suggest that there is a spectrum between the literal and the metaphorical. See 
Philip Wheelwright, Metaphor and Reality (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962). 
57
 The next six paragraphs are taken substantially from Nancy Hale, “‘Was Blind But Now I See’: 
Challenging Metaphors of Disability,” Doxology 27 (2010): 3-21. 
58
 John D. Witvliet, “Metaphor in Liturgical Studies: Lessons from Philosophical and Theological 
Theories of Language,” Liturgy Digest 4, no. 1 (January 1, 1997): 19. A quick survey of online dictionaries 
supports Witvliet’s point: at least a few of the dictionaries consulted listed “body of Christ” as an entry. 
75 
overused and have become literalized (that is, a part of normal, everyday speech).
59
 
Moreover, in its most common current use, “the body of Christ” operates only on a 
superficial level that does not take into consideration certain aspects of the nature of the 
church. As Kim observes, “the fossilized ‘body of Christ’ . . . precludes other possibilities 
of meaning.”60 
There are several reasons why a metaphor tends to become literalized or to be 
interpreted as a literal statement of the relationship between the topic and the vehicle. A 
metaphor remains vibrant if we find that the comparison it makes is “literally absurd” and 
makes no obvious sense.
61
 To put it another way, we comprehend metaphors as 
metaphors and not as literal speech when they violate “selection restrictions.”62 Topics 
(the first term) in a metaphor are always conditioned by certain restrictions, and when the 
comparison with the vehicle (the second term) violates any of these restrictions, we look 
instead for a metaphorical interpretation. For instance, the phrase “You are the salt of the 
earth” (Matt 5:13) presents an immediately recognizable violation of restrictions: “You” 
identifies a living subject, while “salt” is a mineral, and the two have little in common. 
When a quick scan for a literal meaning reveals absurdity—we cannot actually be salt 
(unless we are Lot’s wife!)—we recognize this as a metaphor. However, in Paul’s phrase, 
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“you are the body of Christ,” there are no immediately identifiable restrictive violations 
that would trigger a search for metaphorical meaning. The topic “you” and the vehicle 
“body of Christ” are more similar than dissimilar in that they both represent living 
organisms, and so the phrase is more likely to be interpreted literally. 
The phrase “you are the body of Christ” has also lost its metaphorical potency 
because of the scriptural and ecclesiological context in which it is currently used. 
According to Gibbs, “metaphorical meaning can be ignored if the literal meaning . . . 
makes sense in context.”63 While on the surface, a group of people comprising a body 
does not seem to make sense, the context of this comparison increases the possibility of 
interpreting this phrase literally. Gibbs argues for the “powerful role of authorial 
intentions in the immediate process of metaphor understanding.”64 For instance, people 
are more likely to process the metaphorical meaning in phrases that were written by 
famous poets than in those generated by a computer, which “lacks intentional agency.”65 
Because the source of Paul’s phrase is scripture, which is authoritative for the church, 
because Paul is viewed as one of the most authoritative authors of scripture, and because 
there is a strong tendency among Christians to read scripture in a literal sense rather than 
metaphorically, Paul’s words are taken more literally, even when a metaphorical 
interpretation seems more plausible.  
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Metaphors also become literalized if they lose their sense of “tensive quality” or 
“emotional tension,” or if they no longer exhibit a “surprising similarity within a situation 
of considerable and obvious dissimilarity.”66 Here again, authorial intent is paramount. 
Because we are dealing with scripture, we are more prone to see the similarities between 
our situation and Paul’s words than we are willing to see the dissimilarities. Because the 
scriptures are our story, and because Paul’s words represent the ideal nature of the 
church, we want to identify with what Paul describes. Because we want to be the body of 
Christ, we do not look for “obvious dissimilarity.” We also cannot—or will not—
comprehend any sort of literal absurdity in this phrase, so we tend to see it not as a 
metaphor, but as a literal description of the faith community that is the church. 
Comparisons are more likely be understood metaphorically when the shared 
features of the topic and vehicle are highly salient for one, but not for the other. 
Conversely, a comparison will likely be interpreted literally when the shared features are 
highly salient for both terms.
67
 For instance, the shared features of “you” (as the church) 
and “the body of Christ” include a living (or resurrected) reality, faithfulness to God, 
cruciformity, and ministry to the poor and disenfranchised—all of which are highly 
salient for both—and which lead to a more literal relationship between the two. 
Finally, we may tend to literalize the metaphor because the vehicle—the body of 
Christ—is itself an absurd phrase, at least since Jesus’ ascension, in that it is something 
intangible, invisible, and ultimately inexpressible in concrete terms (unless, of course, it 
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refers to Christ’s actual physical body). For a metaphor to function most effectively as 
metaphor, both topic and vehicle must be concrete. The metaphorical sense is derived 
from the relationship between the two, which is abstract. 
As all this demonstrates, we are likely to find or even create literal meaning for 
“the body of Christ.” But as with any metaphor, when it becomes literalized, it loses 
some crucial features of metaphorical function. One such function is the ability to “both 
reveal and conceal . . . both lie and tell the truth”; the meaning and significance of a 
metaphor “depends upon the interplay of this similarity and difference.”68 But in this 
interplay, certain aspects or characteristics of the topic and/or the vehicle are emphasized 
while others are hidden. For instance, Witvliet notes that the phrase “God is a rock” 
“highlights God’s steadfastness or faithfulness or dependability, but hides the sense that 
God is active, living, and dynamic.”69 Putting this in more direct terms, any metaphor has 
the potential to both highlight and hide certain aspects of the topic or vehicle. 
From the discussion above of Paul’s intention, we can see at least some of what 
the phrase “you are the body of Christ” highlights or reveals about the nature of the 
church: that it is (ideally) a cohesive social group, identified by a strong, shared faith, that 
stands in opposition to other, potentially threatening social groups. But what does Paul’s 
comparison (or statement) conceal or hide about the churches, about the body, and about 
the body of Christ? The most obvious hidden aspect of the metaphor is the question of 
physicality: how can many distinct human bodies constitute one body? If we assume that 
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Paul intended for the church to be a community with strong boundaries, and that he used 
the body imagery as part of his rhetoric to that effect, we can draw a correlation between 
the boundary of the body (the skin) to the boundaries of the church (new ways of being 
and relating to the world). This presents two problems hidden in the metaphor: (1) the 
physicality of the human body makes it impossible to transcend the boundary of skin to 
be incorporated into a new, different body; and (2) as noted above, the church’s 
boundaries need to be somewhat permeable, or else the process of conversion and growth 
in the body (numerically) would cease. Although skin is permeable to air and moisture, it 
is not permeable to the experiences or mutual embodiment of other people. 
Paul attempts to describe the relationship between individual bodies and the body 
of Christ by associating each individual body to a different part of Christ’s body: “For 
just as the body is one and has many members, and all the members of the body, though 
many, are one body, so it is with Christ” (1 Cor. 12:12). Paul goes on to explain that each 
part of Christ’s body has a necessary function, just as does each part of an individual 
body: “But as it is, God arranged the members in the body, each one of them, as he chose. 
If all were a single member, where would the body be? As it is, there are many members, 
yet one body” (1 Cor. 12:18-19). Paul’s fluid language—shifting back and forth from 
referring to a physical body to referring to the body of Christ—does not always facilitate 
our ability to discern what the metaphor conceals. 
Paul builds on this image and notes the indispensability of each part of the body: 
“The eye cannot say to the hand, ‘I have no need of you,’ nor again the head to the feet, ‘I 
have no need of you’” (1 Cor. 12:21). While Paul’s intention is to highlight the necessity 
80 
of each person’s contribution to the community, this ideal of a well-ordered, efficiently 
functioning body hides what is a reality for many people: a body that does not function 
well, and in which certain parts may be considered dispensable because they do not 
contribute to the overall well-being and stability of the body. In a nutshell, what is hidden 
or denied in Paul’s use of the “body of Christ” metaphor is the experience of disability. 
When Paul affirms that any weakness in the body is the perception of the members of the 
body (1 Cor. 12:22), he is also denying the reality of physical dysfunction within the 
body, thus recalling our discussion in chapter 2 about the ways that the experiences of 
people with disabilities are often defined and given value on the basis of the perceptions 
of able-bodied people.
70
 
The way the “body of Christ” metaphor hides disability is amplified by the 
modern church’s image of the resurrected body of Christ as a glorified and perfected 
body. Although scripture does not give an accurate portrait of the nature of Christ’s 
resurrected body, his post-resurrection appearances in the gospels give us some clues. 
While Christ’s body was still recognizable in its physical features (although at times, it 
was not instantly recognizable), while it still bore the scars of crucifixion, and while his 
body could still be seen and touched, it also transcended physicality in that Christ could 
pass through solid walls and appear suddenly in a room. That is, the limits of physicality 
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(and hence, disability) were overcome in the resurrection.
71
 If the church identifies itself 
with Christ’s resurrected, glorified body, and if the church sees this freedom from the 
limitations of physical embodiedness as an ideal state, then there may be no room in the 
body of Christ for disability, or at least no allowance for the experience of disability 
within the church’s concept of its nature and mission.
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CHAPTER 4 
BODY THEOLOGY 
 
Embodiment is the end of all God’s works. 
— Friedrich Oetinger1 
God and humankind encounter each other in the body. 
— Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel2 
 
Jessica Harren, a Lutheran pastor, shares the way her early Christian experience 
shaped the way she regarded her body: 
It was a devastatingly simple revelation: Jesus had a body. You would think that 
being raised in the Lutheran church would have helped me to internalize this 
message. By the time I was in high school, my church celebrated communion 
every Sunday. The communion ritual in the Lutheran church involves someone 
handing you a piece of bread and saying, “This is Jesus’ body, broken (or given) 
for you.” I heard that every Sunday and never understood what it meant. 
What I understood the church to be saying was that God cared about my soul, 
how much I helped others, and how much time I spent praying and reading the 
Bible. What I heard was that I was to give the shirt off my back, which for me 
meant giving up several hours of sleep. What I did was try to prove to God that I 
was worthy of love by making straight A’s regardless of the physical 
consequences. The church taught me that my soul and my body are separate 
things, and that my soul mattered more than my body. The culture around me told 
me that my soul and academic career were more important than my body. My 
body had to be controlled and subdued for me to know God. The pain caused by 
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these messages began to be healed when I began to understand one simple 
revelation: Jesus had a body.
3
  
Christianity has had a love/hate relationship with the human body. At worst, the 
body has been understood as something of a “necessary evil” from which the spirit is to 
find escape at death. At best, the body has been characterized as a necessary means to an 
end (as the vehicle for salvation and preservation of the soul). Even when theologians 
affirmed the goodness of the body, there were always feelings of ambiguity and tension. 
For example, John Climacus, the seventh century Abbot of Sinai, describes his feelings 
toward his own body: 
By what manner of rule shall I bind this body of mine . . . How can I hate him 
when my nature disposes me to love him? How can I break away from him when 
I am bound to him forever? How can I escape from him when he is going to rise 
with me? He is my helper and my enemy, my assistant and my opponent, a 
protector and a traitor . . . I embrace him. And I turn away from him. What is this 
mystery in me? What is the principle of this mixture of body and soul? How can I 
be my own friend and my own enemy?
4
  
Indeed, these questions have been answered—directly or indirectly—in different ways 
during various periods of Christian history. Kallistos Ware observes that “in Eastern and 
Western Christendom, there has never been a single universally accepted doctrine of 
human personhood.”5 
Theology has long wrestled with the question of what “personhood” is and where 
it is located. Is the essence of human nature—the divine image in which humanity was 
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created—found in the human soul or spirit? Or is it found in the mind, with its ability to 
reason? Or in the body itself, the outward expression of an individual’s humanity? What 
is the nature of the body, and what is its relationship to God and to the world? In order to 
answer these questions, I look briefly at the conception of the “body” in ancient Judaism, 
early Christianity including Paul’s theology, and later Christianity. Then I consider the 
work of modern scholars in the emerging field of body theology. 
 
“The Body” in Ancient Judaism 
From the beginnings of Western philosophy, the human body and the soul were 
considered distinct elements of the human being. But because the human body was 
considered weak, mortal and vulnerable, philosophers, especially Plato, valued the soul 
over the body: the soul is strong and the body is weak. The soul is the vessel of the divine 
image while the body, in all its weakness, desecrates that image. The soul is that which 
separates humans from animals and thus enables them to have a unique relationship with 
their Creator. The true nature of the human individual rested in the intellect or mind, 
which was imprisoned in a material body. The immortal soul is “freed” from the mortal 
body at death, which Plato called “the separation of the soul from the body.”6  
Although these philosophical ideas about the dualism of the body and soul 
influenced Christian theology, there is little evidence of such a clear dichotomy in ancient 
Judaism. John Robinson notes that there is no theologically significant Hebrew term for 
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“body.”7 The Hebrew word most often translated as “body” is basar, which is more 
appropriately understood to mean “flesh” rather than “body.” 
Jürgen Moltmann argues that in the Hebrew scriptures, “the human creature 
always appears as a whole.”8 He cites the shema, “You shall love the Lord your God with 
all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your might” (Deut. 6:5) as evidence 
that “a reduction of the ‘human act of living’ to thinking and willing, and its localization 
in the soul or brain, are unknown. There is no ‘primacy of soul.’”9 Robert Gundry writes, 
“man is an animated body rather than an incarnated soul.”10 As is often said, a person 
does not have a body; he or she is a body.  
Hebraic covenantal theology helps us understand this representation of the 
relationship between soul and body. The Israelites understood themselves to be bound to 
God not as individuals, but as a people; the covenant was given, received, and enacted by 
the community. John Robinson remarks that “the flesh-body was not what partitioned a 
man off from his neighbor; it was rather what bound him in the bundle of life with all 
men and nature, so that he could never make his unique answer to God as an isolated 
individual, apart from his relation to his neighbor.”11 The ancient Hebrews did not think 
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theologically about the body in terms of the significance of its composition, but rather 
with reference to its relationship to God. There are no seeds here of Western philosophic 
ideas about the relationship between “form” and “matter” or about the body as a source 
of differentiation of one person from another. 
Although ancient Hebrew theology does not support a clear separation of body 
and soul, neither does it conflate soul and body to the point that there is no distinction 
between the two. As Johannes Pederson observes, ancient Judaism considered that 
the flesh is the weaker . . . the soul the stronger. The soul is more than the body, 
but the body is a perfectly valid manifestation of the soul. Soul and body are so 
intimately united that a distinction cannot be made between them. They are more 
than ‘united’: the body is the soul in its outward form.12  
Thus, soul and body are so interconnected and interdependent that the human person is at 
the same time an animated body and an embodied soul; the difference between soul and 
body is a difference in function rather than in form. Even when the Hebrew scriptures 
refer (sparingly) to life after death, it always involved resurrection of the body rather than 
immortality of a disembodied soul: “Your dead shall live, their corpses shall rise” (Is. 
26:19a). 
This holistic anthropology does not mean that ancient Judaism had a generally 
optimistic view of the human body. As noted in chapter 2, men with physical 
impairments and other bodily defects were prohibited from serving as priests or from 
entering the Holy of Holies. To the ancient Israelites, the body had the potential to honor 
or desecrate the holiness of God. The purity laws reveal a preoccupation with maintaining 
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the body’s potential toward holiness. Impurity, which could be caused by a variety of 
voluntary or involuntary bodily actions such as eating or menstruating, or by illness or 
physical impairments, became an impediment between God and the community, thus 
necessitating the impure individual to be isolated and ritually cleansed. Bodily purity and 
integrity were symbolic of the purity and integrity of the body politic, against which there 
were ongoing threats by hostile nations.
13
  
For the Israelites, who were a threatened minority, individual bodies were 
representative of the body of Israel as a whole. Exercising control over individual bodies 
through purity rituals increased the sense of creating tight social boundaries that 
differentiated the Israelites from neighboring polytheistic nations. This was especially 
true for diaspora Jews; although they could not enjoy the social cohesion of living in 
Israel, they could still maintain a sense of distinction from their pagan neighbors through 
their bodily practices and rituals.
14
 
 
Early Christian Body Theology 
Christianity developed in the midst of cosmopolitan societies that were steeped in 
both ancient Hebraic theology and Greco-Roman philosophy, and, as Ware noted, there 
was no consensus on the theological significance and meaning of the human body. 
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However, by the time the New Testament started to take shape, the relationship between 
soul and body in Christian theology was being influenced by Hellenic Judaism, which 
was itself steeped in Platonic ideas. Death, in particular, is defined in Hellenistic Jewish 
literature by the Platonic notion of the soul separating from the body.
15
 In his Sermon on 
the Mount, Jesus makes a distinction between looking at another person lustfully (with 
the eyes) and committing adultery in the heart (or soul). But he goes on to proclaim that 
body parts such as eyes or hands that cause a person to sin are dispensable, and it is 
preferable to lose that part than to lose one’s soul to “hell” (Matt. 5:27-30). This idea that 
hell is the death of both soul and body is supported by Jesus’ statement, “Do not fear 
those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul; rather fear him who can destroy both 
soul and body in hell” (Matt. 10:28). Death of the body is one thing; it is earthly death 
and normal. But death of both body and soul is worse; it represents eternal condemnation. 
Other passages in the New Testament also reveal a strong bias toward the Platonic notion 
of death as the final separation of soul and body. For instance, the author of James writes, 
“the body without the spirit is dead” (James 2:26), and in the parable of the Rich Fool, 
God says, “This night your soul is required of you” (Luke 12:20, RSV).16 
In early Christianity, the duality of body and soul is evident not only in death, but 
also in life. Jesus’ words to his sleepy disciples in the Garden of Gethsemane, “The spirit 
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indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak” (Mark 14:38, NRSV), have become an aphorism 
that describes the perceived reality of this soul/body dichotomy, and especially the idea 
that the body is often an impediment to the will of God that works in the soul.
17
 However, 
Jesus’ views about the body are more complex than this seemingly simple statement 
reveals. 
Jesus, the Incarnate One, revealed a profoundly embodied, prophetic ministry in 
which he did not adhere strictly to the predominant Hebraic theology of bodily purity and 
holiness. Jesus breached the purity laws many times by touching those who were unclean 
(such as lepers and the woman caught in adultery) and by allowing impure persons to 
touch him (such as the woman with the flow of blood and the woman who anointed his 
feet). He also rejected laws regarding bodily actions such as eating and working on the 
Sabbath. In the Gospel of Mark, Jesus explains to his disciples that it is not what goes 
into the body (as in certain restricted foods), but rather what comes from within, from out 
of the heart, that defiles a person and makes that person impure. In this, Jesus makes a 
distinction not so much between body and soul, but between the inner person and the 
outer person. In addition, in the Gospel of Matthew, Jesus confronts the religious leaders 
who criticize his healing of a man with a withered hand on the Sabbath by saying, 
“Suppose one of you has only one sheep and it falls into a pit on the Sabbath; will you 
not lay hold of it and lift it out? How much more valuable is a human being than a 
sheep!” (Matt. 12:8-13). Where the religious authorities placed burdens on bodily actions 
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that at times denied a person’s humanity, Jesus placed a greater value on the entire human 
person (including the body) than on the ritual laws designed to keep the body “pure.” 
The way Jesus cared for injured, diseased, and impure bodies reveals the great 
value he placed on the human body. The body of the woman with the hemorrhage, which 
is labeled “impure” by her society, becomes the site of God’s healing power. The 
unwanted bodies of those who were blind and deaf and lame become the vehicles through 
which God enacts transformation and restoration to community. Jesus relocates the 
natural separation between humans and God from the potential impurity of the body to 
the failure to value the body, especially the body that is unwanted, outcast, and unloved. 
In fact, Jesus’ own body was the single greatest instrument for the revelation of God’s 
grace and power, not only in his death and resurrection, but also in his life. As Isherwood 
and Stuart note, Jesus was “not a philosopher simply engaging the minds of people on his 
wanderings through the land.”18 It was Jesus’ holistic authenticity—the way his spiritual 
teaching and his embodied expressions of God’s truth were in harmony—that helped 
make his message so compelling. This bodily integrity affirms, as Karl Barth puts it, “the 
oneness and wholeness in which the constitution of man is visible in this man [Jesus].”19  
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“The Body” in Paul’s Theology 
It is difficult to discover a clear, cohesive theology of the body in Paul’s writings. 
For one thing, Paul uses the Greek term sōma to refer to various bodies: the physical 
human body, the body of Christ which was killed and resurrected and through which 
salvation is assured, the body of Christ that is the Church, and the body of Christ in the 
eucharist. But Paul also uses another term, sarx, which some Bible versions translate as 
“body” and others translate as “flesh.” 
At first glance, Paul’s writings seem to embrace the Hellenistic duality of the 
human being as a distinct body and a distinct soul. A brief survey of his writings reveal 
passages in which Paul assumes a clear separation between the physical and the spiritual. 
For instance, Paul laments to the Corinthians that he knows “that while we are at home in 
the body (sōma) we are away from the Lord” (2 Cor. 5:6). To the Colossians, he writes, 
“In him also you were circumcised with a spiritual circumcision, by putting off the body 
(sōma) of the flesh (sarx) in the circumcision of Christ” (Col. 2:11). 
But a closer look at Paul’s theology reveals a different sort of dualism. As noted 
above, Paul uses two Greek words, sōma, which is most often translated as “body,” and 
sarx, which can be translated as “flesh” or “body” or “human being.”20 Paul uses these 
two terms in different contexts and for different purposes, but both of them stand for the 
whole person “under the aspect of the flesh” as opposed to simply the physicality 
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(material nature) of bodily existence.
21
 As Robinson explains, “in essence sarx and sōma 
designate different aspects of the human relationship to God. While sarx stands for man, 
in the solidarity of creation, in his distance from God, sōma stands for man, in the 
solidarity of creation, as made for God.”22 For Paul, the sarx represents the earthly, and 
thus temporary, state of human existence while the sōma represents the possibility of 
future and heavenly existence. That is why Paul can say “flesh (sarx) and blood cannot 
inherit the kingdom of God” (1 Cor. 15:50) while at the same time saying, “so it is with 
the resurrection of the dead . . . It is sown a physical body (sōma), it is raised a spiritual 
body (sōma)” (1 Cor. 15:42, 44). Where Paul makes a clear distinction, then, is between 
these “different aspects” of humanity’s relationship with God, which are the inward and 
the outward expressions of each human body. Ware explains that “when Paul does 
choose to assert a contrast, this is not between body (sōma) and soul (psyche), but 
between flesh (sarx) and spirit (pneuma).”23 
Although Paul often refers to the weakness of the flesh (sarx), he does not imply 
that the body (sōma) is evil, even a “necessary evil.” On the contrary, his views on the 
body are highly favorable. The body by itself is prone to sin because of its physical 
needs, but the will, the heart, and the mind can control these bodily impulses and desires. 
As noted above, the conflict is not between the body (sōma) and the soul; the conflict is 
between the soul, or inner person, and sin “with the body caught in the middle and 
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dominated by sin” rather than by the spirit or will of the inner person.24 The body is the 
outward expression of sin as it works against a person’s will or inward desires. Sin takes 
root in the inner person, but takes form in the outer person or body. But even here, Paul is 
not presenting a duality between physical and non-physical, as Gundry notes: “Because 
of the unity of the inner man and the outer man in a living human being, the whole ‘I’ 
becomes a sinner.”25 
Just as the body is the place where sin becomes evident, it is also the site of 
redemption, both in this life and in the life to come. Paul claimed a prominent place for 
the body in the process of redemption and of being conformed to Christ in the earthly 
life: 
Do you not know that your bodies are members of Christ? Or do you not know 
that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you, which you have from 
God, and that you are not your own? For you were bought with a price; therefore 
glorify God in your body (1 Cor. 6:15a, 19-20). 
However, Paul also put high value on the body’s role in future redemption. The body is 
not disposable; rather, it is a very necessary seed for its own future transformation:  
But someone will ask, “How are the dead raised? With what kind of body do they 
come?” Fool! What you sow does not come to life unless it dies. And as for what 
you sow, you do not sow the body that is to be, but a bare seed, perhaps of wheat 
or of some other grain (1 Cor. 15:35-37). 
In Paul’s theology, the body is more than a material “outer shell” for the soul or inner 
person. It is the essential means by which the person experiences God, for better or for 
worse, both in this life and in the next. Unfortunately, the vital distinction that Paul 
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makes between sōma and sarx is often overlooked. According to Ware, when theologians 
and preachers conflate these two ideas, the church loses much in a sound theology of the 
body.
26
 
 
Body Theology in Later Christianity 
Although Paul did not embrace the radical Hellenistic dualism of soul and body 
and instead placed value on the body, Christian theology after the first century C.E. 
developed in an empire steeped in Platonic philosophy, and reverted somewhat to a 
denigration of the body in favor of the soul. Gnosticism, which spread throughout the 
Middle East during the second and third centuries, took the duality of the body and soul 
to its extreme by rejecting not only the human body, but also anything in the material 
world as completely fallen and unredeemable. Some versions of Gnosticism taught that 
the goal of humans, which were divine souls trapped in physical bodies, was to escape 
from the prison of the material world. Manicheism, a major Gnostic heresy, was 
condemned in the fourth century, but versions of this dualistic movement continued to 
flourish throughout the first millennium, and some remnants of Gnostic thought are still 
evident today in certain esoteric Christian sects. Gnosticism, with its tendency to devalue 
the body, raised questions about Christology. Although it was not a sect in itself, 
Docetism was a train of Christological thought that rejected the idea that Jesus was truly 
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incarnate—that the eternal logos inhabited a physical body—and affirmed that “the flesh 
was unsuitable for Christ.”27 
Throughout the patristic and medieval periods, theologians held ambiguous views 
about the human body. Ambrose, Augustine, and other early church fathers rejected the 
extremes of Gnostic duality but still believed that the body was in some way an 
impediment to a person’s relationship with God. Asceticism and celibacy became the 
highest form of Christian life and the primary ways of dealing with bodies that, because 
they had physical needs and desires, were the scourge of the human will. For Augustine 
in particular, asceticism was not so much an answer to Gnostic duality as it was a way to 
realize “effortless interiority, in which the soul is at home in the body and in control.”28 
For Augustine, the body is utterly fallen, partly because of its material nature, and 
partly because of the inability of the soul and the body to maintain a properly functioning 
relationship. One result of this fallen nature is that “man who would have become 
spiritual even in his flesh . . . became carnal in his mind.”29 Thus, humans were created to 
be a unified entity in which flesh and spirit were inseparable in function, but original sin 
created a rupture in the ideal operation between soul and body. Humans would not 
experience bodily suffering—pain, growing old, and death—“if our natural being were in 
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every way and in every part obedient to our will,” which, of course, is impossible because 
of the rupture between body and will.
30
 
Augustine also places high value on the aesthetics of a well-proportioned physical 
body. Any deformity in the body was a sign of the fallen state of humanity: “of course, 
the sole purpose of deformity is to give yet another proof of the penal condition of 
mortals in this life.”31 These deformities would be removed in the final resurrection.32 
Thus, Augustine believes that the intention of God was to gift humans with aesthetic, 
well-formed, and well-functioning bodies.
33
 
In the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas uses Aristotelian philosophy to describe the 
nature of the human body and particularly its relationship to the human soul.
34
 In his 
Summa Theologica, he clearly sets out a theology of the body and soul that is different 
from the Platonic views that had held sway for some twelve centuries: 
Since, then, sensation is an operation of man, but not proper to him, it is clear that 
man is not a soul only, but something composed of soul and body. Plato, through 
supposing that sensation was proper to the soul, could maintain man to be a soul 
making use of the body.
35
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Although Aquinas affirms that humans are both soul and body, and that both are 
necessary parts of the whole being, he still reveals some duality between the material and 
the immaterial. For instance, he affirms that the soul does not cease to exist once the body 
dies because it is an incorruptible form. He also locates “personhood” in the intellect: 
“For we find an intellect whose relation to universal being is that of the act of all 
being.”36 This intellect differs from the body in both form and function, and operates 
independently of the body: “Now it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man 
transcends matter; for it has an operation in which the body takes no part whatever.”37 
 The Reformation generally focused on the inward, spiritual experience (as seen in 
the emphasis on justification by grace, rejection of the intermediary role of priests, and 
the significance of providing access to scriptures), but the theological significance of the 
human body did not escape the Reformers’ notice. For many of them, the body was the 
carrier of God’s image and was in as much need of redemption as the soul.  
Martin Luther followed the misreading of the Pauline “duality” of human 
existence: 
Man is composed of a twofold nature, a spiritual and a bodily. As regards the 
spiritual nature, which they name the soul, he is called the spiritual, inward, new 
man; as regards the bodily nature, which they name the flesh, he is called the 
fleshly, outward, old man. The result of this diversity is, that in the Scriptures 
opposing statements are made concerning the same man; the fact being that in the 
same man these two men are opposed to one another; the flesh lusting against the 
spirit, and the spirit against the flesh.
38
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But at the same time, he asserts that the body is neutral in that it plays no part in either 
justification or condemnation: 
It is certain that absolutely none among outward things, under whatever name 
they may be reckoned, has any weight in producing a state of justification and 
Christian liberty, nor, on the other hand, an unjustified state and one of slavery.
39
 
It is difficult to find a clear theology of the body in Ulrich Zwingli’s works, but 
his emphasis on the true humanity of Christ and his denial of any real presence of Christ 
in the eucharist reveals the value he placed on corporality.
40
 Because he believed the 
body of Christ had ascended to heaven, it could not possibly be physically present at the 
table. Luther contended that this was a corruption of the doctrine of the incarnation, and 
he argued for the “ubiquity” of Christ’s body.41 But Zwingli responded by calling 
“ubiquity” a contradiction because although Christ is everywhere, his body cannot be 
everywhere without ceasing to be a body, in any proper sense of the term. Zwingli seems 
to have taken the idea and significance of physical embodiment very seriously. 
Of all the reformers, John Calvin had perhaps the most pessimistic view of the 
body. He is clear about the duality of human nature while placing greater value on the 
soul: “there can be no question that man consists of a body and a soul; meaning by soul, 
an immortal though created essence, which is his nobler part.”42 He found it “absurd” that 
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the image of God extended beyond the soul to the body: “seeing that the soul is not the 
totality of human nature, are we not obliged to find it absurd that, in view of this, 
humanity should be called God’s image?”43 Some scholars argue that Calvin’s 
abhorrence of dancing reveals his denigration of the body, but others point out that 
Calvin was more concerned that dancing was a threat to the proper ordering of the 
relationship between the sexes, which was itself a gift from God.
44
 
The ways in which most Reformers rejected both the Roman Catholic tenets of 
chastity as a Christian virtue and also compulsory celibacy for priests reveals a somewhat 
beneficial view of the body and human sexuality. In the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, the Puritans encouraged healthy sexual relationships within marriage, but, like 
Augustine, they also believed that bodily desires were dangerous to their relationship to 
God, and so these desires must be controlled through certain practices that were 
suggestive of ancient Levitical purity laws, such as the timing of sexual intercourse and 
the need to avoid excess in eating or drinking.
45
 Although bodies themselves were not 
corrupt, the ways that bodies gave in to desires could lead to corruption of the whole 
person. 
In the modern period, the primacy of the soul over the body was strongly affirmed 
by the twentieth-century Swiss Reformed theologian Karl Barth, who wrote extensively 
on the relationship between the body and the soul, and who was one of the most 
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influential Protestant theologians of his time. Barth asserted that the human being was a 
unity of material body and immaterial spirit: “Through the Spirit of God, man is the 
subject, form and life of a substantial organism, the soul of his body, wholly and 
simultaneously both, in ineffaceable difference, inseparable unity, and indestructible 
order.”46 But, as Barth notes, there is no equality between the two; the human being is 
essentially “soul and body in ordered unity.”47 Within this unity was a particular and 
necessary order, a divinely-ordained hierarchy, in which there is a “higher and a lower, a 
first and a second, a dominating and a dominated.”48 For Barth, the starting point for 
theological anthropology is “the formula of the primacy of the soul.”49 The difference 
between soul and body is both ontological and functional: “there is control on the one 
side, i.e., that of the soul, and service on the other, i.e., that of the body. As this takes 
place man is fully man in the unity and differentiation of his soul and his body.”50 Barth 
makes the relationship between the body and soul clear when he asserts that the body “is 
ruled by the soul and serves the soul.”51 
These ideas from various eras in church history have left Christianity with the 
legacy of an ambiguous relationship with human bodies. In the great variety of forms, 
doctrines, and practices of contemporary Christianity can be seen elements of the ideas of 
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Plato, the Gnostics, Augustine, Aquinas, the Reformers, Barth, and others. There has 
never been a unified theology of the body in the history of the church, a fact that is being 
recognized and confronted by current theologians. 
 
Body Theology Since the Twentieth Century 
 Body theology emerged as a field of study in the 1960s. Various strands of 
liberation theology helped propel the need to create a theology of the body that offers 
hope of redemption for oppressed, battered, and tortured bodies in this life. Brian Wren’s 
poignant hymn “When All is Ended” speaks of this desire to proclaim redemption in the 
here and now, as compared to in some future life: 
Then do not cheat the poor, who long for bread, 
with dream-worlds in the sky or in the head, 
but sing of slaves set free, and children fed: Alleluia! Alleluia!
52
 
Science is continually creating new motivations for looking at the body through 
the lens of theology and faith. Issues surrounding the end of life and euthanasia, genetic 
testing and modifications, abortion and in vitro fertilization, and other medical questions 
force us to look at the human body in ways that are vastly different from the ways our 
ancestors understood the body and its relationship to the soul, to creation, and to God. 
Modern technology has opened new avenues for understanding embodiment. As Mary 
Timothy Prokes observes, beginning in the twentieth century, technology has turned the 
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body into “a major artifact.”53 Age-old questions such as “what is the human body?” and 
“where is the essence of our humanity found?” seem more urgent—and more complex—
than ever before. Feminist theologians and disability scholars have urged us to look at 
various aspects of the body and how those aspects define—or do not define—what it 
means to be human.  
Other ideological and scientific shifts in contemporary society have changed the 
way we understand the body. Biological advances in the ability to extend life, restore 
diminished physical function, and delay the effects of aging have put great value on 
bodies that are strong, virile, and physically beautiful and capable. Although there are 
still clear components of the body/soul or body/mind dualism in modern Western culture, 
the longstanding preference for the soul over the body has been reversed in some ways. 
So much time, effort, and money are spent on preserving the body and its youthfulness 
(and usefulness), that the ancient desire for the soul to be freed from the restraints of the 
body is no longer the primary concern for many people. “Salvation” of the soul has been 
replaced by “preservation” of the body however that may be possible. Rather than death 
being welcomed as freedom for the soul, it has become something to be avoided (or at the 
least, delayed). No longer is the body something to be “disciplined and made an 
instrument of the soul.”54 Popular culture not only affirms a clear body/soul dichotomy, 
but also places more value on the material than the spiritual. 
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However, this emphasis on preserving the body is more prevalent in secular 
culture than in the church. In fact, many churches hold views closer to Karl Barth’s 
hierarchical concept of the soul/body relationship. Orthodox theologian Alexander 
Schmemann describes this kind of dichotomy in theological anthropology as the 
“fundamental opposition of the spiritual to the material.”55 When one dimension of life is 
valued over the other, both lose their value. When the spiritual is valued over the 
material—that is, when the church values the human soul over the human body, as is 
often the case in contemporary Christianity—then the matter of physical life (in the body) 
becomes “ultimately unredeemable and religiously meaningless.”56  
In this unbalanced duality in which the body is subordinate to the soul, saving 
souls becomes more important than saving bodies. William T. Cavanaugh identifies the 
use of torture during the Pinochet regime in Chile during the latter half of the twentieth 
century as a particularly egregious example of privileging the soul over the body, which 
he cites as an ecclesiological problem. Cavanaugh notes that Roman Catholic 
ecclesiology in Latin America was strongly influenced by Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), 
a French Catholic neo-Thomistic philosopher. According to Cavanaugh, Maritain held 
that “Christianity was needed not only to distinguish the spiritual from the temporal but 
to subordinate the latter to the former.”57 In other words, in Maritain’s ecclesiology, the 
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church’s relationship to the physical realm is only tangential and ephemeral; the ideal 
church “has her roots in the sky of the supernatural life.”58 As Cavanaugh observes, this 
concept led the Roman Catholic leadership during the Pinochet regime to accept “an 
arrangement whereby the state would have charge of the body and the church would care 
for the soul.”59 This allowed the Roman Catholic Church to ignore (or at least fail to act 
in light of) the torture that the regime was inflicting on many Chilean people. 
Furthermore, it did not provide the church with the resources to resist the unjust 
oppression of the regime. 
A similar but somewhat less abhorrent situation exists in the case of disability. 
The state, through legislation such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990), is 
granted control over the disabled body, while the church accepts its charge to care for the 
soul (which, depending on the theological tradition of the particular church, may or may 
not be “diseased” because of the disabled condition of the body). This separation of 
control over the body and soul becomes more evident when we remember that churches 
(along with other non-profit groups) lobbied for and were granted blanket exemption to 
the ADA mandates. The church, it seems, was more than happy to relinquish its care for 
people’s bodies in favor of its self-proclaimed mission to care only for people’s souls.60 
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The issue of physical disability, then, is very much a critique of the church’s theological 
anthropology.  
Contemporary body theology evolved, in part, as a reaction against the kind of 
duality that has shown preference for the soul and has devalued people’s embodied 
experiences. Feminist theologians such as Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel, Lisa Isherwood, 
Elizabeth Stewart, and Sallie McFague have developed theologies of the body that 
address the oppression of women, which they believe is grounded in the fundamental 
issue that women’s bodies are different from the ideal image of the human body that 
patriarchy has promoted. Christianity has been the vehicle for much patriarchal 
oppression, starting with the story of Eve’s creation, which sets up a hierarchical system 
that is inherent in creation and that is based on bodies that are physically and biologically 
different. 
Body theology is a “bottom up” theology that begins with the experience of 
embodiment in its efforts to determine the proper relationships between humanity, 
creation, and God. All humans are embodied. However, that unavoidable fact reveals the 
complexity of doing body theology: as Mary Timothy Prokes observes, because 
embodiment is such a familiar experience, it does not seem necessary to explore the 
nature and significance of the body beyond those “commonly held descriptions and 
understandings [that] have often been presumed sufficient for theological purposes.”61 It 
is only when “significant ‘paradigm shifts’ occur” that new questions arise that demand 
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faithful answers.
62
 In the cases of liberation theology, feminist theology, and disability 
theology, the emergence of voices that have long been ignored or silenced demands a 
theological study of bodies that do not fit the patriarchal or societal ideal of strong, 
functional, male bodies. 
While feminist theologians focus their theology of the body on sexual oppression 
and gender inequality, other theologians (notably men) have developed, as part of broader 
theological projects, a theology of the human body that challenges traditional duality and 
that upholds the body as a fundamental and necessary part of our ability to relate to God 
and to the world. Jürgen Moltmann offers a direct challenge to Barth and other 
theologians and philosophers who value the soul, mind, or reason over the body by 
presenting a holistic theological anthropology. In his book God in Creation, Moltmann 
writes: 
We shall therefore view the relationship between soul and body . . . as a 
perichoetic relationship of mutual interpenetration and differentiated unity; but we 
shall not introduce one-sided structures of domination into it. We are neither 
starting from the assumption of the primacy of the soul, nor assuming the primacy 
of the body. This presupposes theologically that the presence of God in the Spirit 
is not localized solely in the consciousness or in the soul, or in the subjectivity of 
the reason and will; but that its place is the whole human organism—that 
historical Gestalt which people, body and soul, develop in their environment.
63
 
Rather than describing the human being as an embodied soul, or ensouled body, 
Moltmann argues for both a differentiation and essential interrelationship between body 
and soul: 
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If we do define the anthropological differentiation in a person’s relationship to 
himself as “soul and body,” then the body “informs” the soul just as strongly as 
the soul informs the body. The body talks continually to the soul, just as the 
unconscious continually influences what is conscious. If we assume a one-sided 
relationship of domination by the soul over the body, we thereby suppress the 
responding language of the body, and make the body mute.
64
 
Moltmann goes on to explain that the essence of human life is derived from the ways a 
person—body and soul—interacts with his or her environment.65 The influences on one’s 
developing personhood include the person’s genetic structure, the society and culture into 
which the person was raised, the persons’ individual and communal history, and the 
“sphere of transcendence” that represents religion and “accepted values.”66 
 
Toward a Holistic Body Theology 
Because disability involves embodiment in such a profound way, any theological 
project involving disability demands a holistic theology of the body in which the body is 
seen not only as an integral whole in and of itself, but also as a part of the larger 
communal bodies that play a role in shaping and defining the nature of disability. If 
Friedrich Oetinger was right and “embodiment is the end of all God’s works,”67 then 
embodiment is not ancillary to theological anthropology, but is the very place we should 
start and finish in our attempt to discover the relationship between the physical body, 
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God, and creation. A holistic theology of the body can be found in the work of two 
twentieth-century Roman Catholic theologians, Louis-Marie Chauvet and Edward 
Schillebeeckx. Although their projects involve ecclesiology, Christology, and 
sacramental theology, the role of the human body and its relationship to social bodies 
figures prominently in their arguments. 
Schillebeeckx focuses on Christology and ecclesiology and affirms that neither 
can be properly examined without understanding the ways Christianity is deeply 
embodied. Starting with the example of God’s power made manifest in the incarnation of 
Jesus Christ, Schillebeeckx argues that grace—God’s saving power—is experienced 
primarily in and through the body. The effects of grace on the soul are always contingent 
on its reception through the body as the body interacts with the larger world: “The human 
body and its contacts with the world around are realities through which and in which the 
soul grows to personality, just as they are the realities through which the soul expresses 
its personal development.”68  
Schillebeeckx realizes that while the body is necessary for revealing the inner self 
to the world, it acts, in its corporeality, both to reveal and conceal that inner self: 
The inward man manifests itself as a reality that is in the world through the body. 
It is in his body and through his body that man is open to the “outside” and that he 
makes himself present to his fellow men. Human encounter proceeds through the 
visible obviousness of the body, which is a sign that reveals and at the same time 
veils the human interiority.
69
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In addition, the body and soul (or the physical and the spiritual), although ontologically 
separate, work in a mutually interdependent way that cannot be deconstructed into 
distinct actions:  
In human activity a person’s own bodiliness is an aspect of the active subject. The 
bodily expression is not merely the manifestation of a free spiritual act after it has 
already been fully achieved in pure interiority; the spiritual act can only be 
achieved in incarnation . . . Every personal act is one and undivided; in it the 
interior element is made visible at the same time as it is given its fully personal 
and human character by its opposite pole, the bodily element.
70
 
For Schillebeeckx, the Christian life is a series of encounters with God that are mediated 
through one’s body. 
Chauvet expands this idea of the body as mediation.
71
 He constructs a sacramental 
theology in which he highlights the significance and role of the body in shaping the 
human experience of self, God, and the world. Chauvet posits that the body is the 
mediator of all reality, both internal and external, including nonmaterial reality: “the most 
‘spiritual’ happens through the most ‘corporeal.’”72 Starting with the field of linguistic 
theory, and especially the work of Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan, Chauvet explains 
that metaphysics has always valued the spoken word over the written word: “The letter 
presents itself as a mute body and opaque material,” while the voice has “an immediate 
proximity to the soul” and to our “sense of being.”73 But, as Chauvet notes, Derrida 
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argues that this “logo-phonocentric” view of the relationship between the voice and the 
written word has caused the metaphysical tradition to understand anything that is exterior 
or material as an obstacle to the truth.
74
 Chauvet pushes back against instrumentalist 
conceptions of language and applies his arguments to the duality of the body and soul: 
For the decision to describe either the body or language as an instrument 
presupposes an anterior existence, at least of the logical order, of humanity in 
relation to its “tools”; it presupposes an ideal human essence that, since its fall 
and exile, has been thus imprisoned in the empire of the sensible.
75
 
Chauvet points out that just as the written word is not a mere instrument of the voice, nor 
is the material an instrument of the spiritual, neither is the body a mere instrument of the 
soul. “Corporality,” he says, “is the body’s very speech.”76 
Chauvet notes that there is an “unavoidable law of the mediation of matter, the 
body.”77 There is no subject—and no truth—outside this mediation of the body. In 
addition, the body mediates truth and reality both from the world to the self and from the 
self to the world: 
Against traditional logocentrism and its visceral reaction against all exteriority, 
one must respond that the “outside” is the mediation of the “inside” of the subject; 
there is no “dualistic competition” between the two . . . The body is the primordial 
place of every symbolic joining of the “inside” and the “outside.”78 
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Furthermore, just as language (written and oral) “constitutes human beings as subjects” 
through the mediation of reality, so too does the body constitute people both as 
individuals and as members of a particular culture through the mediation of that culture’s 
values, history, and language. This two-way mediation—of the world to the interior 
person and of the interior person to the world—is by necessity limited by the material 
form of the mediation, which is the body. While the body mediates reality to the 
individual, the body also mediates the individual to the world. There is no “pure,” 
unmediated knowledge passed between the individual and the world, or, by extension, 
between humans and God.  
Chauvet calls this mediation of reality the symbolic order, which is the “symbolic 
network of the culture which fashions us” in and through our bodies.79 This symbolic 
order also structures our bodies. That is, individual bodies are “spoken” by the corporate 
body of culture in which they exist. Individual bodies thus become “arch-symbols” of the 
entire symbolic order: in each body, the interior and the exterior, the self and the world, 
the individual and the corporate are joined together.
80
 
Chauvet sums up his emphasis on the significance of the body by quoting 
Stanislas Breton: “‘Revelation’—Christian as well as Jewish—could become the word of 
God only by an ‘exodus’ into the ‘body’ of writing.”81 Theology as a whole is possible 
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only when it begins with the necessary mediation of the body: “The anthropological is 
the place of every possible theological.”82  
Because the context for this project’s constructive ecclesiology is disability, it is 
necessary to employ a theology of the body that is holistic and has the potential to find 
value in the experience of disability. Any duality that privileges the soul or mind over the 
body as the locus for the imago Dei or for the mediation of God’s word and presence 
cannot provide the basis for an ecclesiology that respects dysfunctional bodies. 
Therefore, I ground this project in the body theology of Schillebeeckx and Chauvet, who 
argue for the primacy and necessity of the body for any encounter with God or reception 
of grace. In addition, Chauvet’s point that the body mediates all reality between the self 
and the world in a reciprocal way will figure prominently in an ecclesiology that 
emphasizes the importance of the human body and the experience of disability. 
As previously seen, body theology has not received much attention until recently. 
For people with disabilities, it is a vital subject for continuing conversation, as is the 
relationship between bodies and the church. So I now turn to the topic of ecclesiology to 
explore how individual bodies constitute and relate to the communal body that is the 
church. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE CHURCH AND EMBODIMENT 
 
[Church] is constituted by word and sacrament, as the story we tell, the story we 
embody, must not only be told but enacted. 
—Stanley Hauerwas1 
 
For persons with a disability, the experience of the relationship between 
embodiment and the church is often borne out of their struggles with a dysfunctional 
body: 
Any church that provides a positive approach to the body is healing in my 
world—a church where my body is accepted as it is, a church where it is okay to 
feel physical pleasure and pain as part of God’s creation, a place where my body 
is not denied as a part of me that does not matter, or a place where I am not 
accepted only when I overcome my bodily limits. The church that is healing for 
me is a place where Jesus’ body being broken open is the kingdom of God 
breaking into my painful body and connecting me with God and others—the 
church as a place where denial of the body or release from it are not salvation but 
healing is.
2
 
Ecclesiology is, first and foremost, a matter of embodiment, which ideally should 
be the foundation for all ecclesiological principles and formulations. But from the earliest 
days of Christianity, the church has struggled to define its ontology and mission. The 
church has always affirmed its inherent connection to God through Jesus Christ but has 
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never developed one single, universal ecclesial model.
3
 This means that the many 
different churches around the world do not share a cohesive vision of their nature, 
purpose, or mission, which leads to sometimes contradictory expressions of that purpose 
and mission and to conflicting interpretations of the gospel. In fact, until the early 
fourteenth century, ecclesiology as a distinct branch of theology was unknown. Until 
then, the church was defined in generalized theological terms and as a “presupposition of 
theological speculation rather than [theology’s] primary focus.”4 That is, early church 
theology was based on an assumption of the church as a reality, but was not directed at 
defining the church in theological terms. Many of the traditional descriptions or 
definitions of “church” have centered on the existential and theoretical concept or nature 
of the church but have not provided details about the role that human bodies and 
embodied experience plays in the church. Neither has the church clearly and definitively 
established its relationship to and responsibility for human bodies. As Nicholas Healy 
posits, any theological method “should be determined as much as possible by its subject 
matter if the latter is not to become irremediably distorted.”5 An ecclesiology that takes 
seriously the experience of disability must treat human bodies not as passive subjects, but 
as the innate substance of which the church is created and through which the church 
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carries out its mission. Just as the issue of disability calls for a holistic theology of the 
body, so does it require a holistic ecclesiology in which the totality of the human 
experience finds representation within the church, the body of Christ.
6
 
I start this quest for such an ecclesiology with a very brief foray into some 
historical and traditional understandings of what defines the church. Then I look at the 
ecclesiology of some modern theologians who make the human body very much an 
integral component of the church and its mission. 
 
Developing Ecclesiology in the Church 
By the time the gospels and epistles of the New Testament were written, the 
church was already a reality. Each author of these books and letters wrote for an 
established community that was being defined and shaped by the practices, theology, and 
culture of the society in which the community was based. Ecclesiological ideas found in 
the New Testament, then, did not arise ex nihilo, but were reflections on how these 
nascent congregations had already started to develop their own ecclesiology. Hence, there 
are several images or concepts of the church in the New Testament. 
The earliest description of church comes from the apostle Paul, whose use of the 
phrase “the body of Christ” was examined in chapter 2. But other passages in the New 
Testament offer glimpses of the early church’s self-understanding. Following his 
depiction of the story of Pentecost—the “birth of the church”—in the Book of Acts, Luke 
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offers concrete descriptions of how members of the body of Christ live out their 
communal life in Christ: 
They devoted themselves to the apostles’ teaching and fellowship, to the breaking 
of bread and the prayers. Awe came upon everyone, because many wonders and 
signs were being done by the apostles. All who believed were together and had all 
things in common; they would sell their possessions and goods and distribute the 
proceeds to all, as any had need. Day by day, as they spent much time together in 
the temple, they broke bread at home and ate their food with glad and generous 
hearts, praising God and having the goodwill of all the people (Acts 2:42-47). 
Now the whole group of those who believed were of one heart and soul, and no 
one claimed private ownership of any possessions, but everything they owned was 
held in common. With great power the apostles gave their testimony to the 
resurrection of the Lord Jesus, and great grace was upon them all. There was not a 
needy person among them, for as many as owned lands or houses sold them and 
brought the proceeds of what was sold. They laid it at the apostles’ feet, and it 
was distributed to each as any had need (Acts 4:32-35). 
In several of his epistles, Paul describes the nature and purpose of the church as a “royal 
priesthood” that is to reveal God’s glory among the Gentiles through acts of honor and 
self-control (1 Peter 2); as a community endowed with diverse gifts for the purpose of 
building itself up and to bring its members to faith and knowledge of Christ (Ephesians 
4); and as a reconciled body of people who consent to the Lordship of Christ as their head 
(Colossians 1).  
 Robert J. Banks cites several images that Paul used to refer to the Christian 
community. As noted in chapter 3, Paul used ekklēsia to describe specific, regular 
gatherings of the community that were not necessarily part of a larger unit.
7
 In his letter 
to the Ephesians, Paul mixes metaphors in one richly-laden passage: 
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So then you are no longer strangers and aliens, but you are citizens with the saints 
and also members of the household of God, built upon the foundation of the 
apostles and prophets, with Christ Jesus himself as the cornerstone. In him the 
whole structure is joined together and grows into a holy temple in the Lord; in 
whom you also are built together spiritually into a dwelling place for God (Eph. 
2:19-22). 
Here, members of the community are “citizens,” “household members” and building 
blocks of the reality of God’s presence. Paul employs other metaphors for the church 
taken from the world of agriculture: “For we are God’s servants, working together; you 
are God’s field” (1 Cor. 3:9). But throughout his writings, Paul “shows a distinct 
preference for the ‘body’ metaphor, drawn as it is from the sphere of human existence.”8 
While these biblical foundations conveyed ideas about both the ontology and the 
functionality of the church, early Christian theologians quickly took up the task of 
identifying the operative structure of the church, more often than not as a response to the 
rise of heretical and schismatic factions, and to the threat of persecution. Protecting the 
unity of the church and providing assurance to the faithful became paramount. The first 
century bishop Clement of Rome emphasized that there was “a church of God” that was 
to be patterned after the priestly hierarchy of ancient Israel. In the face of disunity and 
conflict in the Corinthian church, he advised the leaders in Corinth about the proper 
conduct and relationships within the church’s hierarchy and especially obedience to the 
bishop.
9
 Ignatius of Antioch also upheld the authority and necessity for a properly-
ordered and divinely-instituted hierarchical structure in order to maintain the unity of the 
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church.
10
 While neither of these men would equate the church with the ecclesial 
hierarchy, they did plead for church unity and harmony through obedience to that 
hierarchy. 
Beginning in the second century, as the church became more global and diverse, 
theologians began to emphasize that church unity was evident primarily in shared beliefs 
of the one, true, apostolic faith. Irenaeus of Lyons (ca. 130-ca. 202) wrote that “the 
church, although scattered in the whole world, carefully preserves [the apostolic faith], as 
if living in one house. She believes these things everywhere alike, as if she had but one 
heart and one soul, and preached them harmoniously, teaches them, and hands them 
down, as if she had but one mouth.”11 Around the same time, theologians such as 
Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150-ca. 215) and Origin (184-254) were influenced by 
Neoplatonism and its emphasis on the soul having priority and power over the body. This 
gave rise to a dualistic vision of the church: the visible church on earth was an imperfect 
reflection of the true church in heaven. 
During the episcopacy of Cyprian (bishop of Carthage ca. 248-259), the Decian 
persecution threw the unity of the church into question. Emperor Decius decreed that 
Christians must make a sacrifice to the Roman gods or face death. Some Christians 
obeyed the emperor’s edict while others went into hiding. The effect on church unity and 
identity was traumatic; those who had capitulated to the emperor, including some 
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bishops, were considered “lapsed,” and drew the ire of those who had remained faithful 
to their Christian beliefs. Cyprian responded to this crisis by emphasizing the need for all 
bishops to demonstrate unity among themselves in order to uphold and defend the unity 
of the faithful. For Cyprian, the office of bishop was a cornerstone for the church’s 
identity and structure: “the church was established upon the bishops. They could be 
judged by no one except God. To criticize the bishop was rebellion.”12 
A significant shift in ecclesiology occurred in 312 C.E., when Emperor 
Constantine legalized Christianity for the Roman Empire and created a close association 
between the church and the empire.
13
 This Constantinian model of the church set off 
conflicts between increasingly powerful bishops of traditional Christianity and adherents 
of Christian sects such as Arianism. The threat from these heretical sects led to several 
ecumenical councils at which the true Christian faith was codified in creeds. The Nicene 
Creed, revised in 381 C.E. by the First Council of Constantinople, includes four “marks” 
or distinguishing characteristics of the church: the true church is one, holy, catholic, and 
apostolic. These historic creeds (including the Nicene and Apostles’ creeds) focused 
solely on the right belief (or “catholic faith”) that was the theological foundation of the 
church; there is no mention in any of them about the right praxis of the people in the 
church. Because of this emphasis on the mental assent to a set of standardized beliefs, the 
creeds have helped shape the church’s self-identity by relocating the essence of the 
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church from the practices of people in a community of faith to a reality that can be 
identified by an objective set of marks or features (a “litmus test” of faith).  
One particular conflict within the church at this time involved the Donatists, who 
believed that the true church could not include sinners because they contaminate the rest 
of the faithful. If the church did not expel sinners, according to the Donatists, it would no 
longer be the church of Christ.
14
 In reaction to this, Augustine of Hippo declared the true 
church was a mixture of “carnal” and “spiritual.” However, because some of these 
sinners in the church would not receive salvation because of their lax commitment or 
incomplete conversion, Augustine was forced to adopt a dualistic ecclesiology in which 
he distinguished between the terrestrial or visible church and the celestial or heavenly 
church. The former is an institution that is confined by time and history, but the latter is a 
mystery that transcends those barriers.  
In 410 C.E., Rome was sacked by the Visigoths and many Roman Christians 
wondered if their rejection of traditional pagan religions for Christianity was the cause of 
this tragedy. In his seminal work The City of God, Augustine describes two cities, one 
earthly, and one heavenly, that co-exist in the world but are in conflict and stand in stark 
contrast to one another. Only the heavenly city, whose citizens come from diverse 
backgrounds and cultures and are on a pilgrimage in the world, living lives of 
righteousness and love toward God and neighbor, will be victorious. In other words, 
Augustine argued, the true focus for the church was the spiritual, heavenly realm, even 
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though it was, by necessity, on a sojourn through the earthly, political, and sensual realm 
of this world.  
Ecclesiology as a formal doctrine in the medieval period remained undeveloped. 
Although theologians focused on theological concepts such as salvation, the incarnation, 
and the sacraments, textual evidence for substantial ecclesiological discourse is scant.
15
 
At various times leading up to the Reformation, the medieval church focused on the 
papacy and hierarchy in general, relations between the church and the growing Nation-
States, and the sacramental nature of ecclesial experience. Perhaps the most significant 
development in ecclesiology was the increasing union of the political and religious 
spheres in Europe, and the founding of Western Christendom, as symbolized in the 
coronation of Charlemagne as “Emperor of the Romans” in 800 C.E. Almost 
immediately, there was backlash to this blurring of the boundaries between church and 
state, and in the eleventh century, church reforms resulted in a strengthened, autonomous 
papacy, and an increasingly centralized and bureaucratic form of church government. 
In reaction to what they perceived was an overemphasis on the ecclesial hierarchy 
that obscured the true apostolic church and in response to abuses of sacramental and 
ecclesial authority, the Reformers developed a variety of models of ecclesiology. Martin 
Luther defined the church as “a Christian holy people” (a priesthood of all believers) who 
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have justifying faith in Christ. This church can be recognized by concrete signs, 
including: the word of God is preached, believed, professed, and lived; the sacraments are 
“properly” administered according to Christ’s institution; the office of the keys 
(forgiveness and admonishment) is exercised publicly; and the people willingly endure 
suffering and evil of all kinds.
16
 Luther thus moves ecclesiology into the functional 
sphere, as opposed to the structural and hierarchical definition of the Roman Church.  
The theological differences between Luther and the other Reformers centered 
primarily on the practices of the church, and especially the sacraments. However, their 
divergent ideas also created differing ideas about the nature of the church. For Ulrich 
Zwingli, who believed that Christ could not be actually physically present in the 
eucharist, the church became the location for that presence. In this shift of “real presence” 
from the eucharistic elements to the community of believers, Zwingli emphasized the 
church as the “real” body of Christ.17 It was the faith of the community, gathered in 
Christ’s name, that marked Christ’s presence, and, hence, marked the church. Martin 
Bucer embraced the importance of education, and identified the church as the location for 
the education that leads to salvation: “it is necessary for every church of Christ to have . . 
. ministers who both can and will, with utmost zeal and perseverance, instruct and 
advance toward eternal salvation, each and every member of the congregation in their 
care, by the administration both of doctrine and of the sacraments and discipline of 
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Christ.”18 Balthasar Hubmaier stressed the importance of the human response to grace 
and the church’s willingness to follow Christ’s example of ethical, human actions and to 
exist as a community of mutual love, accountability, and peace. Hubmaier’s Form for the 
Supper of Christ included a pledge of “fraternal love” in which members of the church 
promised to love and serve their neighbors, even to the point of laying down their own 
life and blood.
19
 Hubmaier understood the church to be grounded in this fraternal love: 
“If one is thus inclined toward his neighbor, he is now in the true fellowship of Christ, a 
member of his body, and a fellow member with all godly persons.”20 
Thomas Cranmer (1489-1556), Archbishop of Canterbury and a leader in the 
English Reformation, developed with Thomas Cromwell an ecclesiology that created a 
national church under the leadership of the British monarch, who was the “vicar of 
Christ.” The Act of Supremacy (1534) granted King Henry VIII the honors and 
responsibilities of being the only supreme head on earth of the church in England, thus 
solidifying England’s complete split from the Roman Catholic Church. Cranmer helped 
create the doctrinal basis for the Church of England, which was adopted in 1563 as the 
Thirty-Nine Article of Religion. Article XIX offers a functional definition of the Church 
of England: “The visible Church of Christ is a congregation of faithful men, in which the 
pure Word of God is preached, and the Sacraments be duly ministered according to 
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Christ's ordinance.”21 This ideal ecclesiology was challenged during the course of various 
British revolutions and the ongoing battle between those who were devoted to the Roman 
Church and those who were invested in the Protestant Reformation, but it survived to be 
the foundation of the modern Anglican Church. 
The Roman Catholic Church had been undergoing its own reformation for years, 
but it responded specifically and officially to the work of the Reformers with the Council 
of Trent (1545-63). The threats of competing theologies and models of the church forced 
the Roman Church to tighten its own ecclesiology. According to Cardinal Robert 
Bellarmine (1542-1621), one of the primary figures in the counter-reformation, the true 
church “is the community of men brought together by the profession of the same 
Christian faith and conjoined in the communion of the same sacraments, under the 
government of the legitimate pastors and especially the one vicar of Christ on earth, the 
Roman pontiff.”22 The church is, then, a societas perfecta, a visible, self-sufficient 
institution that has all the necessary means—profession of faith; reception of the 
sacraments; and submission to an apostolic hierarchy—to achieve its end, which is the 
universal salvation of humankind. The true church exists wherever the relationship 
between the laity and the hierarchy is proper. There is no mention here about the 
relationship between the people and God, or among the people themselves. Bellarmine 
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realized that this external, objective, visible, and institutional definition of the church 
failed to address the internal work of God in the hearts and souls of the faithful, so he 
also made a dualistic distinction between the body and soul of the church. A person might 
belong to the body, by making a profession of faith, receiving the sacraments, and 
submitting to the papal hierarchy, but may not necessarily belong to the soul of the 
church, since that is accomplished inwardly by the work of the Holy Spirit. This Roman 
Catholic ecclesiology, which placed much value in the church as a properly ordered 
institution, was affirmed by Vatican I in 1870. 
In eighteenth-century England, John Wesley was developing his ideas about the 
church as an interdependent connection of particular, localized or national bodies. In his 
sermon “Of the Church,” he writes, “A particular Church may, therefore, consist of any 
number of members, whether two or three, or two or three millions. But still, whether 
they be larger or smaller, the same idea is to be preserved. They are one body.”23 Wesley 
was not so much concerned about the functional definition of “church” regarding proper 
preaching and administration of the sacraments as laid out in the Articles of Religion, 
which he calls a “remarkable addition,” and he was unwilling to exclude from the church 
those particular congregations or denominations which did not faithfully and consistently 
fulfill the proper functional roles.
24
 Rather, Wesley identified the true church as 
                                                 
23
 John Wesley, sermon, “Of the Church,” sec. 15, Wesleyan Center Online, accessed Dec. 29, 
2014, http://wesley.nnu.edu/john-wesley/the-sermons-of-john-wesley-1872-edition/sermon-74-of-the-
church/. Wesley’s idea of “connectionalism” would became a hallmark of the Wesleyan movement and the 
Methodist Episcopal Church and, later, the United Methodist Church. 
24
 Ibid., sec. 18. 
126 
assemblies of people who have “one Spirit, one Lord, one hope, one faith, one baptism, 
one God and Father of all.”25 
During the period between the two Vatican Councils, the Roman Catholic Church 
rediscovered the Augustinian vision of the “mystical body of Christ.” In his encyclical 
Mystici Corporis (1943), Pope Pius XII upheld both the invisible and visible natures of 
the church and united them by describing the church as a dual, mystical unity of the 
church members both with Christ and with each other. This mystical union is held 
together by the strong, apostolic (and Roman) hierarchy. 
The Second Vatican Council (1962-65) affirmed what had been adopted at the 
First Vatican Council, but also offered an expanded ecclesiology in two significant 
documents, Lumen Gentium (“Light of the Nations”) and Gaudium et Spes (literally, “Joy 
and Hope,” but more familiarly, “The Church in the World”). The church, which is 
identified as a “mystery” and called “the People of God,” is “constituted and organized as 
a society in the present world, subsists in the Catholic Church, which is governed by the 
successor of Peter and by the bishops in communion with him.”26 Although the ecclesial 
hierarchy remains, the church is also dependent on the ministry of the laity.
27
 
In contrast to the tendency to locate the church in its structure or external 
“marks,” Swiss Reformed theologian Karl Barth (1886-1968) maintained that the nature 
of the true church is neither found nor visible in its “earthly-historical” existence: 
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We can, of course, see the members of the Church, and its officials and 
constitutions and orders, its dogmatics and cultus, its organizations and societies, 
its leaders with their politics, and its laity, its art and press-and all these in the 
context of its history. Where else is the Church visible if not in these? If it is not 
visible in these, it is obviously not visible at all. But is it really visible in these? 
Not immediately and directly. This something which claims to be the Church, and 
is before us all in these manifestations, may well be only the semblance of a 
Church, in which the will and work of man, although they allege that they are 
occasioned and fashioned by God, are striving to express only themselves. What 
is visible in all this may be only a religious society. And if we assume, not only 
that this is not the case, but that what we have here is really the true Church, it is 
not self-evident that this will be visible as such in all these things; that its actuality 
will be eloquent truth. As it cannot create or confer its reality, the same is true of 
its visibility. It can only be endowed with it.
28
 
Barth goes on to affirm that the historic creedal marks of the church (First Council of 
Constantinople, 381)—that the church is one, holy, catholic, and apostolic—cannot be 
applied “to anything but the divine operation which takes place in the Church. None of 
them can be sustained in respect of a phenomenon which is only the sum of what seems 
to be something in itself, pretending to be the Church, as a human work ostensibly 
occasioned and fashioned by God.”29 According to Ian McFarland, the result of Barth’s 
arguments is “an abstraction of the church from history that is all but total.”30 Thus, Barth 
can “insist that the ‘earthly-historical’ reality of the church is finally unnecessary” and 
can promote a strict dichotomy between human embodiment and the body of Christ that 
is the church.
31
 
                                                 
28
 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/2, 67, p. 619. The Digital Karl Barth Library (Alexandria, 
Va.: Alexander Street Press, 2007) http://solomon.dkbl.alexanderstreet.com (accessed August 20, 2014). 
Italics mine. 
29
 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/2, 67, p. 617. 
30
 Ian A. McFarland, “The Body of Christ: Rethinking a Classic Ecclesiological Model,” 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 7, no. 3 (July 1, 2005): 229. 
31
 Ibid., 230. 
128 
In a sharp divergence from Barth’s arguments, Robert Jenson, a twentieth-century 
American Lutheran theologian, merges the human and divine “bodies” in the church to 
the point where there is no distinction. In addition, the church exists as the actual risen 
body of Christ because, as Jenson argues, a body is a person “insofar as this person is 
available to other persons.”32 As Jenson writes, “That the church is the body of Christ . . . 
means that she is the object in the world as which the risen Christ is an object for the 
world, an available something as which Christ is there to be addressed and grasped.”33 
Throughout the early and medieval periods, ecclesiology was an informal field of 
theological study. The church was concerned primarily (although not exclusively) with its 
structure and the relationship between civil and ecclesial authorities. In addition, many of 
the major ecclesiological ideas during this time were formed in response to (and often in 
opposition to) some threat to the church’s unity and self-understanding. However, 
starting in the nineteenth century, a contextual ecclesiology began to emerge that takes 
seriously the significance of human embodiment for the church. 
The apostle Paul used the body of Christ image to help the early church recognize 
itself as a concrete, organic unity of diverse individuals who are called to use their varied 
gifts to do the work of God as a Spirit-empowered community. But as this brief 
examination of developing ecclesiological ideas demonstrates, even though the church’s 
existence would always be dependent on the community of believers, its self-definition 
became increasingly abstract and centered not on the people in the church, but on its 
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hierarchical structure, or its relationship to the broader society, or its doctrine, creeds, and 
sacramental practices. Even when influential theologians such as Augustine 
acknowledged the human nature of the church, it was only to affirm the duality of the 
church in which the embodied human experience was simply a vehicle to help the church 
to arrive at its true home in the heavenly realm. 
 
Embodied Ecclesiology 
As noted above, if ecclesiology is to be relevant to the topic of disability, and if 
we are to work toward an ecclesiology of disability, then we need to find a model of 
ecclesiology that respects and values all forms of embodiment. Avery Dulles argues that 
“to be fully effective, images [of the church] must be deeply rooted in the corporate 
experience of the faithful.”34 Yet many of the church’s traditional ecclesiological models 
treat human bodies only as passive recipients of what the church dispenses. Bodies (of 
the laity, at least) are valuable to the church only insomuch as they receive the 
sacraments, or hear the preached word, or submit to the ecclesial authorities. Bodies are 
necessary to receive grace, but are not often valued as active agents in the transmission of 
that grace or in the actual formation and continuation of the church.  
Modern systematic ecclesiology finds roots in the work of Johann Sebastian Drey 
(1777-1853), a faculty member at the University of Tubingen. Drey’s work was not 
overtly ecclesiological, but he did give the church a fundamental role in the development 
of theology. For Drey, the church was not just the guardian and dispenser of the things 
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about which theology is concerned; the church was also the concrete expression of 
theological ideas. As Michael J. Himes notes, “this meant that the church’s history was 
not simply illustrative of its doctrine, it was doctrine embodied.”35 
Embodied ecclesiology is a contextual ecclesiology. Whereas most of the 
traditional models or definitions of the church were grounded in a theology “from 
above,” embodied ecclesiology begins “from below,” from “within the social, cultural 
and historical context of everyday human experience and existence.”36 Such a contextual 
ecclesiology is in some ways a reaction against traditional ecclesiology, which Nicholas 
Healy believes is highly systematic and theoretical and “focused more upon discerning 
the right things to think about the church rather than oriented to the living, rather messy 
confused and confusing body that the church actually is.”37 In fact, Healy believes the 
church does not have an essence that is simply given. Rather, the church “is constructed 
and reconstructed by the grace-enabled activities of its members as they embody the 
church’s practices, beliefs, and valuations.”38 
Several examples of contextual ecclesiology have emerged in the latter part of the 
twentieth century. Each of these ecclesiological frameworks starts from the experience of 
embodiment. Letty Russell describes a vision of the church using what she calls the 
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“feminist (round) table principle,” by which she seeks to “talk back” to a community 
whose self-understanding has been shaped by patriarchal domination, an imbalance of 
power, and the exclusion of the voices those on the margins of society.
39
 Jung Young Lee 
describes the “authentic church” as one that redefines the margins of human existence as 
central to its life and mission, and that eschews the “centralist” tendencies and desires of 
power, status, and domination.
40
 Leonardo Boff advocates for church to be an association 
of “grassroots Christian communities” that counter the often impersonal and juridical 
relationships between members of a church that is massive, bureaucratic, and extols 
“uniformity.”41 Pamela Dickey Young creates an image of churches as “communities of 
eros”—themselves contextualized by individual denominations and congregations—that 
address the challenges to traditional, institutional, hierarchical and exclusivist models of 
the church that are raised by a “post-Christian world.”42  
The idea of embodiment as an expression of the church’s most essential nature 
gained support in the late twentieth century through the work of theologians from varied 
traditions and backgrounds. For the purpose of examining the relationship between 
embodiment and ecclesiology, I focus primarily on the Roman Catholic theologians 
Edward Schillebeeckx and Louis-Marie Chauvet, John Howard Yoder, a Mennonite who 
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writes out of the Anabaptist tradition, and Stanley Hauerwas, who is part of the Methodist 
tradition. 
The theological projects of Edward Schillebeeckx strongly influenced the work of 
Vatican II (1962-65), although his work was not without controversy. In reaction to the 
top-heavy, juridical models of the Roman Catholic Church that developed out of Trent 
and Vatican I and that sought to define the church over and against the rising tides of 
Protestantism and modernity, Schillebeeckx focused on developing a sacramental model 
in which the church is the sign for the world both of Christ, who is the Ur sacrament (the 
initial or primary sacrament), and also of the salvation Christ offers the world. In order to 
understand his ecclesiology, it is necessary to examine some of the underlying theology. 
Schillebeeckx begins his work by exploring the early Christian community’s 
experience of Jesus and the salvation that the community found in and through Jesus. He 
points out that the writings of the New Testament are culturally embedded and 
interpretative witnesses to those experiences of the early Christians. As such, ideas such 
as grace and salvation are interpreted in various ways in the New Testament, always 
according to the social and historical situation of the people for whom the gospels or 
letters were written—many of whom were minority groups who were under threat of 
persecution and who held particular cosmological views. This means that those specific 
interpretative experiences cannot be imported as dogmatic “truth” into modern times 
when Christians no longer compose a beleaguered group that exists on the fringes of 
society, and when the passing of many centuries have generated new ways of 
understanding ourselves and our world.  
133 
Concrete human experience is a foundational part of Schillebeeckx’s argument. 
He notes that theology has always included elements of both faith and experience, but 
human experiences are often “stunted, manipulated and interpreted one-sidedly,” by 
external authorities such as the church.
43
 The authority of human experiences is grounded 
not so much in the doctrines or structure of the church as in the authenticity of those 
experiences in their particular historical and cultural setting, and in an interpretation of 
those experiences that takes into account both the setting and tradition that precedes it. 
Regarding the New Testament, Schillebeeckx notes that the texts as we have them 
today—canonized and made normative for all Christians—were themselves individual 
witnesses to the varied experiences of faith and salvation in Christ of varied communities 
of faith. He suggests that some part of this “dynamic” nature of the early church and its 
experiences was lost once the texts were canonized: “these texts took on a new 
significance over and above their content.”44 The experiences behind the texts were no 
longer the most important hermeneutical aspect of the texts. Rather, the authority of the 
texts was shifted from the experiences described in the texts to the texts themselves. 
Thus, a dynamic, existential authority changed to a formal, static, and institutional kind 
of authority that can no longer accommodate the continuing integration of human 
experience into the story of the text. 
Schillebeeckx is arguing against the church’s tendency to make certain historical 
experiences absolute references for the practice of the Christian faith. Just as God’s acts 
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in Jesus were concrete and historical, so are the ongoing acts of God in (and beyond) the 
church. The church, then, does not exist as a supracultural ideology. Rather, it is always 
and everywhere being constituted through God’s actions through the Holy Spirit in 
concrete, historical, and cultural human experiences. Schillebeeckx notes how the 
tendency of the church to reduce the Christian faith to a set of propositions negates or 
minimizes the experiential nature of faith: “One can say that Christian faith as proclaimed 
by the churches today is no longer endorsed by and from human experiences.”45 
For Schillebeeckx, the church is, above all else, “essentially discipleship of Jesus: 
following in the footsteps of Jesus to turn many people into a community which bears 
witness both to the kingdom of God and to Jesus’ own career.”46 Christ is head of the 
church not as some disembodied spiritual essence, but as the concrete (albeit historically 
conditioned) revelation of God, whose career revealed the essence of God’s intention for 
all people: liberation from the “shame at being outcast” and restoration of their “worth as 
human beings, as children of God.”47  
The true mission of the church is a continuation of Jesus’ message of salvation—
the proclamation of the kingdom of God, which is the “biblical expression for God’s 
being unconditional and liberating sovereign love, in so far as this comes into being and 
reveals itself in the life of men and women who do God’s will.”48 The church is the 
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mediation of this message, which can only happen in and through the embodied 
experiences of the faithful in particular times, places, and situations: 
The church is not the kingdom of God, but it bears symbolic witness to that 
kingdom through its word and sacrament, and in its praxis effectively anticipates 
that kingdom . . . by doing for men and women here and now, in new situations 
(different from those in Jesus’ time), what Jesus did in his time: raising them up 
for the coming of the kingdom of God, opening up communication among them, 
caring for the poor and outcast, establishing communal ties within the household 
of faith and serving all men and women in solidarity.
49
  
The church exists not as a set of doctrines or as a hierarchical system (although 
Schillebeeckx notes that these are necessary to the church’s organization and mission), 
but as historical and concrete manifestations of the embodied acts of Jesus carried out by 
communities of people. The church, then, is an ongoing story of embodied actions that 
are intrinsically ethical and faithful to Jesus’ proclamation and revelation of the kingdom. 
Schillebeeckx’s emphasis on embodiment and human experience was beneficial 
to Louis-Marie Chauvet’s work on the sacraments and the human body. Chauvet’s 
theology was explored in the discussion of body theology, and his emphasis on the body 
as the necessary mediation of all knowledge and experience was noted. As embodied 
(and social) creatures, we can never escape the need for mediation of our bodies, but 
Chauvet’s “symbolic order” that mediates reality also includes social, political, and 
historical institutional bodies. We “come-to-being” only through this multi-faceted 
mediation. Because all knowledge and experience is by necessity mediated through a 
symbolic order, no one has direct access to God. The church, then, serves as one of the 
necessary agents of mediation for knowledge and experience of God.  
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Chauvet presents a model that illustrates just how the church functions as the 
symbolic order—or as the sacramental mediator of the faith—in which Christian identity 
is formed and Christians “come-to-being.” The foundation for this model is the tripartite 
base of scripture–sacraments–ethics, none of which can rightly stand alone. It is in the 
interplay between these three that the symbolic order of the church takes shape. To focus 
on one element at the expense of the others (or to overemphasize the importance of one 
over the others) is to reduce the church and the faith to what Chauvet calls a “quasi-
substance” and a neurotic “point of fixation.”50  
Chauvet’s model brings a new depth of meaning to Paul’s phrase “the body of 
Christ.” Situating that image or concept as part of the symbolic order that is the mediator 
of all reality leads us to discover that “the body is the primordial and arch-symbolic form 
of mediation.”51 That is, the church, as Christ’s body, is more than an ontological reality 
and more than a mystical relationship: it is also a functional reality—the primary and 
necessary form of mediation of the Christian faith for the members of the body. That is, 
saying that the church is the body of Christ does not simply imply a state of existence; it 
also affirms that the church functions to “transport us immediately into the world of 
Christianity to which [we] belong.”52 
Integral to Chauvet’s concept of mediation is the idea that while the body 
mediates reality to the individual, the body also mediates the individual to the world. 
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During Jesus’ earthly ministry, his body was both the means by which he experienced the 
reality of God’s presence and power, and the means by which the world experienced the 
reality of God’s presence in Jesus’ life and being. The church, as Christ’s body, now 
functions in a similar way of reciprocal mediation. As the body of Christ and as the 
living, embodied sacrament of Christ, the church is the locus of mediation both for the 
revelation of its self (or its nature or its mission) to the world, and also by which it can 
most fully know the world. Thus the church learns not only what it is in relation to God 
through Christ, but it learns what the world is through the lens of that relationship. But 
beyond that, the church, as a sacrament of Christ, also “mediates God to the world” 
through its embodied existence.
53
  
Similar to Schillebeeckx, Chauvet notes the role that culture, history, and 
ideology play in the shaping of human experience. The symbolic order is a  
system of connections between the different elements and levels of a culture, a 
system forming a coherent whole that allows the social group and individuals to 
orient themselves in space, find their place in time, and in general situate 
themselves in the world in a significant way–in short, to find their identity in a 
world that makes “sense.”54 
The symbolic order is “the mediation through which subjects build themselves while 
building the real into a ‘world’ where they can live.”55 The church, then, must by 
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necessity be a “concrete local community [that is] in its actions, statements, appearance 
the living sign of what it celebrates.”56  
The church to Chauvet is, at root, not just a mediating symbolic order; it is 
fundamentally a sacramental mediation because in its liturgy, its kerygma, and its 
mission, it is a sacrament of Jesus Christ. When people assent to this unique mediation of 
the church, they “renounce seeing/touching/finding him by undeniable proofs. Faith 
begins precisely with such a renunciation of the immediacy of the see/know.”57 In all that 
the church says and enacts, it is making Jesus’ presence real; it is the “active sacramental 
mediation of his action.”58 In this sense, the church is “the fullest sense of the word 
‘sacrament.’”59 But the church as sacrament has meaning only in its relationship to the 
world. It must always be open to the reign of God that exceeds it while being a sacrament 
of that reign and while showing the marks of that reign in the midst of the world.  
The communal nature of the church, for Chauvet, is its very essence. The church 
is not a conglomerate of individuals who have professed faith in Jesus and have banded 
together. “The gospel is communitarian by its very nature.”60 The gathering of the 
congregation is the major characteristic and primary mark, or “fundamental sacrament” 
                                                 
56
 Louis-Marie Chauvet, The Sacraments: The Word of God at the Mercy of the Body 
(Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 2001), xxiii. 
57
 Ibid., 25. 
58
 Ibid., 33. 
59
 Ibid., 26. 
60
 Ibid., 32. 
139 
of Christ in the church.
61
 It is in this fundamental act of gathering that Christians are 
shaped by the symbolic order of the church through the embodied acts of hearing the 
word, receiving the sacraments, and mediating themselves (“speaking” themselves) to 
each other and to God through their bodies. 
John Howard Yoder (1927-1997), an American theologian from the Mennonite 
tradition, argues that the church has historically misunderstood its message and its 
mission. He reframes ecclesiology by defining the church as a set of practices rather than 
an ontological entity: 
The work of God is the calling of a people, whether in the Old Covenant or the 
New. The church is then not simply the bearer of the message of reconciliation, in 
the way a newspaper or a telephone company can bear any message with which it 
is entrusted. Nor is the church simply the result of a message. That men and 
women are called together to a new social wholeness is itself the work of God, 
which gives meaning to history, from which both personal conversion (whereby 
individuals are called into this meaning) and missionary instrumentalities are 
derived.
62
 
In other words, the church does not have a message; it is the message. It is a herald, in its 
embodied acts, of the “new humanity [that] is itself the purpose that God had in all ages, 
the gospel now to be proclaimed.”63  
Yoder does not deny that church exists as a body itself, but he affirms that the 
body is visible only through the communal life of Christians. However, for the church to 
be true to its identity and calling from God, that communal life must be distinct: “the 
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distinctness of the church of believers is prerequisite to the meaningfulness of the gospel 
message.”64 The church is a sociological reality that must retain (or recover) its 
distinctiveness and separation from the world or the powers of the world. 
Yoder argues at length against the Constantinian model of ecclesiology that has 
prevailed in one form or another since the fourth century when the church became 
intricately associated with the authority and power of the empire. This association, which 
Yoder says was a misinterpretation of how the church should relate to the world, caused 
the church to believe that its purpose was to sanctify the existing structures of society. 
Although the church’s relationship to society (or the world) shifted as time went on, it 
never reached the full state of “disestablishment” that Yoder believes is necessary in 
order for the church to be the church. 
Yoder demonstrates that the contemporary church is part of the establishment 
through his argument that, in the West at least, the church plays the role of “chaplain” 
and is expected to bless the existing power structures. The church has thus become 
nothing more than “an administrative branch of the state.”65 Furthermore, many people 
(Christians included) place the locus of salvation in these power structures. Thus, the 
church loses its ability to proclaim the unique salvific action of God in human history and 
its own unique eschatological nature. 
According to Yoder, the Constantinian model of church-world relations has 
caused the unnatural and unnecessary division of the church into visible and invisible 
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realms. In the early centuries of Christianity, the church was visible in that it was a 
fellowship of believers who saw themselves as set apart from the world and who 
remained faithful to Jesus Christ as their Lord regardless of the risks or the cost. But once 
church and state became fused, the visible church and the visible realm of the world also 
fused, and the church also became invisible; that is, it existed in the spiritual realm, as the 
“soul of the existing society.”66 
Another consequence of Constantinian ecclesiology, according to Yoder, was that 
the church came to understand its purpose as the responsibility to sanctify all of creation. 
This sanctification came through the church’s proclamation that all society was 
“Christian” by association (and through enforced baptism). Thus, the existing structure of 
society was “Christianized” and approved by the church’s authority (as it was derived 
through the church’s association with the state). But Yoder argues that this is a faulty 
view of the incarnation: God does not sanctify things as they are, but calls the church to 
discern what can remain and what must change. 
Yoder notes developments in church history that began to alter the relationship 
between church and world. While the Reformers managed to deconstruct the 
universalism of the church/empire association (even though it was never truly universal), 
they did not do much to separate the church from society. After the Reformation, there 
was no longer a strong church/world connection, but the church still aligned itself with 
varied localized power structures. Even in our modern secular age, when we admit that 
the majority of society can no longer be called Christian, the church is still entwined with 
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the power structures in such a way that it is invisible and, Yoder argues, makes the 
church impotent in its witness to the Gospel. 
Against all this, Yoder argues for the “deconstantinization” and disestablishment 
of the church. The true church would then be one that is visible, distinct, and free from all 
associations with existing structures in society. It would be a “believers’ church,” a 
“covenanted fellowship” of people who have pledged to follow the lordship of Jesus 
Christ.
67
 It would be distinct from society and would follow “the posture of Abraham,” 
which is the posture of radical obedience to God in its communal, embodied acts. It 
would have a strong enough understanding of its own identity that it would be able to 
resist the temptation to sanctify the power structures of the world. 
Yoder points to several New Testament passages that affirm the distinctiveness of 
the church. The “new world” in 2 Corinthians, the “one new humanity” in Ephesians, and 
the “royal priesthood” and “holy nation” in 1 Peter demonstrate that the nature of the 
church is at once communal and distinct.
68
 The church, as a community of believers, is 
called to be a new social reality that is independent of other social structures, and is “by 
its very existence” God’s message to the world.69 Above all, “the church’s responsibility 
to and for the world is first and always to be the church.”70 
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Yoder develops marks (what he calls the Notae Missionis) of the church that stand 
in contrast to the traditional marks (as adopted by Roman Catholic and Reformation 
theologians) which, he says, “pointed almost exclusively to characteristics that could be 
measured by looking right at the management of the church’s liturgy or its business.”71 
For Yoder, the true marks of the church are found not in doctrine or correct 
administration of the sacraments or in any hierarchical ritual or structure: “the real tests 
of whether the church is the church calls for measurements to be taken not in the meeting, 
nor in the administrative structure but at the point of the relation of church and world.”72 
Again, the church–world relationship is the central feature for Yoder’s ecclesiology. 
Yoder believes the true marks of the church are found in the embodied acts of the 
congregation and in the way the members of the congregation order their lives and relate 
to one another: in the Christological paradigms of servanthood, love of enemies, and 
forgiveness, and in witness, fellowship, holy living, and cruciformity in the form of 
loyalty to Christ despite the risk of suffering.
73
 Furthermore, the true church is able to 
live out its witness without needing to exact change in society or enforce its ethics within 
society, and without needing to measure its effectiveness. The true church realizes that it 
should not seek to control the power structures, but should continue to demonstrate 
unwavering loyalty to Christ, in whom all hope is grounded.  
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly for our purposes, Yoder argues that the true 
church acknowledges its “minority posture,” its weakness in the eyes of the world. The 
church must 
recognize that we cannot oblige the world to be Christian. Should we not 
recognize repentantly that we ought never have wanted to Christianize the world 
in this way, from the top down, through the prestige of governmental backing and 
wide social acceptance? Now that the church has become weak may we not 
recognize with joy that her calling is to be weak?
74
 
The significance of the church’s “acceptance of minority status” is that it no longer needs 
to feel obligated to “tailor [its] moral standards to the needs of the people who are 
running the world.”75 This minority status does not necessitate “social cynicism” or 
“withdrawal,” but a “profound intellectual orientation”—an orientation that puts less 
emphasis on traditional qualitative signs of church (such as the number of people in the 
pews) and more emphasis on helping (perhaps fewer) people orient their lives—both as 
individuals and as a community—around the conviction that Jesus Christ is Lord.76 
Yoder’s ecclesiological model is inherently and fully incarnational and embodied: 
the church does not proclaim the message of the gospel; the church embodies the message 
and thus becomes the message itself. The church must understand its relationship to the 
world in light of this understanding of incarnation and embodiment. Like Jesus Christ, 
the church is called to bear witness to the powers of the world while maintaining its own 
faithfulness and integrity to the message of the gospel that it enacts. 
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Stanley Hauerwas (b. 1940), an American theologian and ethicist, argues 
forcefully for the church to keep the experience of embodiment at the core of its self-
understanding and its mission: 
I fear that part of the problem [of the church’s ability to understand its own 
identity] is the very presumption that theology constitutes “thought” which then 
must seek embodiment. Once theology becomes “thought” the church has already 
accepted modernity’s disembodiment of the Gospel . . . In short, we have few 
ways to resist what seems unavoidable . . . namely, the “spiritualization” of the 
church.
77
 
This “spiritualization” of the church, which Hauerwas defines as “the attempt to make 
Christianity intelligible without that set of cultural habits called church,” is desired by the 
“capitalist social order” that needs the church to be purely focused on spiritual matters so 
as not to present a challenge to the embodied practices of that social order.
78
 In other 
words, contemporary society wants to relegate the practice of religion—and by extension, 
the church—to the spiritual realm, where it does not concern itself with embodied 
experiences, especially of those whose bodies are devalued because of their positions at 
the margins of the primary social order. 
This tendency toward spiritualization of religion and the church begins with what 
Hauerwas describes as a faulty Christology: “Christian ethics has tended to make 
‘Christology’ rather than Jesus its starting point [beginning with] some broadly drawn 
theological claims about the significance of God becoming man, but the life of the man 
                                                 
77
 Stanley Hauerwas, “What Could It mean for the Church to Be Christ’s Body?” in The Hauerwas 
Reader, ed. John Berkman and Michael Cartwright (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001), 21-22. 
78
 Stanley Hauerwas, Sanctify Them in the Truth: Holiness Exemplified (Nashville: Abingdon 
Press, 1998), 159-60. 
146 
whom God made his representative is ignored or used selectively.”79 Hauerwas believes 
that any Christology that emphasizes Jesus’ ontological nature (as defined by traditional 
doctrine) often leads to a failure to recognize the significance of his embodied existence 
as a prophetic leader and “teacher of righteousness.”80 Hauerwas notes that recent 
scholarship into the quest for the “historical Jesus” has revealed that Jesus’ teaching was 
focused not on proclaiming his own ontological status, but on the ways God’s kingdom 
was revealed in his own embodied acts of healing, teaching, and relating to others 
(especially those on the margins of society). Christology, then, is an essentially embodied 
concept that, as the foundation for the church’s identity as the body of Christ, necessitates 
an ecclesiology that values bodies and, specifically, the way God’s kingdom is revealed 
in and through embodied acts. 
For Hauerwas, discipleship (and Christian ethics) is learning to be like Jesus, but 
not by mere imitation of what Jesus did.
81
 Rather, individuals learn from each other how 
to be like Jesus. They learn this not by parroting Jesus or through some ecclesial portrayal 
of Jesus, but by becoming actors in the narrative of salvation and being formed into the 
life (both the resurrected and the embodied life) of Jesus. The place where this all 
happens is the church, which is “constituted by word and sacrament as the story we tell, 
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the story we embody, [which] must not only be told but enacted.”82 The church is, in 
effect, an alternate culture that “forms bodies to inhabit the world in a distinctive 
fashion.”83 Therefore, the mission of the church is to witness to a new form of 
humanity—a new form of communal life—that is itself part of the ongoing story of 
God’s salvation: “The church is both the witness to [the presence of Christ] and the 
public and communal form the indirect presence of Christ now takes.”84 The salvation 
that God enacts through the church is “being part of a people constituted by material 
practices” that shape embodied practices and makes those bodies “part of God’s great 
communion.”85 
 Like Yoder, Hauerwas argues against the ways that the church has become too 
closely aligned with society and the ways it “is always tempted to imitate the habits of 
those in power.”86 The answer, for Hauerwas, is for the church “to be a body constituted 
by disciplines that create the capacity to resist the disciplines of the body associated with 
the modern nation-state and, in particular, the economic habits that support that state.”87 
Just as Yoder believes the church is the message (as opposed to having a message), 
Hauerwas believes the church doesn’t have a social ethic; the church is a social ethic, a 
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body politic, that is dependent on human embodiment (and the power of God) for its 
existence and its purpose. 
Furthermore, the relationship between individual bodies and the ecclesial body is 
essential. The church needs to offer “community disciplines through which the story of 
our baptism is embodied in all that we do and are. We require practices through which we 
learn that we do not know who we are, or what our bodies can and cannot do, until we are 
told what and who we are by a more determinative ‘body.’”88 Because the experience of 
disability is so often defined and controlled by other, more determinative bodies, this idea 
of the church as a subaltern community that is in its own way determinative of the value 
and function of human bodies is important for the purposes of this project. 
 
In order to develop an ecclesiology of disability, I need to define the relationship 
between human bodies and the ecclesial body in a way that is holistic, inclusive, and 
faithful. I start with the assumption that human bodies in all their varied forms and levels 
of ability, and all types of embodied experience, are intrinsic to the identity and mission 
of the church. The ecclesiologies explored here are helpful for an attempt to find this 
holistic ecclesiology of disability because they place value on the experience of 
embodiment for the church. Schillebeeckx, in particular, argues that human experience is 
both authoritative and critical to the church because it is grounded in embodiment rather 
than in systems or authorities that are completely external to particular, ongoing historical 
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and cultural settings. Embodied human action—praxis—is the conduit of the church’s 
message, which is bearing witness to the kingdom of God. 
Chauvet takes this idea of the church as manifestations of embodied acts a step 
further by stressing the necessity of the body for the mediation of experience, including 
the experience of God, the Christian faith, and the Christian community. The church is, 
by extension, a functional reality that mediates the presence of God both to its members 
and to the world through embodied acts. 
Yoder places human action at the center of the church, and affirms that the 
church’s nature and mission is to embody a new kind of social wholeness that bear 
witness to the gospel, which is itself a new social order. In fact, Yoder believes that the 
body that is the church is visible only through these embodied acts, lived out in a new, 
distinct form of Christian community, which is the very message with which the church 
is entrusted. 
Finally, Hauerwas calls the church to begin its theology—to contextualize its 
theology—from the starting point of embodiment, rather than from the starting point of 
“belief” or “spiritual matters.” He pushes back against any attempts to confine the 
significance of the church’s message to matters of the soul or spirit, and he argues for a 
Christology that begins with the person of Jesus rather than theological claims about 
Jesus’ nature. That is, Christology—the foundation for the church—and ecclesiology 
should be embodied rather that abstract concepts. 
These emphases on the experience of embodiment for the church will help 
develop an eccesiology of disability that will enable Christians to carry out a “re-
150 
imagining [of] the Church as the body of Christ [that] means that we are in and 
participants of the worlds of love that are unique to the resurrected body of Christ.”89 A 
holistic ecclesiology of disability includes the concerns and experiences of bodies with 
physical impairments and incorporates those concerns into an understanding of what it 
means to be the church. 
I have explored several body-centric ecclesiologies in which the body of Christ is 
the medium through which the church performs the ongoing narrative of salvation that 
God works not just on souls, but on whole persons, bodies and all. Now I turn to the 
unique practices of the church that, by their performative nature, inscribe that narrative 
and that message on individual bodies. 
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CHAPTER 6 
LITURGY AND THE BODY  
 
We are more concretely homo liturgicus . . . those animals that are religious 
animals not because we are primarily believing animals but because we are 
liturgical animals–embodied, practicing creatures whose love/desire is aimed at 
something ultimate. 
— James K. A. Smith1 
 
When I initially attended services, I would often be alerted by an usher that I need 
not go forward for the Eucharist. Instead I would be offered the sacrament at my 
seat when everyone else had been served. My presence in the service using either 
a wheelchair or crutches made problematical the “normal” bodily practice of the 
Eucharist in the congregation [which was filing to the front of the sanctuary and 
kneeling at the communion rail]. Yet rather than focusing on the congregation’s 
practices that excluded my body and asking, “How do we alter the bodily practice 
of the Eucharist in order that this individual and others with disabilities would 
have full access to the ordinary practices of the church?” the decision makers 
would center the (unstated) problem on my disabled body, asking, “How should 
we accommodate this person with a disability in our practice of Eucharist?” 
Hence receiving the Eucharist was transformed for me from a corporate to a 
solitary experience; from a sacralization of Christ’s broken body to a 
stigmatization of my disabled body.
2
 
To be human is, first and foremost, to be embodied. The Christian faith affirms as 
much when it places the incarnation at the center of its belief system. It seems obvious 
that a truly Christian liturgy demands a truly Christian anthropology that values all forms 
of human embodiment. But, as noted previously, the church has not always presented a 
holistic vision of embodiment, especially when it comes to forms of embodiment that 
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may deviate from what society considers “normal.” Of course, our anthropological views 
are always influenced by the values of the culture in which we live.  
I have thus far explored the relationships between embodiment and theology and 
embodiment and the church, and I have identified theological and ecclesiological 
concepts that are grounded in and give value to the experience of embodiment. As I turn 
to the liturgical practices of the church as the body of Christ, I seek to discover the same 
links between what we do in worship and what we do with our bodies. In particular, I 
look at liturgical practices in such a way that the actions of the liturgy become formative 
not only for minds or spirits, but for both individual bodies and the body of Christ as a 
whole. 
 
Liturgy as Ritual Action 
Before an examination of the way liturgy forms people through embodied acts, it 
is necessary to explain how liturgy functions as ritual, which, when enacted, has the 
power to help “human beings come to consider themselves truly human.”3 This ritual 
nature of liturgy is “tangible evidence that there is more to religion that a simple assent to 
beliefs.”4 Thus, liturgy, when properly enacted as ritual, includes the whole of the human 
person, including the body. 
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Perhaps one of the most important aspects of ritual performance is its ability to 
promote social solidarity. As has been seen, solidarity or unity of the early Christian 
church was a concern to early Christian communities. Catherine Bell argues that “religion 
is a set of ideas and practices by which people sacralize the social structure and bonds of 
the community.”5 For the early Christians, who were adopting a set of beliefs and 
practices that were very different from those of the surrounding society, the ritual 
practices of worship enacted in the community would provide a “buffer” against the 
suspicion and antagonism of both the Jews and the pagans. 
Bell points out that the act of being bound to the community through ritual is not 
necessarily a “conscious act of affiliation.”6 Rather, the collective experience of 
embodied enactment of the rites and stories of the faith reveals both the community’s 
relationship to the transcendent God and the presence of the immanent God within the 
community. In addition, ritual helps shape people’s perception of themselves as 
individuals and as a community, has the potential to maintain the community’s ethos, and 
can restore unity and harmony after a conflict. In fact, Bell says ritual can be the “actual 
mechanism for constantly re-creating, not just reaffirming, this unity.”7 
Bell cites a theory of British anthropologist Max Gluckman, which posits that 
“ritual is the occasion to exaggerate the tensions that exist in the society in order to 
provide a social catharsis that can simultaneously affirm unity and effect some semblance 
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of it.”8 One could look at the rituals of the liturgy—especially the prayer of confession, 
the peace, and the eucharist, in which Jesus shares his broken body with the 
community—as acts that portray the brokenness of the church and then ritually (and 
bodily) give expression to both a healing of that brokenness and a tangible sense of unity. 
Symbols always play a vital role in any ritual enactment of religion. Bell observes 
that rather than responding to the sacredness of a symbol, religious ritual “effectively 
creates the sacred” in that symbol, thus imbuing the symbol with more value than “the 
mere sum of its parts” and allowing the symbol to point to something beyond itself.9 This 
created sacredness applies not just to symbolic objects, but also to places and people. In 
the sacraments of baptism and eucharist, then, the sacredness of the water or cup and 
bread is created by the ritual actions of the prayers, the application and reception of 
water, the sharing of the elements and the action of the Holy Spirit. In doing so, the 
community itself is set apart as a holy people. As Richard D. McCall maintains, the 
liturgy attempts to “accomplish what it represents”—that is, to form a holy people 
through their participation in the act of making the holy real and accessible through both 
material symbols and bodily actions.
10
  
In recent years, attention has been given to looking at the liturgy as performance. 
Bell notes that one of the qualities that make a ritual effectively performative is 
communication on multiple sensory levels: “the power of performance lies in great part 
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in the effect of the heightened multisensory experience it affords: one is not being told or 
shown something so much as one is led to experience something.”11 As anthropologist 
Barbara Myerhoff writes, “not only is seeing believing, doing is believing.”12 
According to McCall, as a performative, embodied act, liturgy “is an instance not 
only of theological content but of the immediate presence of that which it performs.”13 
Liturgy becomes the performed—and embodied—theology of the people as they enter 
into the presence of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, to which the liturgy 
witnesses. As McCall contends, the liturgy “implies the performance of an action that 
accomplishes in the present the end for which the narrative is remembered and of which 
the narrative is the shape and meaning.”14 This is anamnesis—not simply dramatic 
reenactment of past events, but making real in the present moment the significance and 
power of those events. It is the “social construction of reality.”15 Thus, in the ritual 
performance of liturgy, the power of salvation history, especially as revealed in Jesus 
Christ, is made real in the actions of the worshiping community. Because God has 
effected that salvation history through the claiming and creation of a people called to be a 
“holy nation,” the liturgy helps the church reclaim and recognize once again that sacred 
identity, which is rooted not in the community’s memory or belief, nor in individual 
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spiritual experience, but in the communal acts of embodiment. As Alexander Schmemann 
posits, liturgy is “an action by which a group of people become something corporately 
which they had not been as a mere collection of individuals.”16 
Richard Schechner makes a crucial distinction between “aesthetic drama,” in 
which the audience is separated physically and conceptually from the performers, and 
“social drama,” which involves all people who are present, although in different degrees. 
His description of how these two types of drama function as transformative acts 
addresses the importance for worship to invite people to be participants rather than to be 
spectators:  
In aesthetic drama everyone in the theater is a participant in the performance 
while only those playing roles in the drama are participants in the drama nested 
within the performance . . . The function of aesthetic drama is to do for the 
consciousness of the audience what social drama does for its participants: 
providing a place for, and means of transformation. Rituals carry participants 
across limens, transforming them into different persons.
17
 
Liturgy, then, is a performance within which is nested a drama of salvation history. In 
order to function as a ritual that transforms bodies, and not just consciousness, it must be 
not just a “theological show,” but also a social drama in which everyone is given 
opportunity to embody the ritual acts of worship. 
Liturgy as performance is a combination of words, material things, and actions, 
but enactment is primary. Dom Gregory Dix proposes that the liturgy can only be 
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properly identified by verbs of doing: taking, blessing, breaking, giving.
18
 This embodied 
enactment of the shape of the liturgy is the liturgy’s “very essence,” which brings the 
material, humanity, and words together in an intentional act that is the “only adequate 
locus for confronting the reality of human life in time and space, and thus the only 
adequate locus in which to meet the God whose Word is made flesh to dwell among 
us.”19 Such ritual practices “show the essential role that a ‘turn towards the body’ has as 
we identify with the One who came incarnate and enter into the gestures of God with our 
bodies as part of the body of Christ.”20 
 
Liturgy as Formational 
Lex orandi, lex credendi. This shorthand Latin phrase, translated as “the law of 
prayer constitutes the law of belief,” has become an axiom in liturgical studies to support 
the idea that there is an inherent relationship between the way a Christian community 
worships and that community’s theology and way of believing.21 This principle has been 
interpreted in different ways, often according to ecclesiastic tradition. Some theologians 
argue for the normative nature of the church’s prayer (and by extension, liturgy), which 
leads to faith and to doctrinal and theological claims, while others consider liturgy as an 
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extension and expression of the church’s theology, which is primary. Still others see a 
more reciprocal relationship: “worship influences doctrine, and doctrine worship.”22 
Some theologians discern other “laws” at work in the relationship between prayer and 
belief. Kevin Irwin expands the formula by adding lex vivendi (the law of living), while 
Don Saliers adds lex agendi (the law of ethical action).
23
 That is, there is an inherent 
relationship between belief, prayer (or worship), and living. E. Byron Anderson contends 
that “if liturgical sacramental practice is constitutive and normative for the nature and 
identity of Christian persons and communities, then it is oriented toward the life of such 
persons and communities in and with the world.”24  
If one of the “aims” of liturgy is to shape us to live ethically and faithfully, then 
the formation offered by liturgy must take place in our bodies: “to learn, to know, is to be 
transformed—it is to implicate our selves, our very bodies in the actions and practices of 
learning and coming to know.”25 Furthermore, if we are learning, through our 
participation in worship, to live faithfully as embodied creatures, we need to know how to 
conduct ourselves, relate to others, and respond to sometimes challenging situations 
outside the realm of the gathered community. Debra Dean Murphy says that “such 
knowledge demands our transformation—not in the sense that our minds are changed or 
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our intellects are conditioned (though this is certainly part of it), but in the deeper sense 
that we are constituted differently.”26 
Brett Webb-Mitchell challenges what he sees as normative practices of Christian 
formation that are based on the distinction between mind and body and that focus on 
educating the mind rather than the body. He suggests that the church restores “body” (as 
in the body of Christ that is the gathered community) as “the primary context in which we 
educate Christians, and that we reiterate the truth that education of Christians is a 
community practice of the mind, body, and spirit of Christ.”27 He describes the “gestures 
of the body” as an “embodiment of a storied-knowledge” that form Christians similar to 
how the experience of apprenticeship forms someone into a craft.
28
 These gestures 
require that the members of the body of Christ be transformed from an individualistic 
viewpoint to one that is communal and interdependent. That is, the gestures of the body 
of Christ require no less than a collaborative effort. While Mitchell depicts gestures that 
include interactions that extend beyond the act of worship, he also notes that baptism and 
eucharist both function to pattern individuals into the gestures of the community through 
an identification with and sharing in the body of Christ that is the church. 
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Some religious leaders have criticized the tendency to focus on the didactic 
aspects of the liturgy. As John Westerhoff claims, to use the liturgy in this way is “to do 
it violence.”29 However, Murphy argues against that, saying,  
In contrast, to admit the intimate connection between knowledge and action, 
between learning and bodily practice, is to recognize that, for Christians, worship 
is the site at which our formation and education are initiated and completed 
(insofar as they can ever be complete). What we do, how we act, in the liturgical 
assembly shapes us in particular and powerful ways and is both formative of 
identity and catechetical in the most basic sense.
30
 
With this assumption as a guiding principle, I now examine how the concept of 
embodiment affects and informs this relationship between liturgy, theology, and life.  
 
A Brief History of Bodies and Liturgy 
Throughout its history, the church has recognized the intrinsic and necessary 
relationship between embodiment and the practice of worship. However, the value that 
the church assigned to bodies and the degree to which bodies were permitted or expected 
to participate in worship varied at different times and within different church traditions. 
The word liturgy comes from the Greek term leitourgia, which was originally a 
political or legal term used to describe a service that was rendered on behalf of the people 
and for the good of the people by a duly-appointed representative. In Christianity, the 
apostle Paul used the term to describe actions of the people such as the collection of gifts 
by congregations in Macedonia and Greece the churches in Jerusalem (2 Cor. 9:12). 
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Elsewhere in the New Testament, it refers to a priestly, mediating ministry. Eventually, it 
came to be known as the celebration of worship in the gathered community, and 
especially as the texts, rituals, and orders used for worship. It is common for modern-day 
liturgical scholars to use liturgy to mean “the work of the people” (the literal meaning of 
leitourgia), as in the work done in the course of worship by the people in the gathered 
assembly. For the purposes of this chapter, I look at liturgy specifically as the “work of 
the people” in worship through bodily actions, which can reveal how the church viewed 
the significance and value of bodies in relationship to the liturgy at particular times and 
contexts in church history. The following is not meant to be either an exhaustive 
overview of liturgical history or a study of liturgical rites. Rather, certain examples of 
liturgical texts will be explored—especially those that describe the actions of the laity—
to determine the ways that members of the community were expected to be involved in 
the liturgy through the actions of their bodies. 
Little is known about the particulars of bodily participation in the worship of the 
early church. The only evidence we have is from the New Testament, and there are 
certain passages that scholars believe may contain parts of hymns (such as the Canticles 
in Luke 1:46-55, 68-79 and 2:29-32) or creedal formulations (such as Phil. 2:5-11) or 
implied examples of liturgical rubrics (such as the information Paul shares about the 
Lord’s Supper in 1 Cor. 11:23) or general instructions (such as Paul’s notes to the 
Corinthians in 1 Cor. 14:26ff). In spite of these allusions to the forms of worship in the 
early church, the New Testament does not offer explicit descriptions or instructions for 
the “work of the people” in worship. 
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By the Patristic Period (approximately from the second to the fifth centuries), a 
variety of liturgical orders with rubrics began to be produced by different communities in 
different areas around the Middle East. Although we cannot ascertain whether these 
documents were descriptive or proscriptive (that is, whether the documents describe 
either what communities at the time were actually doing or an idealized form of liturgy 
that attempted to shape the way people worshiped), we can assume that they reveal at 
least the expectation, if not the actual reality, of bodily participation in worship.
31
 One of 
the earliest documents from this era, The First Apology of Justin Martyr (ca. 155), 
describes a weekly communal gathering of believers who participate by greeting one 
another with a kiss, by shouting “Amen” to show their assent to the prayer of 
thanksgiving offered by the one presiding over the assembly, by sharing the bread and 
wine with all who are present, and by standing together to offer prayers. In addition, the 
elements of the eucharist are carried to those who are unable to join the assembly. 
According to Justin, bodies, even when they were absent, were an important part of the 
church’s worship. 
When Emperor Constantine legalized Christianity in 313, Christian liturgy 
developed rapidly, integrating many forms and symbols from Roman civil society.
32
 
During this time, people continued to participate in the liturgy in various ways such as 
offering prayers and receiving the eucharist. But other, highly participatory (and public) 
forms of worship, called stational liturgies, developed in the fourth century in cities such 
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as Jerusalem and Rome. In Jerusalem in particular, the stational liturgies took advantage 
of Constantine’s program of building churches or shrines at sites in and around the city 
that were considered important places in Jesus’ life and ministry, especially regarding his 
death, burial, and resurrection. Stational liturgies were celebrated at these sites on a 
regular basis, including on Sundays. The sites and the design of the stational churches 
were planned with procession in mind, and they were well situated to accommodate 
pilgrimages. People flocked to Jerusalem in order to visit each of these sites in the 
context of liturgical celebrations. Our best evidence of these stational liturgies comes 
from the travel diary of Egeria, who visited Jerusalem in the late fourth century. From her 
description, we can see that the sites of the Holy Week liturgies approximately matched 
the sites of Jesus’ Passion, and that the bodily participation in the liturgies was rich and 
full: as the people processed to and gathered at each location, they offered prayers, 
hymns, and antiphons. These stational liturgies represented the increasingly public nature 
of Christian worship and the civic importance of Christianity. Because they revolved 
around the ecclesial leader in each city, they also revealed the desire for visible, 
embodied unity in the church as one flock under one leader. 
In the medieval period (approximately the fifth through the fifteenth centuries), 
the liturgy was increasingly “performed for [private] devotional purposes rather than as 
an action of the whole people of God engaged in their public work.”33 Significant bodily 
participation in the mass was confined to the priests, and the laity became more 
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disengaged from the fuller kind of bodily participation that had been seen previously. As 
Senn observes, the architecture of the great Gothic cathedrals that were being erected 
during this time encouraged the separation of clerical bodies and laic bodies and 
discouraged any substantial kind of a shared embodied worship event: 
The priest was separated from the choir, engaged in his private devotions while 
the choir was singing extended chants of the mass. The choir was separated from 
the people who were also engaged in their own devotions while mass was being 
offered. Thus, all were gathered in separate spaces within one building, separately 
pursuing their own devotions. The notion of liturgy as a communal public work 
was becoming very tenuous indeed.
34
  
Opportunities for the laity to offer their bodily actions in the liturgy were even further 
reduced by the rise of the spoken liturgy (“low mass”) in which there was no singing, and 
by the increasingly popular practice of elevating and processing the eucharistic elements, 
which gradually encouraged people to be “content to gaze at the sacrament rather than to 
eat or drink it.”35  
McCall notes that the performance of elevating the host from its “burial place” 
shows how “spectatorship was to become, by the late Middle Ages . . . ecclesiastical 
ritual. The liturgy increasingly became a presentation to the people rather than [bodily] 
enactment by the people.”36 The clericalization of the tenth and eleventh centuries was 
manifest in this belief that the priests acted (performed) on behalf of the people. As a 
result, the actions of the liturgy became more and more isolated from the people. Bodies 
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were still important to the liturgy, but bodily participation no longer functioned as a sign 
of the shared work of the people or of the unity of the gathered community.  
During the Reformation, Protestant churches enacted liturgical reforms that 
increased the bodily participation of the laity. For instance, people were invited and 
expected to use their bodies to sing hymns and to eat the bread and drink the wine. 
However, the use of cheap, mass-produced books for worship had a counter effect on 
full-body participation. As worship became more text-oriented and as texts supplanted 
embodied rituals, ceremonies, and events, “worshipers came together not to perform 
liturgical actions, for which the space had to kept open to accommodate moving bodies, 
but to hear and read text, for which pews were probably a welcome convenience.”37 In 
general, reformation liturgy emphasized one bodily action in worship over all others: the 
act of hearing the word in the liturgy and the preaching. 
The Counter Reformation of the Roman Catholic Church, which culminated in the 
Council of Trent in 1545, produced a few reforms to church practices such as the plan to 
produce a catechism and to revise the Breviary and Missal under the guidance of the 
pope. However, the Council passed no decrees that would correct the failure to encourage 
a fuller level of bodily participation by the laity in the Mass. Although several council 
members advocated for changes such as offering communion in both kinds, the Council 
made no recommendation on these matters. 
In the eighteenth century, Enlightenment ideals affected the worship practices in 
many church traditions as churches turned to Rationalism to understand Christian faith 
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and practices. “Church leaders valued public worship only to the extent that it was 
edifying to the people.”38 Liturgy became more didactic and less sensual. Sermons 
became longer, liturgical prayers were shortened or eliminated, and the sacraments were 
celebrated with much less frequency and “with little enthusiasm.”39 In addition, as 
knowledge became grounded in perception, the ability for religious signs and symbols to 
mediate any significant knowledge or truth came under suspicion. While the Reformation 
emphasized the act of hearing as the most important aspect of bodily participation in 
worship, the Enlightenment reduced the body’s significance—in worship and in the 
Christian faith as a whole—primarily to the use of reason. 
The Wesleyan movement of the same period was an exception to the effect of the 
Enlightenment on liturgy and bodily participation. Senn points out that Methodist 
worship was “countercultural” in two ways: first, it was “enthusiastic” and encouraged 
frequent celebrations of communion and a great deal of hymn singing, and second, it 
emphasized the actions of baptism, eucharist, and prayer as “means of grace.”40 This is 
significant because it demonstrates that John Wesley believed that God acts in and 
through bodily liturgical actions to impart grace in a special way. 
In the twentieth century, the Liturgical Movement brought both a scholarly and 
pastoral interest to the liturgy. Some of the aims of this worldwide movement, which 
began in the Roman Catholic Church, were revitalization of the church through the 
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liturgy and restoration of active participation of the people by reclaiming the liturgy as 
the “work of the people.” In 1963, the Second Vatican Council promulgated the 
document the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, which affirmed greater participation of 
the laity in the liturgy as a celebration of the whole church. The Liturgical Movement 
spread to other denominations and has resulted in a variety of liturgical reforms that 
include enculturating the liturgy to particular times and places in order to make it more 
culturally expressive, vibrant, and participatory, and encouraging a stronger connection 
between liturgy, social justice and ethics.  
According to Geoffrey Wainwright, the years since the Liturgical Movement 
began its work have represented an “anthropological turn” in liturgical studies and 
practice.
41
 Since the 1990s, there has been a concentrated effort to explore the 
relationship between liturgy and embodiment. A common theme in this effort is the idea 
that the embodied practices of Christian worship are inherently formative. E. Byron 
Anderson argues that the liturgy itself is catechesis: “Christian worship is a cluster of 
practices in which persons and communities are formed intentionally and unintentionally 
in particular understandings of self and church.”42 Anderson maintains that these 
embodied practices should “not only make a person and community feel a certain way 
but transform or convert that person and community as well.”43 That is, the community is 
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transformed by what it does, bodily, in worship. As Catherine Vincie observes, “there is a 
relationship between a society’s identity, its values and its beliefs and its ritual 
performances.”44  
Whether we intend it to be so or not, the liturgy is always forming us in both 
conscious and subconscious ways. The words we hear or say, the bodily actions we 
perform, and the repetitive ritual acts we practice all shape us as individuals, as a 
community of faith, and as a people of God. Even though liturgy is (or should be) 
primarily the praise of God by the gathered community, it also always teaches and forms. 
I will now look at the work of several scholars whose work addresses the 
relationship between worship, theology, and bodily practice, and who focus on the 
importance of bodily ritual action for Christian worship and formation. 
 
Bodies, Theology, and Practice 
Don Saliers examines liturgy as an enacted, culturally-embedded expression of 
the theology of the worshiping people that both shapes and is shaped by the real human 
situations in which the enactment takes place. He believes the liturgy is the “primary 
theology” of the community, and worshipers come to know God through “full and active” 
participation in worship rather than through a “cognitive mastery of texts.”45 In addition, 
knowing God is “profoundly affectional,” and prayers and other ritual acts are ways that 
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we relate and respond to—and thus more fully know—God.46 Saliers argues that it is the 
acts themselves—the water bath, sharing the common meal, praying, singing, 
celebrating—that reveal the “future-present” of God.47 This is true, in part, because 
Christian worship is the ongoing prayer and worship of Jesus as enacted through his 
body—the Church—for the sake of and on behalf of the whole world. 
The guiding principle for Saliers’ work is “liturgy as rite and as prayer is 
thoroughly eschatological.”48 That is, liturgy that is honest and faithful is grounded in the 
hope of God’s future and in the understanding of the implication of that future for the 
present. Saliers is quick to admit that eschatology as a lived and enacted theology has 
been prone to misinterpretation, which results in eschatology being seen as escapism or 
as culturally irrelevant. But he also notes that the twentieth-century liturgical renewal 
movement has helped reorient Christian thinking to eschatology.
49
 No longer relegated to 
a chapter in a book on systematic theology, eschatology is now the lens through which all 
of Christian theology and practice (including, and perhaps most especially, worship) can 
be understood. True eschatology is a “radical openness toward the future” and is a 
realization of the “already but not yet” aspect of a future that has already been 
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accomplished in Jesus Christ but is yet to be realized in its fullness in the kingdom of 
God.
50
 
Saliers demonstrates the importance of the enacted aspect of liturgy in his 
examination of the four modes of prayer (thanksgiving, confession, adoration, and 
intercession), which act as “schools” that form people into authentic ways of “being 
before God.”51 More than just texts (whether ancient or modern), these forms of prayer 
are themselves “languages”—of gratitude, of speaking the truth in love, of remembering 
who God has promised to be, and of a cry on behalf of the world—that give voice to the 
community’s awareness of the human condition and that are an appropriate response to a 
hurting world. An eschatological perspective of prayer reveals that the fullness and the 
power of such prayers can only be realized over time as the people of God gather, pray, 
and worship in spirit and in truth. Eschatology, after all, speaks to the ways God acts in 
history, and the forming of the people into the truth of the gospel and the vision of God’s 
future is an ongoing part of that historical reality. Thus, immediate affective experiences 
during times of prayer and worship are only steps in the “transformative power of God’s 
self-giving in and through liturgical action” that shapes people’s thoughts, feelings, and 
awareness of God and the world over time.
52
 
While Saliers is very interested in the anthropological aspects of Christian 
worship, he is quick to stress the Christological center of worship: “our liturgy is Christ’s 
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before it is ours.”53 When the community worships, the people are doing so in and 
through Jesus Christ; they are participating in what is, in effect, Christ’s ongoing sacrifice 
of praise and thanksgiving to God, and Christ’s ongoing prayers of intercession for the 
world (as in John 17). Thus, it is not enough simply to imitate Christ. Through the 
liturgy—and over time—people must be shaped into Christ’s life and into his 
proclamation of God’s kingdom.  
Liturgy, therefore, is inherently ethical. In fact, Saliers expands the notion of 
liturgy into liturgy as cultus (leitourgia) and the liturgy carried out by the people in the 
world (diakonia).
54
 Liturgy does not only proclaim what Jesus said and did as witnessed 
in the New Testament; it also proclaims that in the gathered community, Christ is still 
acting, saying, and doing, still proclaiming the coming of the kingdom until God’s reign 
is fully realized. Worshipers are shaped as an eschatologically-minded people by their 
participation in Christ’s prayers and presence.  
Thus, the result of the formation offered by the embodied liturgy is itself an 
aspect of embodiment. As noted above, Saliers points to the relationship between 
Christian worship and ethics, with “ethics” being a concrete way of living rather than a 
theoretical conception. What a community does in worship—how the people pray, how 
they enact baptism and the eucharist, how they relate to one another in the Peace—forms 
how they concretely embody the “pattern of affections and virtues revealed in the pattern 
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of God’s self-giving in Jesus Christ.”55 This pattern requires constant “re-entry” into the 
Christ-pattern, the story of God revealed in Christ that is retold and re-membered in 
Christian worship. Saliers posits that mere imitation of Christ is not enough; “what is 
needed is an actual reorientation of life, a process of conversion of the heart and social 
imagination to the rule and reign of God that Jesus proclaims and embodies.”56 
Saliers describes one prerequisite for what he considers “authentic” worship: the 
tension between human pathos (broadly defined as human suffering) and divine ethos 
(the self-giving of God to humans, especially in the liturgy). Authentic liturgy occurs 
when the two meet in the texts, the forms, the prayers, and the style of worship. Worship 
that does not bring human pathos into contact with divine ethos can become a “self-
serving flight from what is real.”57 Saliers argues that the divine nature includes human 
pathos, as revealed in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. If the liturgy is to 
help us more fully understand both ourselves and God, then we must be willing to bring 
the fullness of our pathos to our worship. An eschatological perspective necessitates this 
offering of our human condition, for God’s future is predicated on and directly pertains to 
that human condition. Eschatology is not an escape from pathos; rather, it proclaims the 
triumph of God over it. 
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One argument that directs Salier’s examination of the actual practice of worship is 
that liturgy is “radically dependent on what is not verbal for meaning and significance.”58 
He argues that the key question is not so much, “What do the texts say in terms of 
theology and doctrine?” but, “What are the people saying and doing in using these texts?” 
Again, it is the embodied, enacted theology of liturgy that is both primary and 
formational. 
Gordon Lathrop describes the relationship between liturgy and ethics as the 
“geography” of the liturgy; Christian liturgy offers “maps” for orienting worshipers in the 
world.
59
 Liturgy, as an “enacted map,” is a communal interpretation of God, humanity, 
and the world that all people need in order to live in the world.
60
 Lathrop points out that 
there are many such maps, such as those created by the media, advertising, and social and 
political systems, that orient and guide us away from God. Properly understood and 
properly used, the “tools” for liturgical geography—baptism, communion, hearing the 
word, singing hymns, praying—can act as a correction to these deceptive orientations and 
can orient bodies toward what Lathrop calls the four cardinal directions in Christian 
liturgy: toward God, toward one another in the assembly, toward the needy, and toward 
the earth.
61
 But too often,  
the orientations we have allowed our religious rituals to give us have been almost 
exclusively interior orientations to the self, a map of the human heart without a 
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macrocosm, without exterior references except to a . . . “heaven.” Such 
orientations have nothing much to do with mapping the community of life outside 
our windows. And leave largely unchallenged and untransformed the maps 
created by television, daily news, advertising narratives, highway systems, racial 
categories, and national boundaries.
62
  
James K. A. Smith makes a case for the primacy of the body in any kind of 
orientation or formation. The body, he says, is not just essential to human identity, it is 
also the locus of the very core of human identity.
63
 Smith notes that behind every 
pedagogy is a set of assumptions about what it means to be human. Thus, there is a 
reciprocal relationship between the form of the liturgy and its inherent anthropology: 
what we believe we are as humans shapes our liturgy, which in turn shapes (or reinforces) 
our anthropology.  
Smith argues against any dualistic anthropology or theology that would favor the 
mind (or soul) over the body. Such dualistic models of Christian theology and faith are 
inadequate because they “fail to actually counter the cultural liturgies that are forming us 
every day” and because they “are inattentive to the centrality of embodied, material, 
liturgical practice.”64  
Smith challenges two forms of theological anthropology that are inadequate for 
true Christian formation. The first is the “person–as–thinker,” which focuses on the 
cognitive aspects of human identity (as per Descartes’ assertion, Cogito ergo sum—“I 
think, therefore I am”). This, according to Smith, “accounts for the shape of so much 
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Protestant worship as a heady affair fixated on ‘messages’ that disseminate Christian 
ideas and abstract values.”65 This kind of liturgy not only reinforces the dualism between 
mind and body, valuing the former over the latter, but also is inaccessible to some people 
who do not have the cognitive ability to grasp abstract ideas and doctrinal statements. 
Thus, it teaches us that some people are somehow less than human by reason of their 
cognitive abilities. 
The second faulty anthropology is the “person–as–believer,” which leads to an 
individualist model that locates belief as something that has little or no attachment to 
bodies.
66
 Without the need for bodies, Smith says, there is little need for church: “as 
Hauerwas rightly notes, when Christianity is turned into ‘a belief system,’ it is reduced to 
something ‘available without the mediation by the church.’”67 Smith argues that it is not 
just human bodies that are necessary for this formation through certain practices, but 
social bodies as well: “Practices don’t float in society; rather they find expression and 
articulation in concrete sites and institutions—which is why and how they actually shape 
embodied persons. There are no practices without institutions.”68 
Smith offers an alternative, non-cognitive anthropological model: the person as an 
embodied agent of desire and love. Rather than orienting ourselves to the world in the 
realm of thought or ideas or beliefs as disembodied thinkers or believers, we are oriented 
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to the world through our desires, our passions, and our love—all of which are features of 
embodiment. We “inhabit the world . . . as more affective, embodied creatures who make 
our way in the world more by feeling our way around it.”69 In other words, human 
experience precedes reflection on that experience; our involvement with the world 
enables us to think about the world. Most of the time, our involvement with the world is 
forming us in ways that transcend our conscious thought.  
Being agents of desire and love means that what we love defines our human 
identity. We are shaped most profoundly not by what we think, or by our conscious 
reflection, but by what we desire—what we love most deeply. This desire or love 
animates us and orients us to the world in particular ways, and is always directed to a 
teleological end that is manifest in a concrete vision and not just abstract ideas. For 
Christians, the “goal” of desire should be the goodness of God’s kingdom, in which life is 
grounded in community and all persons are free to flourish as God intends.  
According to Smith, this (or any other) desire “becomes operative in us 
(motivating actions, decisions, etc.) by becoming an integral part of the fabric of our 
dispositions,” which he defines as habits that are non-cognitive, almost automatic 
actions.
70
 And this is why taking embodiment seriously is so important: these habits are 
both inscribed in us and performed through our bodies rather than our minds. As Smith 
says, “we are selves who are our bodies; thus the training of desire requires bodily 
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practices in which a particular telos [the kingdom of God] is embedded.”71 We orient and 
train our desire and our telos through our participation in bodily practices in which that 
telos is embedded.  
Liturgy, then, has the potential to offer us the rituals and practices that “mold and 
shape our precognitive disposition to the world by training our desires” toward a 
Christian worldview.
72
 Liturgy has the power to inscribe this vision within us through the 
communal practices of baptism, holy communion, prayer, singing, and other embodied 
acts of worship, all of which are aimed toward the kingdom of God, both as “already” 
and as “not yet.” Christian liturgy can also help us understand how other, competing 
liturgies such as those utilized by popular culture or materialism or capitalism (which 
Smith defines as “rituals that are formative for identity [and] that inculcate particular 
visions of the good life”) orient us to ends that are antithetical to the kingdom of God.73  
To be human means being created in the image of God. But this image, as Smith 
suggests, is not a property of being human, nor is it some “thing” that we carry within us, 
such as morality.
74
 Rather, the imago Dei is the responsibility given to each Christian to 
reveal God’s image to the world after the pattern set by Jesus, who was the fullest (and 
most human) revelation of God to the world. Liturgy provides us with a set of patterns—
patterns of prayer, of ritual, and of sacramental action—that are the practices of a 
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community of faith that does not simply imitate Christ, but is formed into the very life of 
Christ by imagining of the stories of his life, by participating in his sacramental presence, 
and by sharing the divine love through acts of caring, greeting, and respecting one 
another in worship.  
The concept of lex orandi, lex credendi is implicit in Smith’s ideas about the 
formative value of liturgy. He argues that just as our perceptions of and interactions with 
the world precede any theorizing we undertake, so too does our experience of liturgy 
precede our theological reflection. Christian liturgy does not express a particular 
worldview; rather, it represents “an understanding that cannot be had apart from the 
practices.”75 This is an anthropology that starts from the experience of embodiment: 
bodily practices inform the “social imaginary” (the vision, the desire, and the love), 
which in turn leads to the cognitive aspects of theory, doctrine, and knowledge.  
The inherent relationship between embodiment and liturgy is evident in what 
Smith calls the “sacramental understanding” of the world: an understanding that “God 
inhabits all [the] earthy stuff, that we meet God in the material resources of water and 
wine, that God embraces our embodiment, embraces us in our embodiment.”76 Smith 
believes the sacraments—“unique channels of grace”—are “intensifications,” through 
material, embodied events, of the omnipresence of God in creation.
77
 In this conception 
of sacramentality, Smith cites Alexander Schmemann, who writes, “Because of the sort 
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of animals we were created to be, we need water and oil, bread and wine in order to be in 
communion with God and to know Him.”78 
Schmemann (1921-1983) was an Orthodox priest and scholar, and although in this 
project I focus on the Western church, some of Schmemann’s critiques are directed at the 
ways in which the Western church understands the relationship between itself, its liturgy, 
and its sacraments. Schmemann believes that the Western church is accustomed to seeing 
the liturgy and the sacraments as an “act of the church and within the church,” rather than 
seeing the church itself as the liturgy and “as the sacrament of Christ’s presence and 
action.”79 Schmemann critiques this tendency of the Western church to define liturgy 
narrowly as a cultic act that is in some way separate from the whole of human life. He 
defines leitourgia as “an action by which a group of people become something 
corporately which they had not been as a mere collection of individuals.”80 Liturgy is the 
“sacrament by which [the church] ‘becomes what it is,’” and that is, a sacrament of God’s 
presence to the world.
81
 
In previous chapters, I looked at Louis-Marie Chauvet’s theology of the body and 
ecclesiology, both of which emphasize the necessity of the body as the essential means of 
mediating all reality, including nonmaterial, or spiritual, reality. Building on that concept, 
Chauvet describes the sacramentality of the economy whereby “the anthropological is the 
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place of every possible theological.”82 The sacraments “inscribe the faith in the body of 
the participants.”83 That is, each individual human body is the place where the liturgy and 
the sacraments are at work in a symbolic network that comprises what Chauvet calls the 
“triple body” of culture, tradition, and nature, each of which play a role in defining the 
whole self of an individual. Faith is made manifest in bodies through the mediation of 
these other bodies: the social body that is the church, with its set of values and its 
specific, culturally embedded Christian worldview; the traditional body within the 
church, which could be described as the historical witness to the life of Jesus Christ as 
revealed in the scriptures; and the cosmic body of the universe, from which the material, 
sacramental elements are received as gifts from the creator. All of these bodies mediate 
spiritual reality—the grace and presence of God—to individual bodies in the sacraments.  
The sacraments are intrinsically and essentially corporeal, and “thus serve as a 
buffer which repels every temptation a Christian might have to ignore body, history, 
society in order to enter without any mediation into communication with God.”84 Thus, to 
“become a believer is to learn to consent to the corporality of the faith” and to give up the 
idea that we can have any experience of God that is direct, transparent, and unmediated.
85
 
As Chauvet argues, “there is no faith unless somewhere inscribed, inscribed in a body.”86  
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The relationship between bodily formation and the liturgy is reciprocal. 
According to Stanley Hauerwas, “to learn to worship . . . God truthfully requires that our 
bodies be formed by truthful habits of speech and gesture. To be so habituated is to 
acquire a character befitting lives capable of worshiping God.”87 Smith and Lathrop point 
out the danger of alternate liturgies orienting our desires toward other gods. Hauerwas 
sees the added danger of “narcissistic” Christian liturgies that shape us to seek gods that 
make for good evangelism and church growth—gods that appeal to people’s perceived 
needs for personal fulfillment or earthly success, for instance. In such churches, the 
eucharist is often neglected or absent. However, Hauerwas believes that the eucharist is 
the remedy for such dis-orientation: we can worship God as Christians only by 
“submitting our bodies to a training otherwise unavailable if we are to be capable of 
discerning those who use the name of Jesus to tempt us to worship foreign gods.”88 He 
notes that the question is not whether churches are choosing “contemporary” or 
“traditional” worship; the question is whether, in that worship, they are forming people to 
be part of a eucharistic community that embodies the story of salvation—a story of self-
emptying and self-giving—as revealed in Jesus Christ. 
Liturgy as a whole, and the sacraments of baptism and eucharist in particular, are 
by their very nature embodied events experienced in community. In some traditions, they 
are constitutive practices of the church. They are means of grace that are mediated 
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through human bodies by the reenactment of a story of God’s loving acts toward 
humanity—forgiveness, reconciliation, and an embodied self-giving in Jesus Christ. The 
ethics inherent in the sacraments—the dying and rising to new life signified by baptism 
and the celebration of a new kind of human community signified by the eucharist—are 
embodied experiences that are engraved in our whole selves by the presence of the One 
whose own embodied experiences we share.  
The body is not simply a vehicle for the infusion of grace through the liturgy and 
especially the sacraments. Nor is it simply the place in which ethics are inscribed by the 
liturgy. The body mediates the reality of God to ourselves and to others. In the words of 
David Brown, the body functions “sacramentally in initiating experience of the divine” 
and has the potential to “open human beings up to the possibility of experiencing God or 
the divine through them.”89  
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CHAPTER 7 
AN ECCLESIOLOGY OF DISABILITY 
 
The body language of the church . . . does not always agree with the church’s 
verbal proclamation, either because body language is not considered to be 
important, or because no consensus has been arrived at in the Gestalt [or total 
pattern of the lived life]. 
— Jürgen Moltmann1 
The church is the community of God’s marginal people. 
— Jung Young Lee2 
 
Why is it important to look at ecclesiology from the perspective of disability? As I 
have shown, the concept of embodiment is not only important but also essential to the 
church because bodies are the primary form and locus of mediation for reality and truth. 
Because the church is grounded in the incarnation of Jesus Christ—the truth, values, and 
justice of God’s kingdom revealed in a human body through concrete and particular 
bodily actions—embodiment is of primary significance for the church. The body of 
Christ that is the church is no mere spiritual reconfiguration, representation, or 
remembrance of Jesus Christ. It is a new kind of community that is shaped chiefly 
through its liturgical rituals into ways of relating to the world that reveal the kingdom that 
was proclaimed by Jesus Christ. Just as God’s saving grace was once made known in and 
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through a human body, it continues to be made known in and through the human bodies 
that, together, form the body of Christ in its many particular, concrete, and historical 
manifestations. 
Bodies are the site of Christian formation. Through the physical actions of the 
liturgy and the sacraments, individuals are shaped into the Christian narrative and 
apprenticed into a pattern of communal living that becomes a new humanity and a new 
social construct that is, above all, faithful to God’s ways as revealed in Jesus Christ. The 
church is a body politic that is dependent on human embodiment (along with the power 
of God) for its existence and for carrying out its mission. 
Likewise, the practices of the church—the liturgy and the sacraments as well as 
mission and ministry—are dependent not only on the gracious presence of God, but also 
on the actions of human bodies. Liturgical ritual creates the sacred in the material 
symbols of bread, wine, water, and oil—a sacred essence that is not a suprahistorical, 
disembodied reality, but is made visible through the embodied acts of the community. 
The anamnetic dimensions of the church’s liturgical practices depend on bodies to make 
real and present the story of the events that those practices signify. Otherwise, anamnesis 
is reduced to a mere reenactment or remembrance of something that is past, and no longer 
accessible in a physical sense. 
But why disability? The concept and experience of disability can inform and 
enrich the ways the church understands embodiment in relation to God and to the world. 
Because disability draws attention to the body in such a profound way, because it calls 
into question and offers a critique of traditional concepts of bodily function and ability, 
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and because its definition is rooted in the way impaired bodies interact with the societies 
in which they live, the concept of disability can also help the church discover faulty 
expressions of its relationship to human bodies, its nature as the body of Christ, and its 
relationship with the world. 
The challenge is to construct an ecclesiology that includes ideas of human 
embodiment, the church as the body of Christ, and the formative aspects of the liturgy, all 
held together in the context of disability. If it is true that all reality and truth are mediated 
through both the individual body and social bodies, then this project can be framed in the 
question of how a disabled body—or how the embodied experience of disability—can 
mediate the truth about God, humanity, and the world both to the church and to the 
world. Or, to borrow again the words of Stanley Hauerwas, “how does the description of 
‘the body of Christ’ [now perceived as a disabled body] help Christians better understand 
what we must be in order to face the challenges of being Church?”3 
Any contextual theological project needs to be grounded both in the lived 
experience of the community in which the project is situated, and in a set of principles 
that guide the construction of the new theological paradigm and/or practice. In his work 
on evangelism, Bryan Stone refers to the ecclesial habitus as an “alternative way of living 
and seeing” in which “belief is acquired as a way of life and over time.”4 In this concept 
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of habitus, “the body adopts a particular habitual way of relating to the environment” 
through the embodied experiences of everyday life.
5
 In other words, a habitus is the 
mostly unconscious system of dispositions—deeply embodied (as opposed to cognitive) 
ways of comprehending and relating to the world—that is acquired through social 
“experiences which shape the stance we adopt in the world.”6 A habitus is not static, but 
is always in flux as our social location and embodied experiences change, and functions 
to orient an individual in his or her own particular social location and according to his or 
her own embodied experience of and interaction with social bodies. 
It can be argued that the most familiar habitus in the church (here painted in very 
broad, general terms within the North American context) is one of able-bodied 
dominance and privilege because the society in which the church is situated is 
“dominated by non-disabled bodies” and favors “the corporeal status of non-impaired 
people.”7 Thus, the church’s context—its habitus—shapes its practices in particular ways 
that may or may not be faithful to the church’s true identity and purpose. These practices, 
in turn, shape individuals in the same way. 
It is important, then, for the church to develop its own determination of the value 
and function of human bodies. The challenge is to identify an ecclesial habitus that 
shapes bodies—both individual bodies and the communal body that is the church—to be 
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an embodiment of Jesus Christ’s life and ministry and a revelation of the kingdom of God 
as a new social order in which all people are freed from oppression to flourish as God 
intends. The “specific shape of our material embodiment [such as the experience of 
disability] plays a significant role” in the way the whole person “perceives and interprets 
the world.”8 An ecclesiology of disability—or a habitus that is grounded in the context of 
disability—can offer the church a way to evaluate and transform its identity and practices 
so it can be the church it is called to be. 
Such an ecclesiology of disability is based on the constructive elements of this 
project that have already been explored, including the theological and anthropological 
significance of embodiment, the identity and nature of the church as the body of Christ, 
and the formational value of the liturgy. Before beginning to develop this ecclesiology, I 
need to revisit the ways in which I approach these concepts and offer an interpretation of 
their relationship that guides this work. 
The body of Christ that is the church is a physical, literal social body—a 
community—that defines itself by its ritual enactment of the scriptural narrative and its 
communal practices as modeled by Jesus Christ. The embodied practices of this 
community both distinguish the church from the world and also form its members into a 
distinctive Christian identity that takes root not just in the cognitive aspects of belief, but 
in actions of the whole body. The Christian faith is inscribed in the bodies of individuals 
through the use of symbols and the ritual actions of liturgy that create a new social reality 
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for the church. This new reality—the kingdom of God as proclaimed by Jesus Christ—is 
not an end for the church, but is the means by which the church reveals the kingdom to 
the world. Finally, the body of Christ is not defined as an institution (although it has 
institutional aspects) or solely by a set of doctrines (although these are important to the 
church’s identity). Rather, it is defined by its manifestation as a concrete, historical 
revelation of God’s work in the midst of the faith community.  
 
Ecclesiological Principles in the Context of Disability 
With this concept of the relationship between church, body, and worship in mind, 
I can begin to name some of the principles that are fundamental to an ecclesiology that is 
rooted in the context of disability. The guiding question is, “What would it mean for the 
church to understand itself as a disabled body?” That is, how might the context and 
embodied experience of disability inform and transform the church’s identity, sense of 
mission, and relationship to the world? There are many implications in identifying the 
church as a disabled body, some of which I will now attempt to name.  
As noted in chapter 1, the ecclesiology offered here is designed to be a very 
general tool for individual churches or denominations to use to examine, in light of their 
own theology, practices, and institutional structure, what it means to be the body of 
Christ. Therefore, in what follows, I use “church” not to suggest that this project presents 
a universal, comprehensive ecclesiology. In fact, I alternate between “church” and 
“churches” to demonstrate how these principles of an ecclesiology of disability could be 
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used in particular, concrete, and contextual ways that are appropriate to each part of the 
body of Christ that is the universal church. 
In addition, I utilize the term “society” in the following principles to represent 
broadly those social bodies that are distinct from the church. I use “society” in the same 
way that Hauerwas uses the term “world,” which for him signifies those aspects of 
broader human society that do not bear witness to the kingdom of God (which is the task 
of the church).
9
 Because the intention is to offer a general ecclesiology, the concept of 
“society”—these other social bodies—is open to interpretation according to specific 
cultural, doctrinal, or ecclesial settings. For instance, “society” could represent a political 
philosophy, popular culture, or the predominant ethos of a particular social community, 
any of which can be recipients of the prophetic word that is constituted by the embodied 
practices of the church. 
The first principle of an ecclesiology of disability is the refusal to let society 
define the identity or purpose of the body of Christ. Some of the main difficulties 
faced by people with disabilities are caused by the ways they are judged and labeled by 
those who are not disabled (such as those in the medical or therapeutic fields), and by the 
ways they are defined by a set of norms that are based on what Amos Yong calls an 
“ableist worldview.”10 Disability is thus identified as a particular kind of bodily 
impairment that differs in some way from “normal” bodily functioning as defined by that 
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worldview. These norms are grounded in both what society values—physical ability, 
attractiveness, independence—and in what society finds undesirable—loss of function, 
reliance on medical devices or on other people, inability to be productive. Because people 
with disabilities violate these norms, society often views their experiences as insignificant 
and their bodies as irrelevant. In his definition of disability, Thomas Reynolds critiques 
society’s ideals of “normal” both in terms of bodily function and social interaction, and 
notes that “society’s conception of normalcy informs and governs exchanges between 
persons, producing a system of conventions resistant to or incapable of accommodating 
the non-normal.”11 
At times, the church allows itself to be defined according to some set of societal 
norms, and allows its ecclesial habitus to be shaped by the values of society. For instance, 
the so-called “Prosperity Gospel,” in which churches teach that financial blessings are a 
sign of God’s favor, has its roots in the ethos of the “American Dream,” which promises 
that the opportunity for success and prosperity is available to anyone, regardless of social 
class or economic status. Societal norms also affect the church in the way that some 
churches structure their worship services as spectator events that supposedly appeal to 
people who enjoy cultural events such as concerts or movies. For many people, church 
has become something you go to, a performance, rather than something you do, such as 
embodying the message of the gospel. The phenomenon of “church shopping” among 
potential worshipers can lead churches to create a worship event that appeals to what the 
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church leaders believe these consumers want or desire from church. Thus, the needs and 
desires of a consumerist society sometime become the defining principles for how 
churches understand, shape, and promote their identity and purpose. 
An ecclesiology of disability challenges the church to reject the idea that the 
norms of society should define the church, especially when those norms are contrary to 
the lived experience of the church as the body of Christ. In the United States, strongly 
held cultural values such as materialism, consumerism, and patriotism are antithetical to 
the alternative social body that is the church, which is marked by Jesus’ radical 
generosity, rejection of material wealth, and loyalty to God alone.  
Disability advocates emphasize the need for people with disabilities to define 
themselves according to their own experiences and their own narratives rather than 
according to a set of objective standards for what is acceptable or appropriate or 
desirable. Similarly, the church would benefit from intentionally defining itself according 
to its own experience as the body of Christ and according to the norms of its own 
narrative—the gospel of Jesus Christ—especially when the scriptural standards are 
contrary to those standards that are valued by the competing narratives of society. 
An important corollary to this principle is Hauerwas’ argument that the church 
needs to help individuals learn the true value of embodiment in a way that differs from 
the societal norms of embodiment. A quote from chapter five bears repeating here: The 
church needs to offer “community disciplines through which the story of our baptism is 
embodied in all that we do and are. We require practices through which we learn that we 
do not know who we are, or what our bodies can and cannot do, until we are told what 
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and who we are by a more determinative ‘body.’”12 Thus, the church can challenge and 
change the tendency for both human bodies and the ecclesial body to be defined by those 
powerful social bodies outside the church. 
The next principle follows from this notion of cultural ideals: if something in the 
church’s teachings or practices does not meet society’s expectations or measure up 
to the values of society, it does not mean that something needs to be changed or 
fixed. According to the objective standards of what constitutes a normal and properly 
functioning body, the medical or functional-limitation model of disability locates the 
problem of disability in the body that does not function the way it should. Disability then 
becomes a matter of abnormal function—a problem that needs to be fixed through 
surgery, therapy, or assistive devices. The focus is on what is broken in the body of the 
individual and how to fix it.  
But not every person with a disability wants to be “fixed,” at least according to 
the way society would expect or approve. Neither is every kind of disability “fixable.” In 
addition, “fixing” people with disabilities—by providing wheelchairs or hearing aids or 
guide dogs, for instance—does not solve the problems of inaccessibility to public spaces 
and barriers to being active members of society. Without a corresponding transformation 
of society’s structures, services, and attitudes, no amount of “fixing” a dysfunctional 
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body will achieve the level of inclusion and accessibility that is the true problem of 
disability.
13
 
In recent years, churches have been led to believe that there is something broken 
about their ministry, worship, discipleship practices, or concept of mission that must be 
fixed, and there is no shortage of church “self-help” books designed to correct these 
problems. Of course, some churches have become broken in some ways, such as by their 
attempts to cling to glory days of the past when attendance was high and finances were 
strong, or in their staunch rejection of trying something new because “we’ve always done 
it this way,” or by impulsively trying new things simply for novelty’s sake, or in their 
tendency to become focused on maintaining the institution at the expense of making 
disciples. These attitudes, which can hinder a church’s mission, can and should be 
addressed and changed when possible.  
But sometimes society decides that the body of Christ is dysfunctional and that 
the church is somehow broken. Both Yoder and Hauerwas offer visions for how the body 
of Christ should function: as an alternative culture with distinctive bodily practices that 
forms people into a new, radical way of living that is marked by the gospel of Jesus 
Christ and includes servanthood, forgiveness, love of enemies, fellowship, and holy and 
sacrificial living. However, these “bodily practices” may well seem dysfunctional to a 
world steeped in the ideals of individuality, competition, and a human sense of justice 
that involves punishment and retribution.  
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The bodily acts of the liturgy and the sacraments may also seem dysfunctional or 
even useless to those outside the church.
14
 As Romano Guardini reminds us, participation 
in the liturgy requires individuals to “surrender” their independence and “renounce” their 
own ways in order to enter into the fellowship of the social gathering that is the liturgy.
15
 
Because the liturgy is not a “spectator” event, but is rather a formative, constructive 
participation in the new reality that is the body of Christ, it requires sacrifice—the 
sacrifice (at least to a point) of ego and the desire for personal spiritual fulfillment—and 
the willingness to be transformed from an independent being into a member of the body 
of Christ who is dependent both on God and other members of the body. 
Contemporary society still clings to the Reformation and Enlightenment 
emphases on the spoken word and the value of cognitive formation, which is a faulty 
anthropology that denies the necessity of bodily participation in the ritual actions of the 
church.
16
 The word—or, in our increasingly visual culture, the image—are the preferred 
means for learning and for receiving information. In such an atmosphere, the formative 
bodily practices of the church may seem antiquated or inefficient, and thus, may be 
another example of the church’s “brokenness.” 
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In the case of disability, society wants to “fix” broken, dysfunctional bodies to 
make them more acceptable, more “normal,” and easier to manage. The same is often 
true with the way society views the church. Sometimes society wants the church to “fix” 
what seems broken to make it easier for people to deal with the church’s worship or 
ministries. For instance, traditional forms of worship that rely on historic liturgical forms 
may seem irrelevant to the modern world. Likewise, society see brokenness in the 
church’s teaching of biblical principles such as sacrificial giving, loving enemies, and 
living in humility, which go against the highly valued principles of self-expression and 
personal success. The challenge for the church is to discern which aspects of their 
ministry, worship, and mission, if any, are truly broken because of some internal 
problem, such as conflict within the congregation or weak leadership, and which aspects 
only seem broken because society says they are broken.  
What follows from this is the concept that, as a disabled body, the church needs 
to recognize and accept its own “dysfunction” in its relationship with the world. As 
noted in chapter two, it is important to identify the limitations inherent in the bodily 
experience of disability. There is a fine line between the medical and social models of 
disability, and between locating the experience of disability in bodily impairment or in 
social systems that fail to accommodate impairment. Simply addressing those limitations 
that are a result of society’s failure to become accessible to people with disabilities denies 
the daily lived reality of disability. Even with the best accommodations, the bodily 
impairment of physical disability can still manifest itself as a limiting experience. For 
instance, wheelchairs do not restore full mobility and hearing aids do not restore normal 
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hearing function; there are still limits and restrictions on ability. Denial of these 
limitations—and of the presence of bodily impairment and difference—can lead to 
psychological, social, and even physical problems if persons with disabilities either reject 
the ways they are disabled (which is, in a way, rejecting a fundamental part of themselves 
as embodied creatures) or if they try to extend themselves beyond what is feasible or 
prudent.  
When society assesses the church according to its own standards and values, it 
regards the church as dysfunctional in that the church’s embodied practices stand in stark 
contrast to what society considers “normal.” However, it is in this place of difference that 
the body of Christ is called to live and work. As Bryan Stone notes, “the church’s 
difference from the world, far from diminishing its ability to offer a credible witness to 
the world, is a necessary condition of that witness and is intrinsic to the church’s 
invitation to the world to accept that witness as truth.”17 Moreover, the church’s witness 
is that this difference from the world—which it embodies in its communal life—is both 
possible and desirable.  
This place of difference can be described as a social location of minority status or 
marginality, both of which are inherent to the experience of disability. That is, the 
normative condition of the body of Christ is to exist on the margins as an actual, social 
minority. This is not to say that marginality or minority status is the “natural” or 
preferable experience of people with disabilities, but it is the habitus that people with 
disabilities inhabit—a reality that the church must acknowledge. This marginal status 
                                                 
17
 Stone, Evangelism After Christendom, 176. 
197 
challenges any concepts of triumphalism in the church. Both Schillebeeckx and Yoder 
contend that it is important for the church to recognize its “minority posture” and 
weakness in the eyes of the world so the church can be freed from any obsession over the 
need to occupy a central place in society and to fulfill society’s expectations of a social 
body that occupies such a place. For instance, Hauerwas affirms that the church “cannot 
merely identify with the ‘cause’ of the poor, [it] must become poor and powerless.”18 But 
throughout its history, the church has often desired to be at the center, a social location 
that is marked by power, authority, status, wealth, exclusivity and the desire to dominate 
or control others through the use of a “correct belief system.”19 In other words, the church 
has often chosen to be situated in the very place from which the oppression and 
marginalization of people with disabilities originates. Thus, as a disabled body, the 
church must realize that in occupying a centralist position, it is, in a way, suppressing its 
own ability to be the body of Christ that it is called to be, because disability is always a 
marginal and marginalizing experience. In fact, advocacy for the inclusion of people with 
disabilities must be accomplished from the margins, for once it moves to the center, it 
becomes a part of those very systems that advocacy would confront and challenge. Any 
concept of the church being at the center is therefore a fallacy and a denial of the reality 
of its embodiedness as a community that is called to live in the margins of society. 
For much of its history, the church has been used to being in a central position. 
With Constantine’s legitimization of the church in the fourth century, the church was 
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invited to share in the secular government’s values of status, wealth, and power. As long 
as the church has been complicit with the power of the state, it has been unable to 
function fully as the body of Christ and to work toward freeing people from the abuse of 
that power. In addition, the evaluative metrics of the state became the standards for the 
church, which measured its effectiveness in terms of financial success, large numbers of 
members, and occupying a place of respect in society.  
In this “post Christendom” era, the church has been stripped of its mutually 
beneficial association with the government and is facing the challenges of an increasingly 
multi-cultural, secular, and pluralistic society. We have seen the “emancipation” of the 
church, which is “the loss of the church’s grip or influence on society and culture.”20 
Thus, the church is wrestling with the loss of the social status and power it once enjoyed. 
Hostile debates and accusations being thrown about in the “war on Christianity” in the 
United States demonstrate the fear of those who perceive the church’s current social 
location as a significant loss. In relation to physical disability, “loss” (of bodily function, 
of productivity, of a sense of meaning and purpose) is defined according to how it relates 
to some essence or ability that is valued. Yong describes the rhetoric used to depict 
disability: “dis-abled, in-capacitated, in-capable, ab-normal, and so on.”21 As a disabled 
body, the church can realize that if it has lost those things that are held in value by 
society, then it is doing exactly what it is called to do: to be an alternative social body in 
which the values of the gospel shape communal life. 
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Another principle of our ecclesiology of disability requires the church to 
reject binary categories that label, oppress, and stigmatize. Physical disability is 
defined frequently according to the binary construction of disability/able-bodied: one is 
either disabled or able-bodied, either normal or abnormal, either functional or 
dysfunctional. As noted in chapter two, binary constructs such as these contain a 
dominant term—something that is valued by the dominant bodies in society—and a less 
significant term, which is a negation of the dominant term. That is, the less significant 
term only has value insofar as it emphasizes the dominant term, or that which is valued. 
When people with a disability are defined according to a binary in which the dominant 
term is valued by society, they will be devalued by their association with the weaker 
term, and thus marginalized and stigmatized. People with disabilities, then, only serve to 
highlight the able-bodiedness that is preferable. 
Within the experience of disability, the definition of physical ability and 
functionality is much more fluid and subjective than an objective binary would suggest. 
Among individuals with disabilities, there is a great variety of functionality and, even 
within one particular disability, there is a wide range of ability. Thus, there are important 
nuances in the definition of disability (important in that they have great bearing on an 
individual’s embodied experience) that are hidden by the binary construct. 
The church sometimes falls into this trap of using binary constructs to teach that 
one is either Christian or not, either saved or not, either worthy or not, in order to 
determine who is part of the body of Christ and who is not. However, because Christian 
formation is a bodily, and not just a cognitive, event, it is also a process (some would say 
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a life-long process). Worship and participation in the sacraments are the ongoing 
orientation of the individual to God, to the community, and to the world. According to 
Saliers, the church embodies a “pattern of God’s self-giving in Jesus Christ” in the liturgy 
and sacraments—a pattern that requires constant re-entry into and re-membering of the 
narrative of God’s acts in Jesus Christ.22 Chauvet describes the liturgy and the sacraments 
as working within a symbolic network of culture, tradition, and nature, which is always in 
flux and is always being manifested in new ways. Thus, there is no point in time when a 
person can be identified as “Christian” or “saved,” and binary constructs, which make no 
allowances for nuanced definitions, are antithetical to the idea of Christian formation in 
the church through ongoing embodied practices. 
The church also needs to refrain from using binary constructs to define itself or its 
mission. For example, if the church identifies its mission as being a herald of the 
kingdom of God, which is the dominant or valued ideal, then anything that is not 
specifically oriented to proclaiming the kingdom is devalued. But God is present and 
active even in those situations, persons, and experiences that lie outside the realm of 
“proper” or “acceptable” Christian practice. In addition, while the church is called to be 
distinct from the world, it must take care not to make such a sharp distinction between 
itself and the world that the world as a whole is rendered less valuable than the church. 
An ecclesiology of disability challenges the church to recognize that the 
“problem” of the church, as identified by society, is not always located in the church 
itself but is sometimes is located in the relationships between the church and other 
                                                 
22
 Don Saliers, Worship as Theology (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994), 174. 
201 
social bodies. As discovered in chapter two, the social or minority group model of 
disability defines disability not by some abnormality of bodily function, but by the 
unwillingness of society to accommodate, accept, and respect people with disabilities. 
The problem is not situated in the body of the person with a disability. Rather, it is 
situated in the social bodies (communities, organizations, etc.) that exclude people with 
disabilities. For Deborah Creamer, this makes disability an issue of justice.
23
 That is, the 
injustice of societal structures and attitudes, which are themselves a product of the ableist 
worldview, continue to exclude people with disabilities from participating in the life of 
the society. The solution, according to this model, is to address the unjust systems and 
work for systemic social change.  
For the church to be a disabled body is, first, to empathize with people with 
disabilities who are excluded because of unjust social systems, and then, to understand 
how these systems keep the church itself from working for necessary systemic changes. 
As is the case with physical disability, the malfunction in the relationship between church 
and society is located in the ways that society devalues or even stigmatizes the church in 
its life and work because the norms and values of the body of Christ are not easily 
accommodated into the norms and values of society. The challenge for the church is to 
identify and confront any barriers in society that hinder the work of justice and God’s 
kingdom. However, although the point in addressing these unjust systems from the 
perspective of disability is to encourage society to accommodate and respect disabled 
                                                 
23
 Deborah Beth Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 25. 
202 
bodies, that is not the point for the church. Rather, the church’s purpose is to identify and 
work to dismantle any system that is contrary to the justice of God as embodied in the 
church.  
Sometimes the relationship between church and society is harmful not as a result 
of exclusion, but of an overly close association. As seen in the discussion of John 
Howard Yoder’s ecclesiological work in chapter 4, the church is sometimes so strongly 
identified with society—and especially with the power structures in society—that it is 
reduced to the role of a “chaplain” that is expected to sanctify those power structures, 
even when those structures are unjust and contrary to the church’s mission.24 Thus, we 
see American politicians who, citing their association with the church, call for policies 
that are contrary to the gospel of justice for all people, such as harsh penalties for 
immigrants (even children) or for cutting food assistance programs to the most 
vulnerable. This “social” church of these politicians—which is sometimes the only 
“church” that some people see—sanctifies discriminatory and unjust policies that help 
protect the status quo of those in power. As a disabled body, the church must stand in 
solidarity with those on the margins and confront any abuses of power that result from 
disordered church-society relations and that are carried out in the church’s name. 
The next principle encourages the church, as a disabled body, to recognize its 
need for interdependence with society, rather than complete isolation from society. 
Many people with disabilities rely on some kind of assistance from other people, even 
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when they use assistive devices and even if the number of physical barriers in their daily 
lives is minimal. Personal independence—at least the way independence is defined and 
valued by society—is simply not attainable for many people with disabilities. Physical 
disability demands a realization of the limitations that are imposed by bodily function 
that is impaired in some way. It is in these limitations that we—both people with 
disabilities and people who are able-bodied—discover the need for interdependence. 
A properly-ordered and well-functioning relationship between the church and 
other social bodies requires that the body of Christ maintain boundaries that are well-
defined enough to maintain Christian identity, and yet permeable enough to allow mutual 
interaction between the church and society. As Yoder argues, the church must be distinct 
enough from the world so that the new social reality of the church is plainly visible. But 
at the same time, as Schillebeeckx points out, the church must recognize its limitations as 
a particular, historical, and regional social body that cannot transcend the history that 
includes the world as a whole. The limitations of the church imply that it must recognize 
its need for interdependence with the world, because the world is itself an ongoing 
revelation of God. Chauvet posits that the fact that the church has these limitations 
confirms that the reign of God exceeds the boundaries of the church and its practices. The 
church as the body of Christ mediates the presence and truth of God only insofar as it is 
open to the presence and action of God in the world. Because the world is the 
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“sacrament” of God’s presence, says Schmemann, the church should “live in the world 
seeing everything in it as a revelation of God.”25  
That the church must have an interdependent relationship with the world is 
evident in Chauvet’s concept of the “symbolic order,” which mediates reality not only 
through individual bodies (of the human person or of the church), but also through the 
myriad of social, political, and institutional bodies in which the individual (or church) is 
situated. When social structures and institutions become independent from other social 
bodies, they “give the impression of being unchangeable natural regularities.”26 But 
because the church at any given place and time is dependent on the historical, contextual, 
and cultural milieu of human embodiment, it must be open to change and cannot allow 
itself to become an independent, static reality that exists outside the always changing 
experiences of humanity. 
Don Saliers argues that authentic worship brings human pathos into contact with 
the divine ethos. In order for the church to offer the fullness of the human condition to 
God in worship, the church must first be able to recognize and understand human pathos 
as it exists in the world. Thus, the church must be able to receive from the world even as 
it is able to give to the world. As Schmemann claims, the church is not “being in itself,” 
but “the new relation of God, man and the world.”27  
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An additional principle affirms that disability can help the church understand 
its nature is by challenging the church to reject any need for perfection. Nancy 
Eiesland observes that acceptance of disabled bodies carries with it an acceptance of 
imperfection as a form of wholeness, goodness, and beauty: “Instead of flagellating 
ourselves or aspiring to well-behaved ‘perfect’ bodies, we savor the jumbled pleasure-
pain that is our bodies.”28 With her image of the disabled God, Eiesland offers a new 
model of wholeness in Jesus Christ, who “reconceives perfection as unself-pitying, 
painstaking survival.”29 In other words, for people with disabilities, imperfection is 
simply an acceptable reality in which life is lived. 
For the church, the ideal of perfection is sometimes what Schillebeeckx calls a 
“subtle vice” that is manifest in the form of “unassailable laws,” universalized dogma, or 
attempts to redeem humanity from the fall from the perfection of Eden—a state of 
perfection that the church sometimes teaches was/is God’s intention for humanity.30 This 
striving to experience (or recover) a state of perfection for the church or for individuals 
“injures already vulnerable fellow men and women” by excluding those for whom such 
perfection is impossible, or whose lived experience falls far outside what constitutes 
perfection.
31
 Schillebeeckx confronts this false image of perfection by noting that in Jesus 
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Christ, there is a “redefinition of what it is to be human.”32 This is precisely the calling of 
the church: to redefine human relationships, to demonstrate new ways of being in the 
world, and to reveal God’s unconditional love and acceptance of humanity, which does 
not require that we return to some primordial state of perfection. The church can accept 
the imperfection of individual bodies and its own communal body as a new state of 
wholeness that is a necessary and survivable reality in which the church can live and 
work as the body of Christ in the world.  
In the Methodist tradition, there is an emphasis on the idea of “Christian 
perfection.” John Wesley taught that such perfection was attained when the “humble, 
gentle, patient love of God and our neighbors” was not only present in a person’s life, but 
ruled that person’s every thought and action.33 While the true notion of perfection in 
Christ lies in the disposition of one’s heart toward God and other people, and is thus 
independent of the human body’s ability to function, the ideal of perfection that invades 
the contemporary church is influenced by society’s view of perfection that includes 
“normal” and appropriate bodily function. 
Although Wesley does not specifically include physical disability in his 
description of how Christians are not perfect, he does assert that no one can be made so 
perfect in this life to be free of what he calls “infirmities,” which include “slowness of 
understanding, confusedness of apprehension, slowness of speech, ungracefulness of 
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pronunciation” and “a thousand nameless defects either in conversation or behavior.”34 
Any of these “infirmities” could result from a physical disability. Therefore, according to 
Wesley’s view, Christian perfection does not include the healing or “fixing” of such 
dysfunction.
35
 In other words, the only perfection to which the church should strive is that 
of being perfect in love, which is a kind of perfection that does not depend on the 
functionality of individual bodies and that is accessible to all people through the grace of 
God. 
An ecclesiology of disability requires the church to claim a holistic 
theological anthropology in which it rejects any dichotomy of body and soul. This 
kind of duality, particularly when the soul is deemed more significant than the body, 
devalues people’s real-life embodied experiences, especially those experiences that 
deviate from the “normal” or ideal image of embodiment. In the case of disability, this 
binary anthropology often leads to a diminishing of the experience of disability as a 
“cross to bear” or as “virtuous suffering” from which the individual with a disability will 
be released someday. Critiques of this dualism contend that the body is vital to the 
construction of human knowledge and experience not because it is a container for the 
mind or soul, but because persons come to know reality and truth primarily through 
bodies and only secondarily through cognitive reflection on bodily experience.  
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A holistic, non-dualistic anthropology from the perspective of disability would 
affect the church in several ways. First, it would encourage the church to take seriously 
concepts of the mediation of the body and the formative aspects of the liturgy. But more 
than that, it would force the church to recognize the variety of ways that God’s presence 
and grace are revealed in and through bodies. Different kinds of disabilities mediate the 
same reality but through different means. A person with vision loss will depend more on 
auditory and tactile information; someone with hearing loss will be more visually 
oriented; and a person in a wheelchair will receive information most often from a position 
of non-access or restricted access. Each individual’s experience of reality will be shaped 
according to his or her bodily abilities and functions, but their experiences are no more or 
less “worthy” than those of able-bodied persons. In fact, disability can actually enhance a 
person’s perception of the world in some ways. For instance, people with hearing loss 
often rely on visual cues, which can make them much more aware of things like signs and 
symbols than other people. What they lack in auditory information they can make up for 
(at least in good part) in visual information. As a disabled body, the church must resist 
the temptation to absolutize or universalize one particular form of mediation. Different 
forms of worship, different theological understandings of the sacraments, and different 
organizational structures can all lead to valid experiences of God’s presence. In addition, 
as noted above, the church can often become aware of God’s presence and purposes not 
in itself, but in the world. 
Finally, an ecclesiology of disability demands liturgical practices that value 
bodies and their different forms of action and function, and that also support the 
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preceding principles. People with disabilities are perhaps more aware of their bodies 
than those who are able-bodied. They often make daily choices by first referring to their 
body: Will this choice be possible with my bodily impairment? Will it be difficult? Or is 
it outright impossible? Able-bodied persons “don’t have to work to ignore the working of 
[their] bodies.”36 However, people with disabilities cannot ignore the working of their 
bodies—their identities are, to a point, rooted in the non-working parts of their bodies.  
As the quote from Jürgen Moltmann that opens this chapter notes, if the church 
does not value its body language—that is, what it does with its communal body—then 
what the church proclaims verbally may not coincide with what the church does bodily. 
Yet the integrity between word and action, which is a chief mark of Christ’s faithfulness 
to God, is precisely the primary calling of the church as the body of Christ. Attention to 
the importance of the body is critical to the church’s ability to be (embody) the message 
of the gospel rather than simply proclaim that message. Therefore, the church’s ritual 
practices must reflect the significance of bodies to the church’s identity and mission.  
The eucharist is the predominant embodied act of the church, and the communion 
table is the primary ritual location where the value of bodies can be recognized and 
revealed. Bryan Stone contends that “as the church gathers around a common table . . . a 
new space is created where bodies once separated and placed in opposition to one another 
(Jew and Gentile, male and female, slave and free) are now united. This it does by 
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enacting a participation in one another.”37 Stone further argues that if such communal 
bodily practices become secondary in the church to an emphasis on a personal, inward 
relationship with God, then the “visible social body” of the church becomes irrelevant.38 
The eucharist is a defense against this devaluing of bodies because, as William T. 
Cavanaugh argues, the church’s ritual practice of the eucharist is what makes the church 
“publicly visible as the body of Christ in the present time, not secreted away in the souls 
of believers.”39 
The most obvious consequence of giving proper attention and respect to the body 
would be increased focus on the accessibility of the church’s ritual practices for all 
bodies, regardless of ability or functionality. The eucharist is the celebration and 
anamnetic reenactment of Christ’s death and resurrection, in which the imperfection of 
human existence—including the imperfection of bodies that are limited by impairment—
is not overcome, but is gathered up in Christ’s post-resurrection body, which still bore the 
scars of physical impairment. Thus, in the eucharist, the church celebrates God’s 
acceptance and inclusion of all bodies—able-bodied and disabled. If it is to fulfill its 
function to make the church what it is called to be, the eucharist must be accessible and 
open to all people. If the church can recognize the ways that people with bodily 
impairment are excluded from various social and communal practices, it can better 
understand and prepare for the ways its own “dysfunctional” body practices (which differ 
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greatly from those that are sanctioned by society) will, by necessity, be excluded from 
certain social practices and experiences. 
What would liturgy look like for the disabled body of Christ? Although a full 
scheme is beyond the scope of this project, I offer a few suggestions. To develop liturgy 
and liturgical practices that are rooted in the context of disability, principles would need 
to be identified that respect the challenges that disability poses for those with bodily 
impairment. For example, in her development of intentionally feminist liturgy, Mary 
Collins observes five principles that are fundamental to the concepts of feminist theology: 
First, feminist liturgies ritualize relationships that emancipate and empower 
women. Second, feminist liturgy is the production of a community of worshipers, 
not of special experts or authorities. Third, feminist liturgies critique patriarchal 
liturgies. Fourth, feminist liturgists have begun to develop a distinctive repertoire 
of ritual symbols and strategies. Fifth, feminist liturgists produce liturgical events, 
not liturgical texts.
40
 
Similar principles could guide the shape of a liturgy of disability. These would include 
focusing on ways to empower people with physical disabilities; recognizing and 
appreciating the contribution of all human bodies to the body of Christ; critiquing any 
“alternative liturgies” that devalue bodies on the basis of society’s definition of a worthy 
or acceptable body; and challenging any practices in the church that equate disability 
with sinfulness or unworthiness. 
One important way a liturgy of disability can function for the body of Christ is by 
making the embodied practices of the liturgy, and especially the eucharist, full-body 
experiences. That is, the celebration of the eucharist should be an act of the whole body 
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of Christ that includes the whole bodies of those gathered. The four-fold action described 
by Dix—taking, blessing, breaking, giving—can be an action of the entire community.41 
In many Christian traditions, only those authorized to preside can enact certain parts of 
the eucharistic liturgy. But whenever possible and appropriate, the gathered community 
as a whole should find ways to perform the bodily acts of the eucharist that, in 
themselves, form people into the gracious life of the Christ who is present among them. 
Pastors and priests can discern how to help the church as a whole to take, bless, break, 
and give to one another so they can, as the body of Christ, do the same for the world. 
 
Just as there is no universally applicable definition of disability, and just as there 
is no one experience of disability, so too there is no one universally applicable definition 
of what it means to be the body of Christ in a particular place and time. The nature of 
embodiment means that the church will always be contextual. I hope that these general 
principles for ecclesiology will be able to transcend differences of theology, doctrine, and 
practice.  
So what are the next steps? First, this project can be further contextualized 
according to the needs, social location, and missional situation of local churches. Second, 
this ecclesiology can be broadened to include the contexts of mental, cognitive, and 
emotional disabilities. Third, liturgists can start to consider how new forms of liturgy—
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prayers, hymns, litanies, and most importantly, embodied actions—can help support the 
habitus of the disabled body of Christ. Finally, this general, practical ecclesiology can be 
brought into conversation with more theoretical and organizational models of 
ecclesiology to see how the concept and experience of disability might help shape church 
structure and polity. 
Gordon Lathrop observes that “going to church can be going to a celebration of 
our own unchallenged identities and worldviews.”42 If the body mediates truth, then it 
follows that how a particular body is defined and how that definition shapes that body’s 
experience of itself and the world will affect how that body both mediates and perceives 
truth. It is hoped that this ecclesiology of disability will help dis-able the church’s 
tendency to seek central positions of power and status; to be complicit in an “ableist” 
worldview; to privilege the human soul over the human body; to seek or insist on 
perfection; to depend on simplistic, binary categories of definition and meaning; and to 
let itself be defined by or conformed to the norms of society.  
The best that can be hoped is that all churches can dis-able those beliefs and 
practices that keep them both from being the message of the kingdom of God—a 
kingdom in which all people experience full participation in the human community—and 
from embodying the new social reality of the gospel that challenges the values of other 
social bodies in the world. This project calls churches—each one a unique community 
that embodies the narrative of God’s acts in Jesus Christ—to recognize how the study and 
theology of disability and embodiment can help them discover their true nature as the 
                                                 
42
 Gordon Lathrop, Holy Ground: A Liturgical Cosmology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 179. 
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body of Christ, provide the means for Christian formation through embodied practices, 
maintain a healthy, faithful, and interdependent relationship with the world, and carry out 
their mission in their particular context as marginal, alternative communities that 
understand the significance and value of all experiences of embodiment.
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